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ABSTRACT 
Current normative analyses and recommendations in -
medical ethics do not sufficiently analyze the social 
context of concrete ethical ..problems. This results in 
-impractical or ineffective policy recommendations or case 
responses which reinforce the social context which created 
. r 
the ethical problem. A social analysis is possible which 
displays how the social context directs the communication 
and action of physicians and patients, and in turn 
reinforces and further establishes these influential social 
factors. Such a social analysis provides a means of 
integrating short-term case-responses with long-term 
institutional policy and structural change. The latter, on 
this analysis, is the more ethically "complete", and 
unintegrated short-term responses threaten to undermine 
these efforts. 
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Introduction 
A contextually-bound, social analysis of medical 
interactions clarifies the philosophical-ethical issues that 
arise therein. The recommendations which are based on this 
analysis are of two complementary forms: 1) short-term 
responses which are normatively inadequate, and 2) long-term 
efforts to alter the social circumstances which constitute 
the ethical problems. Contemporary discussions in medical 
ethics typically assume some sort of social "picture." These 
assumptions direct the recommendation resulting from the 
analysis. Policy recommendations frequently do not 
accomplish their objectives when implemented. Case analyses 
fail to respond to the social circumstances which resulted 
in an ethically problematic case. The case analysis 
frequently reinforces these social circumstances because it 
needs to assume their stability in constructing a response. 
Recognition that these disparities are due to the focus and 
implied social "analysis" of the different approaches draws 
attention to the necessity of social analysis in applied 
medical ethics. The confusion which intentional models of 
ethical analysis generate when applied to policy issues 
further suggests the desirability of the move from a 
psychological to a sociological understanding of human 
behaviour. Drawing on work in my Master's Thesis (Burgess, 
1 
1983), I have illustrated the problem with the issue of 
informed consent (Chapter I). 
I recommend an ethnomethodological approach to 
understanding physician-patient encounters. Following the 
work of Sue Fisher (1979; 1982, 1983, 1986), I suggest that 
a complete analysis must recognize and account for the 
effects of institutional· and cultural factors on these 
encounters. As most poigriantly a�gued by Jeff Coulter 
(1979), the methodological assumptions of such a social 
analysis is a reasonable response to some current problems 
in the philosophy of mind (Chapter II). 
Once again drawing from research conducted with 
Sue Fisher (cf., Fisher, 1983, 1986; Fisher and Groce, 
forthcoming; Burgess, 1983, 1986), I have presented three 
paradigmatic cases for analysis (Chapter III). The social 
analysis of these cases illustrates how the context of 
physician-patient interactions directs the communication and 
decisions that are likely to be produced therein. 
Clarification and criticism of the notion of 
informed consent is aided by the social analysis. The 
abstract goals of •patient's best interest• �r •freedom from 
physician's influence" are not practical or meaningful. The 
layered social analysis displays that some of the ethical 
concerns which informed consent has been meant to respond to 
cannot be dealt with in this manner. Careful social 
analysis clarifies the limitations of the doctrine, and 
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suggests more effective recommendations. The implication of 
the overall social-normative analysis is that ethical 
recommendations can arid must be constructed as complementary 
efforts designed both to help concrete individuals and to 
change the practice of medicine as well as patient and 
physician "attitudes. " The structural level of analysis has 
shown that the�e latter, more comprehensive goals are 
difficult to achieve because they challenge broader societal 
p�actices and political agendas (Chapter V). The ·integration 
of ethical analyses and recommendations with a social 
analysis enhances the clarity of the philosophical 
discussion as well as the defensibility and effectiveness of 
the recommendations. 
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Chapter I 
Importance of Empirical and Contextual Analysis 
The thesis of this chapter is that different types 
of medical ethical analyses (i.e., case-, issue-, 
policy-oriented) present disparate responses to similar 
problems due to their different foci vis-a-vis the social 
context. Since each type of analysis has much to recommend 
it, we might reasonably expect that there might be some way 
to unite these different analyses. In particular, I think 
that the psychological-intentional model of analysis of 
ethical actions cannot unify these normative analyses, nor 
is it the best method of understanding 
institutionally-situated action. A contextual-social 
approach, discussed in Chapter II, more adequately fulfills 
these purposes and results in more applicable and effective 
recommendations. 
Current discussions in medical ethics can be 
distinguished in different manners. One distinguishing 
characteristic is the particular approach. There are 
case-illustrated philosophical discussions, issue-oriented 
discussions, case-by-case analyses, issue-oriented case 
discussions and policy discussions. A second means of 
distinguishing the different approaches is to consider the 
type of intervention or social change that are recommended. 
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While some suggest that individual physicians or patients 
act differently, others take a wider focus, and recommend 
that the profession or institution should form policy to 
change the problematic behavior, or that laws should be 
enacted to enforce the ethically required change. More 
extreme are views suggesting that the problems in health 
care are reflections of those of society in general and so 
effective responses will take the form of social change on 
the largest scale, social revolution (i. e. , Navarro, 1973, 
and Waitzkin, 1983, both suggest that ethical and social 
problems in the delivery of medical care must be responded 
to with a change in the capitalist economy) . These two 
different ways of characterizing medical ethics discussions 
cut up the literature along similar lines; case-studies 
generally suggest individual changes in behavior while 
issue-oriented discussions are more likely to produce 
policy. 
It is my contention that the reason the 
discussions happen to divide in such a manner is due to 
different forms or "scopes" of social analysis that are 
either implicit or explicit in the approaches. Starting 
with the most "philosophical, " there are discussions which 
can be characterized as case-illustrated philosophical 
analyses. These are primarily concerned with utilizing the 
controversial ethical issues that arise in biomedical 
pra�tices to clarify standard philosophical discussions. 
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The social factors relevant to the discussions are those 
which are demanded by philosophical considerations. 
Metaethical discussions and the like will occasionally 
utilize such examples. Charles Fried, in discussing and 
evaluating use of the self-defense exemption to the rule of 
non-maleficence, uses the following example: 
IX. A retarded and sickly child is the only 
available donor of a kidney for an otherwise 
normal sibling. The donor would surely not 
survive the removal of his kidney. (Fried, 1978: 
49) 
The role that the example plays in the discussion is to 
clarify our moral intuitions on the use of force to avoid 
personal harm in situations where the "defense" is not 
against an attacker in the usual sense. Fried also uses the 
case of organ transplant, the withholding of treatment and 
scarce medical resources to illustrate his argument (Fried, 
1978: 52). The conclusion of his discussion is not so much a 
reference to how such cases should be decided or handled as 
much as a clarification of the role intention plays in the 
general applicability of categorical norms (Fried, 1978: 
53). The social picture presented in these discussions 
establishes the ethically relevant criteria needed to 
illustrate the borderline issues and to argue for important 
distinctions in the formulation of general ethical 
principles and theory. 
The use of such cases as examples is a recognition 
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that medical practice presents us with difficult ethical 
dilemmas. The medical-ethical. case is used for the 
philosophically practical purpose of illustration and 
argument. The accompanying social picture, which is the 
reason why the medical cases are so useful, presents the 
ethical questions in a limited context. This limited, and 
familiar, context is useful because it focuses our attention 
on those factors which must be considered in the application 
of moral principles to the case resolution. The focus of 
the discussion, however, is on ethical principles and 
theories. The cases considered are a means of 
clarification. The social picture is not based on a social 
analysis, but rather the case is chosen precisely because it 
illustrates the social factors needed to make the argument. 
While the general ethics discussion may enlighten the reader 
as to how certain ethical principles might apply to medical 
cases, such is not the purpose of the writings and this 
effect is secondary and unintended. 
A second approach in medical ethics literature is 
an issues-oriented approach which does have the purpose of 
exploring how ethical principles and theories apply and 
assisting in resolving ethical problems that arise in 
medicine. In an introductory anthology, edited by R. Munson 
(1983), J. Gay-Williams, considers the issue of euthanasia 
in a brief issue-oriented discussion (Munson, 1983: 
156-162). Using arguments from varying theoretical 
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perspectives, Gay-Williams maintains that euthanasia, 
defined as "intentionally taking the life of a presumably 
hopeless person, " is immoral. Gay-Williams rejects the 
passive/active euthanasia distinction, claiming that passive 
euthanasia is not euthanasia proper, since it is not 
deliberate or intentional taking of life. Arguing from a 
natural law perspective, Gay-Williams indicates that we have 
an essential tendency to self-preservation. This is 
sufficierit, it is argued, to show that euthanasia is wrong. 
Shifting to a discussion of self-interest, Gay-Williams 
argues that, since the acceptance of euthanasia might 
undermine the drive to survive and is too dependent on very 
limited capacities to predict the outcome of disease and 
medical developments, it is immoral from the perspective of 
self-interest. Finally, arguing from "practical effects, " 
the author claims that acceptance of euthanasia could result 
in an overall decline in the quality of medical care and 
sets society on the slippery slope of allowing society to 
contain and kill off those who are disapproved of and 
labelled by mental or medical health officials. The entire 
argument is backed entirely with references to theoretical 
and ethical distinctions. 
Another example of what I am referring to as an 
issue-oriented approach is the well-known article by R. M. 
Veatch called " Models for Ethical Medicine in a 
Revolutionary Age" (1972) . In this article, Veatch draws out 
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the social and ethical implications for different 
conceptions of the relationship between physician and 
patient. He refers to different possible models as 1) the 
engineering model, 2) the priestly model, 3) the collegial 
model and 4) the contractual model. Veatch's arguments are 
based on ethical principles and concerns, as well as a 
discussion of the social state of affairs that is promoted 
by each model. He condemns the ethical abstinence of the 
engineering model, the ethical elitism of the priestly model 
and the idealism of the collegial model. The contractual 
model, conceived along the lines of the religious notion of 
covenant rather than a more legalistic conceptualization, is 
what Veatch finally recommends as the most desirable model 
for the physician-patient relationship. 
There are obvious conceptions of social relations 
and of society in Veatch's argument. Consider his criticism 
of the collegial model: 
for the most part we have to admit that ethnic, 
class, economic, and value differences make the 
assumption of common interest which is necessary 
for the collegial model to function a mere pipe 
dream. What is needed is a more provisional model 
which permits equality in the realm of moral 
significance between patient and physician without 
making the utopian assumption of collegiality. 
(Veatch, 1972: 7) 
In both Gay-Williams' and Veatch's arguments there 
is explicit use of premises that are empirical 
generalizations about society. Gay-Williams asserts that 
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society is not capable of distinguishing and enforcing 
different policies toward the terminally ill and those who 
are labelled deviant. Veatch asserts an asymmetry in 
medical knowledge and claims that class, ethnic, economic 
and value differences render unrealistic any expectation of 
collegiality between physician and patient. No empircal 
support or theoretical framework is suggested for such 
statements. Rather, they are assumed to be 
non-controversial statements about a familiar state of 
affairs. Neither is there reference to specific cases. The 
discussion is issue-oriented in that it explores the ethical 
implications of the acceptance of certain moral attitudes or 
types of actions. The outcome or conclusions of such 
discussions are either condemnation (in Gay-Williams' 
discussion) or condemnation and recommendation (in Veatch's 
discussion) of particular moral stances. There is no 
mention of concrete actions that might help to alleviate the 
ethical concerns expressed in particular cases. Though 
Veatch's conclusions may be a policy recommendation in that 
he suggests a particular model for medical practice (Veatch, 
1972: 7), he does not give concrete suggestions of how to 
implement the model. It is not clear how physicians or 
patients can shift or grow into Veatch's model, nor what 
sort of institutional policies might encourage such a 
shift. 
A third type of discussion might be characterized 
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as a combined issue-oriented case-study approach. Case 
studies are used to illustrate an ethical problem that 
occurs with a degree of frequency in medical practice. The 
cases may be used to show the development of the issue as an 
ethical problem rather than simply to show that the ethical 
problem has occurred in at least one case. The 
issue-oriented component of the discussion establishes the 
issue as an ethical issue and suggests what sort of response 
is ethically appropriate. The fact that the issue has been 
illustrated and developed through case studies has the 
benefit of making the recommended responses more obviously 
applicable or sensitive to the social factors surrounding 
the occurrence of the ethical problem. 
One example of this approach is found in Veatch's 
Case studies in Medical Ethics (1977). Interspersing ethical 
discussions and case studies, Veatch works through most of 
the issues typically discussed in current medical ethics 
literature. On the issue of informed consent, for example, 
he presents three cases to illustrate the general issue as 
well as standards of disclosure, non-beneficial research on 
children and consent that would invalidate the result of 
research, as in the use of placeboes (Veatch, 1977: 
290-306). On the issue of informed consent for 
non-experimental therapy, Veatch presents a brief history of 
the issue's development in American medicine. He then 
presents a case titled " The Practice-of-the-Profession or 
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Reasonable-Person-Standard" (Veatch, 1977: 302-304). Veatch 
cites a case where a patient sued physicians who suggested 
and performed a myelogram which resulted in injury to the 
nerves in his lower back causing "diminished sensation in 
the front of the left leg below the knee and a weakness in 
the left foot" (Veatch, 1977: 304). Dr. Anderson, one of the 
physicians, argued from the standard of practice in the 
community, claiming that other physicians in the area would 
not have informed a patient of the remote risk of serious 
spinal injury. The complainant, Mr. Berkey, argued that 
physicians are governed by a standard of disclosing what a 
reasonable patient would want to know, even if the risk is 
extremely small. 
Veatch discusses the issue of standards of 
disclosure, citing legal cases. He indicates that the 
"community standard of practice" is based on the principle 
of benefitting the patient. " The decisive factor" as to 
whether the physician should tell the patient is whether the 
physician thinks that the information would benefit the 
patient (Veatch, 1977: 305). Veatch points out that Natanson 
y, Kline is cited in the court argument of the case study 
as support for the community standard of disclosure. The 
court ruled in Berkey v, Anderson that the medical 
community standard is insufficient and that such a situation 
is governed "in the same manner as others in a similar 
fiduciary relationship" (Veatch, 1977: 305). 
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Veatch develops the discussion of informed consent 
in non-experimental therapy by citing cases which illustrate 
patients who 1) are said to manufacture side effects if they 
are informed, and 2) are surprised and upset by extra 
charges and use of an independent laboratory (raising the 
issue of confidentiality). Issues are illustrated by the 
cases, implications and conflicts are indicated in detail 
through the discussion. The discussions are drawn to a 
close with statements of what issues are at stake. For 
example, after the case where a patient is said to 
manufacture the side effects she was warned might occur, 
Veatch comments: 
To reveal extremely rare risks of diagnostic 
procedures can produce disturbances for a patient, 
as suggested by this case. It shows that informed 
consent for medical treatment is a problem not 
only for major, complex medical and surgical 
procedures but for the most routine procedures as 
well. (Veatch, 1977: 306-307) 
This approach has the very considerable 
advantage of clearly illustrating, through very concrete, 
usually true, examples, what the issue is that is being 
discussed. The use of court cases also brings the legal 
dimension into the discussion. I consider this approach 
issue-oriented because it seems primarily to raise and 
demonstrate the ethical issues but does not tend to 
recommend explicitly any concrete responses. In this sense, 
it is more concerned with establishing the issues as 
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legitimate ethical problems. The spread or scope of the 
particular ethical issues is also sometimes suggested, as in 
Veatch's comment that the one case shows that informed 
consent is also a problem in "the most routine procedures. " 
In other words, even in routine procedures the same 
normative analysis can be applied to reveal the ethical 
problem. This is perhaps an implicit suggestion to 
practitioners and ethicists that they should be aware that 
informed consent is an issue that might arise even in 
routine procedures. 
Note that the social details of such discussions 
are set by the scope of the cases used. Consideration of 
the "manufactured symptoms" case was limited to similar 
cases; those that were routine procedures and which had a 
small chance of side effects. In the case of the suit over 
the lack of the patient's knowledge of a rare side effect, 
the considerations were broadened to bring into the 
discussion legal rulings on the legal status of the 
physician-patient relationship and its implications for 
disclosure standards. But these legal considerations serve 
mainly to aid in pointing out the ethical issue. The scope 
of social observation or analysis in these discussions is 
limited to consideration of how such ethical issues occur in 
certain social settings and to establishing that there is 
reason to consider them as legitimate ethical issues. 
Perhaps there is an implicit assumption that, as responsible 
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moral agents, physicians will act on the knowledge to change 
their behavior in a manner that will at least acknowledge 
the ethical issue. If so, then this too makes certain 
social assumptions about physicians' character, behavior and 
the social setting in which they operate. 
More specifically, such implicit assumptions would 
suggest one form of recommendation. If physicians are at 
least as moral as most of us and are likely and able to act 
on their new knowledge of the ethical side of their medical 
practice, then an ethicist simply needs to establish the 
issues. There may, however, be good reasons to doubt that 
the mere indication of a moral problem will affect the 
behavior or a moral agent. Perhaps this assumption is not 
made by those engaged in such discussions but they are 
merely setting the ball rolling for more effective change. 
If such is the case then further discussion is obviously 
needed with an emphasis different from that of these 
discussions. The second social assumption, that simply 
desiring to change the situation empowers physicians to make 
effective change in their practice, may also be naive. 
Whether such is the case is an empirical question yet to be 
answered. 
More practical and yet probably more limited in 
its scope is an approach taken in ethics grand rounds in 
teaching hospitals. In an attempt to get staff and 
residents to be more aware of the ethical issues in medical 
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practice, many faculties of medicine have sponsored case 
discussions where the emphasis is the ethical rather than 
the medical issues. These discussions may be more practical 
simply because of the fact that they occur in a situation 
where many of the participants are clinicians who want to 
know how to respond in such a situation. So in a case 
discussion of the "manufactured symptoms" the discussion 
that Veatch included as part of the case presentation would 
be likely to occur. In that discussion a resident suggests 
that the proper response is to withhold information about 
such side effects and the staff physician responds that such 
is not an option since "patients and their lawyers" have 
ruled out such action. Though likely to be in greater 
detail, such a discussion is of the type that occurs in the 
case presentations. Professional responsibility, legal 
liability and patients' interests are all weighed in an 
informal discussion or by the commentator. The main 
question usually addressed is "How ought a medical 
practitioner act in this and similar situations?" So the 
level of intervention is primarily that of appealing to the 
individual practitioner to behave appropriately. 
The scope may be more limited than issue-oriented 
case discussions such as Veatch's, in the sense that time 
limitations may prevent similarities to other cases and 
related ethical issues from being indicated and 
illustrated. And the same social assumptions as were 
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pointed out for the previous approach seem to be operative 
here as well. 
A final characterization of an approach to medical 
ethics discussions is what I will call policy discussions. 
Policy discussions usually, though not without exception, 
occur in the context of a policy making group which has some 
sort of institutional authority. Policy making bodies are 
convened to consider concrete responses to recognized 
problems. Hospital committees and medical professional 
groups engage in policy-oriented discussions regarding such 
issues as "no-codes" and the termination of treatment. 
Organ donor contracts, printed on drivers' licenses 
represent a means of implementing particular patients' 
wishes and is the result of policy discussions of ethical 
aspects in organ transplantation. The writing and legal 
status of living wills is a possible legislative response 
arising from policy discussions of euthanasia (cf., U.S. 
President's Commission Report, 1982: 155-166 for discussion 
of legal and ethical ramifications of "instruction 
directives" and designating proxies). Such policies are 
more overtly political in the sense of either establishing 
formal policies or of summoning support to appeal to other 
legislative or policy setting groups to make changes in 
their policies or laws. 
Policy discussions outside such policy setting 
groups tend to focus on issues of allocation that are in 
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need of a response on the level of a social policy. For 
example, Ethic� d· Heaith-c�xe-Poiicy, edited by Veatch and 
Branson (1976), presents discussions of health care delivery 
policies by different authors. The ethical issues are 
justice, the "right" to health care, distribution of scarce 
resources and research efforts (e. g. , the totally 
implantable art�ficial heart) ,·and non-medic�! community 
participation in health care decisions (threatening 
professional autonomy). Such issues clearly need some 
discussion of social systems within which the issues must be 
considered. As such they explicitly bring in considerations 
of such social theories and issues as social justice 
(Outka), distributive justice (Fletcher), contract theory 
(Green), liberalism (Callahan, Steinfels), and technology 
assessment techniques (Walters). Disagreements are sometimes 
over the social analysis used (e. g. , "The Right to Health 
Care and the Anxiety of Liberalism: A Reply to Daniel 
Callahan" by Peter Steinfels). 
Another example of policy discussion is found in 
an anthology edited by T. A. Mappes and J. S. Zembaty (1981, 
1986: cf. , Capron 1974: 340-438: and page 49 of this chapter 
for a more complete list). Alexander Capron discusses the 
function of informed consent, concentrating on extreme 
therapies such as transplants (Mappes and Zembaty, 1981: 
74-78). The general roles of informed consent are described 
as 1) the promotion of autonomy, 2) protection of the 
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patients' or subjects' status as persons and 3) avoidance of 
fraud and duress. Capron emphasizes that a formal 
requirement of disclosure increases patients' or subjects 
ability to exercise informed choice. He then enumerates six 
elements of informed consent set out by the federal 
government for the protection of human subjects (U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare: The 
Institutional Guide to DHEW Policy on the Protection of 
Human Subjects 7, 1971, as amended in 1974): 
1. A fair explanation of the procedures to be 
followed, and their purposes, including 
identification of any procedures which are 
experimental; 
2. A description of any attendant discomforts and 
risks reasonably to be expected; 
3. A description of any benefits reasonably to be 
expected; 
4. A disclosure of any appropriate alternative 
that might be advantageous for the subject; 
5. An offer to answer any inquiries concerning 
the procedures; 
6. An instruction that the person is free to 
withdraw his consent and to discontinue 
participation in the project or activity at 
any time without prejudice to the subject • 
• . • No such informed consent, oral or written, 
. • • shall include any exculpatory language through 
which the subject is made to waive, or appear to 
waive, any of his legal rights, including any 
release of the organization or its agents from 
liability for negligence. 
Following Capron's article is a legal opinion 
by Judge Spotswood w. Robinson III in the Canterbury v, 
Spence (1972) case (Mappes and Zembaty, 1986: 90-94). 
Robinson argues that a physician has a duty to inform 
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patients about dangers that "are material" to a patient's 
decision. He refers to a "reasonable person" standard for 
determining what dangers are material to the decision. Two 
exceptions are suggested. One exception is where "the 
communication of the risk information would present a threat 
to the patient's well-being" (Robinson, 1972: 788). The 
other is where in an emergency situation (i. e. , life 
threatening) the patient is unable to give consent 
(Robinson, 1972: 789). Explicitly condemned is withholding 
information so that patients will not refuse therapy that 
the physician deems necessary. 
Policy discussions are more practical than 
issue-oriented discussions in that they conclude with some 
form of concrete recommendation. The discussions in the 
Veatch and Branson volume (1976) are the most general in 
that they critique and make explicit use of social theories 
and theories of social justice and analysis. Since they are 
not restrained by an institutional mandate to make 
recommendations that will be effective within an existing 
system, they can be more critical of current systems than 
any of the other analyses can be. The Institutional Guide 
to Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) Policy 
may also be fairly open in terms of requiring change, if 
deemed necessary, in the policies of institutions and 
perhaps even legislative change. Judge Robinson's comments 
must remain within the legal tradition, since that is the 
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institution and authority within which his opinion is 
sought. Yet all of these discussions have in common that 
their recommendations are policy; they suggest that certain 
practices within either institutions or society must be 
constrained by ethical considerations. And, in each case, 
the arguments used to support the recommendations are either 
base upon the explicit use of a form of social analysis or 
are made within an assumed institutionalized social 
framework. 
What all the policy discussions have in common is 
a recognition that there are ethical issues which need to be 
responded to at a policy level. This is at least an 
implicit recognition that these ethical issues are not 
easily dealt with at the level of physician-patient 
relationships. Social factors such as limited access to 
medical information and resources and conflicts of interests 
within the health care system serve to limit the 
effectiveness of appeals to individuals to act more 
ethically once educated as to the existence of the ethical 
issues. Policy recommendations, including those which 
suggest the need for significant large scale social change, 
are attempts to respond to this need. 
The same ethical issue may be approached through 
any of these different ethical discussions. Informed 
consent, for example, may be a topic of discussion in a 
simple case presentation, a case-oriented issue approach, a 
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straightforward issue-oriented approach, or in a variety of 
policy discussions. But the type of approach taken also 
seems to influence the type of recommendation that results 
from the ethical deliberations. Each approach is useful, 
whether for the immediate resolution of a case, illustration 
of an issue, normative analysis of underlying ethical 
issues, or for policy recommendations. But variation in the 
breadth of focus on social factors influences the 
recommendations which are likely to result. I will now 
discuss what these recommendations have in common as a first 
step to unifying the social foci of the different types of 
discussions. 
�al Change 
Concrete ethical problems always occur in a social 
setting. That is to say that, in order for the problem to 
come to public attention, it must be observable. It is true 
that some ethical theories hold intentions or motives to be 
crucial in determining the ethical status of an act. But 
the illustrations, cases and issues discussed in medical 
ethics are subjects for discussion because they are 
observable. Attitudes and motives may be ascribed in order 
to provide an explanation for the behavior--whether as a 
reason or as an excuse. Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
concrete or "encountered" ethical problems are observable 
22 
actions or some statistical representation of them (in 
allocation discussions). Since they are raised as problems, 
the likely response will be a recommendation that is a means 
to change the situation. In other words, the encounter with 
an ethical problem is an encounter with concrete social 
circumstances. A recommendation that is based on a 
normative analysis will either endorse the particular 
circumstances or will make some suggestion as to how the 
situation should be changed. 
It might be objected that this entire discussion 
is irrelevant to those who adopt an ethical theory which 
bases some or all of its ethical judgments on the moral 
agent's intentions. Kant's requirements that we always 
treat persons as ends and act out of a sense of duty would 
be an example of such a theory. Perhaps one of the most 
popular of such judgments, based on natural law deontology, 
are those based on the principle of double effect. This is 
a principle that is appealed to in such cases as a medical 
procedure required to save the life of a pregnant woman 
which will result in the fetus' death. The important detail 
which makes the principle of double effect applicable is 
that there are two conflicting moral claims: the mother' s 
and the fetus' lives cannot both be saved. Ethical theories 
such as Catholic natural law considers any evaluation of one 
life as more important than the other to be unethical but 
recognizes that in such situations some decision must be 
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made. The principle of double effect may be appealed to in 
this case to justify operating on the mother even though it 
results in the fetus' death. 
Munson (1983: 33) succinctly specifies the 
necessary conditions for an action to be morally permissible 
under the principle of double effect: 
1. The action itself must be morally indifferent 
or morally good. 
2. The bad effect must not be the means by which 
the good effect is achieved. 
3. The motive must be the achievement of the good 
effect only. 
4. The good effect must be at least equivalent in 
importance to the bad effect. 
If the act is done with the intent of saving 
the mother and is not a direct act of killing the fetus or a 
case of using the death itself as the means to saving the 
mother' s life, though it does in fact kill the fetus, the 
act may be morally justified on this principle. 
Craniotomies are ruled out since they directly kill the 
fetus. The removal of a pregnant woman's cancerous uterus 
is permissible even though it does result in the death of 
the fetus. 
While they differ from ethical theories which do 
not focus on intention, intention-oriented ethical theories 
help in similar ways. That is to say that they establish 
whether or not certain actions are moral and determine which 
actors are morally culpable or praiseworthy. 
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Recommendations for future behavior will rule out those 
procedures which violate the conditions of double effect and 
approve those which meet them. In this sense the 
recommendations which come from intention-oriented ethical 
theories do not differ in form from those which originate in 
other types of ethical theories. If the recommendation is 
addressed to individual moral agents, it will be an 
exhortation to use the principle of double effect in those 
cases where it is applicable to determine the ethically 
appropriate course of action. In this case it is personal 
behavior that is to be determined by this moral principle. 
If the recommendation is directed to policy considerations, 
it will give criteria for membership in a class .of actions 
which will then be approved or disapproved. The procedure 
of removal of a pregnant woman's cancerous uterus, mentioned 
above, might be an approved policy, perhaps after approval 
by an ethics committee which will attempt to determine 
whether the four conditions mentioned above are met. 
Prohibitions such as the one against euthanasia in "The 
Ethical Directives for Catholic Hospitals " (Munson, 1979: 
35-36: cf., Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Appendix, 1978: 
1756-1757) would be an example of a forbidden procedure and 
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an official definition of what particular procedures are to 
be taken as members of that class: 
The direct killing of any innocent person, even at 
his own request is always morally wrong. Any 
procedure whose sole immediate effect is the death 
of a human being is a direct killing • • • •  
Euthanasia ("mercy killing") in all its forms is 
forbidden . • . •  The failure to supply the 
ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to 
euthanasia. 
It is important to notice that even these 
intention-oriented analyses make recommendations that 
certain� are approved or forbidden. General 
recommendations will always take the form of specifying 
types of behavior morally condemned or accepted and criteria 
for membership in the relevant class. As such these 
recommendations take the same form as those which are based 
on ethical theories which place less or no emphasis on 
intention. While the normative analysis may make use of 
intention in determining what ethical behavior is, the 
ethical recommendations are expressed in terms of 
permissible and prohibited behaviors. Such behaviors are 
social in that they are observable and involve other 
persons. In fact the actions are usually approved or 
prohibited on the basis of the social relationship between 
the actors (e. g. , the prohibition of direct killing is a 
prohibition against an action toward another person as well 
as against an intention or attitude). In this sense all 
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ethical recommendations are recommendations that direct 
social behavior, whether or not they suggest appropriate 
intentions or attitudes. 
There is also a practical reason to prefer 
analyses which apply normative principles to actions rather 
than intentions. It is notoriously difficult, if not 
frequently impossible, for observers an doctors to have 
infallible, or even dependable, knowledge of motives and 
intentions. This may be due to the abstract concept of 
"intention" not having a psychological referent in many 
instances of intentional behavior (see Chapter II). But this 
analysis is designed to respond to publicly identifiable 
ethical problems, with recommendations whose effectiveness 
is measured by the elimination or reduction of (ethically 
condemned) behavior. If some persons act in ethically 
unobjectionable manners on motives which we might 
disapprove, that is a matter of character and virtue with 
which I am not here concerned. 
Any recommendation based on ethical analysis will 
be either to change the situation analyzed or to maintain 
it-. If the ethical analysis results in approval of the 
action, then either no change will be recommended, or change 
to encourage recurrence of the action. If the ethical 
analysis results in condemnation of the action, then the 
recommendation (if any) will be to change the situation to 
avoid recurrence of the action. Of course, based on the 
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limitations of certain forms of analysis as discussed 
earlier, some analyses may treat certain social features as 
unalterable. Such analyses may conclude of morally 
condemned actions that nothing can be done to avoid their 
recurrence·. The analysis here defended (the 
social-normative analysis) is, in part, a response to this 
inadequacy. 
The focus on ethical action to the exclusion of 
intention may be a result of this analysis' orientation. If 
someone acts in an ethically appropriate manner for motives 
which we might condemn (i.e., fear of punishment, 
disrespect, etc.) the ethical concern over the motive is 
not likely to arise. It is when the motive manifests itself 
in terms of unethical behavior, or when a disclosed attitude 
is judged to be likely to lead to unethical behavior, that 
the motive or attitude is criticized. Recommendations which 
promote ethical behavior, and prevent unethical behavior, 
are effective in so doing without considerations of the 
ethical status of actors' motives and attitudes. The change 
recommended may be either that individual actors consider 
certain details in determining their proper course of action 
or that certain moral polices be adhered to. In this sense, 
most recommendations based on ethical analysis will take the 
form of recommendations for social change. 
Limiting the discussion to applied ethics, it is 
reasonable to assert that any recommendations will take the 
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form of social change. Social change is taken here to have 
a broad definition that includes the various levels of 
intervention that have been discussed in the first part of 
this section. To be more specific, whether recommendations 
take the form of exhortations to individuals that they 
modify their behavior, claims that professional groups or 
institutions should change their actions or policies, or 
suggestions and calls for legislative changes or a form of 
social revolution, they are all recommendations for social 
change. 
Medical ethics discussions have often left the 
impression that policy discussions, though normative, are 
quite different from typical ethical or normative issues. 
For example, Ruth Macklin (1981: 513) claims that: 
Policy issues are surely normative ones, but they 
may include political and economic, as well as 
moral considerations, arising out of vested 
interests or prior commitments. 
Some political theorists have argued that political theory 
and political philosophy cannot operate without making 
normative assumptions or judgments (Jagger, 1983). It is far 
from clear that� recommendation based on a normative 
analysis is exempt from "vested interests or prior 
commitments" or that any argument for social or political 
change is complete or convincing without backing the 
normative elements with ethical argumentation. The 
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different levels of intervention all recommend social 
change. They are essentially recommendations which are made 
and implemented within social settings and so require the 
consideration of political and economic vested interests and 
"prior commitments. " 
Consider the issue of informed consent. A 
physician's resistance to the requirement that he or she 
fully inform a patient of the risks and alternatives might 
be based on concern that the patient might reject medically 
required treatment. Such a concern may be embodied in a 
moral argument to the effect that the responsibility of the 
physician is to take care of the patient's health needs 
(cf. , Veatch, 1977: 305) . Or perhaps the underlying worry is 
that the patient is not fully rational in rejecting or 
considering the information, since the background medical 
education is lacking (cf., Ingelfinger, 1972) . But the 
physician's resistance might also be based on prior 
commitments to such values as health or to treating all 
similar medical cases similarly. Patient choice will 
possibly disrupt such consistent treatment or perhaps 
prevent the physician from treating some illness. In other 
words, a prior commitment to treating illness may be partly 
or fully the basis for the physician's doubt of the ethical 
or practical wisdom of informed consent (cf. , Robinson, 
1972: 789). 
An example of the influence of political 
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commitment on ethical anlysis and subsequent recommendations 
can be found in the use of "edge of the wedge " or "slippery 
slope" arguments in such issues as euthanasia or abortion. 
On such issues the argument claims that legislatures and 
those who implement policies on "killing" are incapable of 
making the kind of subtle distinctions that are required to 
keep the accepted moral policy from sliding "down the slope " 
to include killing those who are not the intended 
benefactors of the policy but for some reason are socially 
undesirable (cf. , Kamisar, 1958; Ramsey 1978: 217, 225). 
What sort of ethical recommendation might be 
exempt from such prior commitments or political or economic 
interest? A brief catalogue of the issues typically 
considered in biomedical ethics texts might be a good place 
to start. Ronald Munson (1983) has the following categories 
or titles in his table of contents: 
Abortion and Infanticide 
Treating or Terminating: The Problem of Birth 
Defects 
Euthanasia 
Paternal ism, Truth Telling, and 
Confidentiality 
Medical Experimentation and Informed Consent 
Psychosurgery and Behavior Control 
Genetics: Control, Counselling and Research 
Competition and Allocation (for resources) 
The Claim to Health Care 
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Mappes and Zembaty's anthology adds the following to the 
list: 
Patients' Rights and Professionals' Obligations 
Health, Disease and Values 
Involuntary Civil Commitment 
Suicide and the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment 
Apart from the explicitly political topics (i. e. , behavior 
control, involuntary civil commitment, competition and 
allocation of resources, the claim to health care, and 
patient rights and professional obligations) any of the 
issues are of the sort that can be discussed abstractly, 
apparently excluding vested interests and prior commitments 
of an economic and political nature. That is to say that 
these issues can be analyzed in the manners earlier 
described as issue oriented, case-study or a combination of 
the two. As observed earlier, such analyses also tend to 
produce recommendations that either establish the issue as 
an ethical issue, perhaps in the hope that practitioners 
will pay heed, or construct particular responses that the 
practitioner can use in similar cases without requiring 
changes in the medical setting or policies. 
It is also obvious that such issues frequently 
involve discussions of social policy and practices, 
attempting to develop responses that are sensitive to the 
social contingencies and the variety of opinions on the 
values and appropriate means. So particular case studies on 
3 2  
informed consent or  withholding information, in observing 
that the physician is the person with the information that 
the patient needs or _ is threatened by, recognizes a common 
social fact about physician-patient relationships: There is 
an asymmetry in knowledge which gives the physician a degree 
of authority and power over the patient (cf. , Fisher,  1979, 
1982, 1983; Todd, 1982; ·Friedson, 1970a). 
Case-recommendations which are directed to intervening in 
concrete interactions focus on indicating how practitioners 
can change their behavior, or  more generally, what general 
rules they should follow. Social change at "higher"  levels 
of intervention, i. e. , those that require changes in 
policies or institutions, are not considered in case-studies 
since they are simply not the focus of such analyses. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive policy discussion, the 
President' s Commission for the study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1982: 
115-164), discusses increasing public access to medical 
information, reviewing medical school selection criteria and 
cur riculum, nursing practice and legal means. 
The significant point here is that no matter the 
level of intervention to which a recommendation is directed, 
since the recommendation is for social change it can ignore 
the social factors, since they determine the 
recommendation's relevance and effectiveness. It is obvious 
that abstract normative ethical theory (i. e. , metaethical 
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accounts of the good, theories of justice, etc. ) can be 
constructed without reference to concrete social situations, 
finding instead that hypothetical examples can control for 
relevant similarities and avoiding troublesome 
dissimilarities. Once the concern shifts from abstract 
philosophical issues to the construction of effective 
recommendations, however, this theoretical distance cannot 
be maintained. The fact that an ethical problem is 
perceived reveals that the problem exists in a social 
setting, not merely as a private psychological event. If 
the normative analysis confirms that there is an ethical 
problem, then the recommendation will be directed to change 
the situation. Since the recommendation is an attempt to 
make a relevant social change, it must be sensitive to those 
ethically relevant social factors which will affect the 
normative analysis. Even this amount of social sensitivity 
is insufficient. The recommendation ought also take into 
account those social factors which will mitigate or enhance 
the effectiveness of the recommendation. Otherwise, 
unforseen consequences are likely to follow the 
implementation of the recommendation which may create more 
problems than the recommendation resolved. 
Recommendations aimed at affecting the· most 
concrete or "micro" level often ignore those social factors 
that are not immediately relevant to the ethical analysis of 
implementation of the recommendation. To do this may 
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invalidate the accuracy of the analysis or the effectiveness 
of the recommendation. On the other hand, recommendations 
typically directed toward changing social structures, or 
creating new ones (e.g, Institutional Review Boards and 
Hospital Ethics Committees), neglect some of the more 
concrete social factors and result in ineffective 
recommendations. 
Consider, for example, the ethical issue of 
informed consent. All the ethical discussions agree that 
there are circumstances that demand medical intervention 
without fulfilling the requirement of informed consent, such 
as an emergency with an unconscious unidentified patient or 
when the information itself presents an obvious threat to 
the life or mental health of the patient (cf. , Robinson, 
1972). Most ethicists reject the withholding of information 
by the physician for the reason that the patient, if fully 
informed, might reject what the physician perceives to be 
medically required treatment (Robinson, 1972; Capron, 1974; 
Zembaty, 1979) Once this normative analysis has been made, 
the resulting recommendation must be directed at some 
particular level or levels. Some analyses seem to leave the 
recommendations implicit, such as Veatch in his Case Studies 
in Medical Ethics (1977: 306-307). This analysis concludes 
that informed consent can be a problem in the most routine 
of cases. Some commentators suggest that the physician is 
reasonably assumed to be the expert on such social and 
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medical factors as the remote risks of major and minor 
effects that are not the therapeutic goal as well as 
possessing the knowledge and experience within which the 
proportion of risk can be assessed { Ingelfinger, 1972 ; 
Alfidi, 1975). Physicians may then be said to be the best 
judges of what ought to be disclosed to each particular 
patient. Extending this line of reasoning, Veatch suggests 
that only through compassionate and ethical physicians will 
patients get what is in their best interests {Veatch, 1981: 
Chapters 5 & 9). This suggests that the level of 
intervention is quite concrete, perhaps the education of 
physicians as to the ethical dimensions of such issues. 
Other recommendations resulting form the normative 
analysis direct. attention toward legislative and policy 
recommendations. An example of this type of recommendation 
would be the United States Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare's Institutional Guide to PHEW Policy on the 
Protection of Human Subjects { 1971) which lists elements of 
informed consent to be included and a prohibition on 
exculpatory language. Judge Spotswood W. Robinson I I I's 
opinion in the Canterbury v. Spence case (Robinson, 1972) 
which sets out the previously noted exemptions to informed 
consent is also such a policy oriented recommendation . The 
effect of such recommendations may. be to guide institutional 
ethics committees and hospitals in constructing forms for 
informed consent, as well as giving concrete guidelines to 
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practitioners who must present the information to patients 
and subjects and receive informed consent. 
Yet both of these approaches, at least in 
isolation, have significant deficiencies. The lower level 
of intervention, that of educating and emphasizing to 
physicians that they have this responsibility, neglects the 
social fact recognized in the policy oriented 
recommendations: Physicians as a group have prior 
commitments that may color their view of when it is 
appropriate to withhold information for the patients' own 
good. In response to this factor, the policy 
recommendations spell out in more detail the sort of 
information to be disclosed and what reasons are legitimate 
to justify paternalism (when it is appropriate). But the 
policy recommendations must also depend on the physicians to 
make the judgments as to when the particular . patient 
qualifies as one of the specified exceptions. Furthermore, 
the simple disclosure of the information on forms or 
verbally by practitioners does not guarantee comprehension 
by the patient. An inadequate policy response to this 
problem is to require review of forms and educational 
materials to assure that medical terminology is translated. 
There may also be a requirement that patients or subjects be 
given time away from the medical setting to consider their 
decision and to formulate questions. Nevertheless, the 
emotional and psychological burden of an ill patient may be 
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relevant in a particular case and such issues must 
inevitably be decided on a case by case basis. This is of 
course a strength of the lower level recommendations over 
the higher level or policy recommendations. The former 
emphasizes the individual practitioner' s responsibility 
while the latter may seem to pre-empt professional autonomy 
and personal responsibility by stipulating the particular 
obligations. Clearly the best type of recommendation is one 
which sets out what the particular obligations are and the 
basic means that are to be employed but also encourages the 
practitioner to use considered judgments as to how best to 
achieve the designated ethical value. But even the ethical 
goals that the recommendation is meant to serve may depend 
on the social analysis. Some ethical discussions recognize 
this in the observation that ethical issues are dependent on 
the particular descriptions of action. 
Consider the issue of moral agency or 
responsibility. In a case of a person accused of murder 
what must be determined is whether or not the person acted 
freely and intentionally to commit the crime. The 
prosecution might present the account that the accused had 
been harassed and threatened by the murdered person and had 
planned the murder ahead of time. The defense might agree 
that the defendant had been harassed and threatened by the 
victim but had acted out of fear and that the act was one or 
self-defense in that the defendant perceived herself to be 
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in danger. The prosecution's account encourages us to 
consider certain factors to be the defendant's motive while 
the defense claims that the same factors are morally 
relevant in a completely different sense ; they excuse the 
defendant from her other wise unacceptable behavior. The 
difference in the two claims has to do with the role that 
the particular factors played in the action being judged. 
In this manner certain factors that on one account play a 
role of excusing otherwise morally questionable actions 
(self-defense) may, on another account, be combined with 
other factors to establish moral culpability (premeditated 
murder). 
The above account of the different roles that 
certain factors can play focuses on the psychological impact 
of harassment and threats on the accused. The "other 
factors" referred to in the above discussion are the crucial 
points to be established. In fact, what must be claimed by 
the defense is either that there are some morally acceptable 
cases in which threats and harassment relieve a person of 
the prohibition on killing, or at least that such conditions 
render the individual morally excusable since she is unable 
to act as a fully autonomous person in these circumstances. 
The first account is generally referred to as some form of a 
self-defense argument and the second as a "crime of passion" 
(or temporary insanity). 
Such accounts of the circumstances surrounding a 
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morally questionable action are also relevant in more 
general discussions. The general form would be one which 
considers whether the social setting of particular moral 
concerns renders moral agents less autonomous ( e. g. ,  whether 
ncaptive populations n can give valid informed consent). In 
specific cases we consider the plausibility of the 
psychological account: whether or not the factors in the 
case affected the accused in the manner described. The 
ethical issue is whether the psychological effects of the 
social setting alter the person ' s  moral responsibility. If 
the psychological account is accepted as plausible in the 
particular case, then it must be admitted that such an 
account has a more general applicability in all similar 
cases. Similar cases are those in which the relevant 
factors are present. But it is not clear whether what will 
be accepted (say by jurors) as the relevant factors are the 
psychological account (i.e. , what one claims to have •felt n) 
and/or a description of the social setting and in a manner 
that makes the action forgivable (i. e. , that it would be 
understandable or forgivable in •these circumstances• to 
kill and not QD.ll that one felt threatened) • . 
The ethical requirement , based on 
universalizability or some version of the principle of 
justice, is that we treat all moral agents with equal 
respect . It would be prejudicial to do otherwise. 
Consequently we must find morally relevant differences 
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between the judgment in those cases where a fully autonomous 
person kills another who poses no threat to the murderer or 
anyone else. Ceteris paribus we ought to treat all 
murderers similarly. Self-defense is the judgment that the 
killer acted on the reasonable belief that she was in danger 
of temporary insanity, or even of continuous or permanent 
insanity, and this is a recognition that the killer was 
incapable of exerting rational self-control. What counts as 
reasonable belief must be more than the testimony of the 
killer; the social context is relevant as evidence for or 
against such a claim. 
In the murder accusation, the factors are the 
harassment and threats of the defendant from the deceased 
and particular observable or verifiable signs that the 
defendant's reactions to the victim's behavior are best 
explained by one theory rather than another (the 
prosecution's argument rather than the defense's). 
Acceptance of such an account in the particular case sets 
precedent for a similar line of argument in other (similar) 
cases. In other words, the account must be accepted as 
plausible in general. The normative claim in the particular 
case can be expressed in a universalized moral statement: In 
cases of harassment and threats resulting in the killing of 
the offensive person the killer may be excused of his or her 
actions if it can be established that the act was the only 
way to protect himself or herself from serious harm. Or 
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perhaps a less controversial form would be that the charge 
not be murder (i. e. , reduce the charge to "manslaughter ") if 
it is established that the killer acted irrationally out of 
passion due to the victim's threats and harassment. Legal 
issues of what is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of 
such claims in particular cases turn on the concept of 
"reasonable doubt" as determined by a jury . Ethical 
discussions, however, do not have recourse to such a 
procedural response. Rather we must attempt to specify what 
conditions would justify accepting this account of the 
action over one which would find the defendant fully, or 
somewhat, responsible for killing the victim. 
Since the crucial consideration for moral 
discussions such as the one above is whether or not the 
killer is autonomous, any account which excuses the agent 
from normal moral obligations must explain how the actor's 
autonomy was either threatened or infringed upon in a manner 
sufficient to justify the act of killing. Ethical claims 
paralleling the "crimes of passion " legal excuse are that 
the killer's autonomy was restricted in such a way as to 
relieve the person of moral responsibility for the killing. 
So the entire discussion of when the killing is justified in 
the face of threats and harassment by the victim will turn 
on what are unacceptable amounts of infringement and 
restriction of autonomy. Descriptions of threats 
(infringement) and of non-autonomous acts of passion will 
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have to be accounts of observable behavior in order for the 
ethical judgments to be applicable. So while the ethical 
claims are based on judgments of particular instances of the 
psychological impact of certain behaviors on the killer's 
autonomy, the universalized ethical statement will, for 
practical purposes, need to be based on verifiable accounts 
of social behavior. 
This is tantamount to claiming that ethical 
judgments are about classes of social behavior. Such a 
claim is clearly controversial. Surely it is true that a 
description of the behavior may meet the conditions we would 
typically accept as indicative of a loss of control without 
the killer's autonomy necessarily being impaired in such a 
way as to reduce the moral culpability. It is precisely 
such facts which give credibility to act utilitarianism. 
But does such an exception to the rule invalidate the rule? 
A more detailed account of what is entailed by the general 
ethical rule is in order. 
Choosing only one of the above conditions, it may 
be claimed that a certain level of harassment and threats 
relieves the harassed and threatened individual of 
responsibility for the killing of the threatening and 
harassing person. The reason for the suspension of the 
usual attribution of responsibility is that the necessary 
condition for moral responsibility has been interfered 
with--the killer is rendered less or non-autonomous by the 
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killed person's threatening and harassing behavior (insanity 
plea). In other words, the conditions under which the 
killing has taken place render the killer incapable of 
engaging in the sort of moral deliberations one is morally 
obligated to engage in before acting in such a blatantly 
immoral fashion. Assuming that ought implies can, then one 
can only be held responsible for that which is within one's 
capabilities. The killer cannot be held responsible for 
failing to do that which was not possible. Of course there 
may be other reasons for punishing the killer, such as 
discouraging such acts in general or the symbolic value of 
promoting negative consequences for such behavior. It may 
also be claimed that the killer's autonomy was impaired, not 
incapacitated, so perhaps it would be appropriate to reduce 
the punishment but not to remove it. Universalizability, 
fairness or a principle of justice all seem to demand that 
similar cases be treated similarly. So we must, in all 
fairness, determine what details count as the morally 
relevant conditions which demand similar treatment. 
Conceptually, the important fact is the impairment 
or reduction of autonomy. So in any case where there is a 
similar effect on autonomy we must treat the agent as we do 
in this case. But it is also likely to be true that 
different individuals can endure different levels of 
harassment and threats before their autonomy is affected. 
This in fact does seem morally relevant for each case. In 
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other words, holding constant the "level" of threats and 
harassment, we can imagine that there is a spectrum of 
personalities which will vary from those persons who are 
quick to anger to those who are rarely exciteable or 
reactionary under such circumstances. A rule or policy 
which considers autonomy of persons to be impaired under 
specified levels of threats and harassment will not be 
sensitive to these various levels of tolerance for such 
behaviors. But a policy which is based on consideration of 
individual levels of tolerance will hold different persons 
to have varying levels of responsibility under similar 
circumstances. Clearly these different policies will differ 
in judging those cases where the killer is seen to have high 
levels of tolerance and thus to have been more autonomous in 
the act of killing. The issue then becomes one of whether 
it is fair to hold some persons more responsible than others 
in similar circumstances. This is , in a way, to penalize 
the tolerant individuals for being so tolerant by expecting 
more of them. Conversely, this policy would reward, or at 
least not hold responsible, those who are especially quick 
to anger for their nasty disposition. 
If one accepts the more particularized version 
(that an individual is responsible according to his or her 
disposition and consequently the actual effects of the 
threats and harassment on autonomy is what is of moral 
significance), then other even more particular details also 
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seem important. The tolerant individual's level of 
tolerance may have been affected by such conditions as lack 
of sleep , other encounters with abusive persons , etc. The 
explosive person may also be unusually tolerant on the 
particular day due to surrounding circumstances. If what is 
of central moral concern is the actual effect of the threats 
and harassment on the individual's autonomy , it seems that 
such factors also play a significant role. In other words , 
even the most tolerant of persons have bad days when they 
are quick to anger. So the estimate of how autonomous the 
act of killing was would need to be based on an evaluation 
of the net effects of the threats and harassment on the 
particular individual's autonomy considering how generally 
tolerant of such things the person is and on whether there 
are any other circumstances that might alter this estimation 
of the person's autonomy. Provided that we accept that the 
focus is to be on how autonomous the person was in killing , 
these considerations do not seem to be unreasonable. 
On the other hand we might adopt the moral policy 
that individuals should only be held responsible for fully 
autonomous acts in the absence of a certain level of threat 
and harassment. This might seem an easier policy to enforce 
and would not hold persons responsible for the particular 
level of tolerance that they have grown to have. It is at 
least highly plausible that varying levels of tolerance for 
different personalities are due to environmental or genetic 
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differences beyond the control of the ind�vidual. It may 
therefore be fair to hold this standard. But even this 
policy does not free us of all social-psychological 
considerations. 
First of all we must determine that level of 
threats and harassment over which it is unreasonable to 
expect an individual to exercise full autonomy. Should this 
be a minimal or median standard? That is , should we hold 
all moral agents responsible only to that standard we can 
expect of the least tolerant or autonomous of us? Or should 
we hold the least tolerant responsible to a standard that 
most of us can live up to? (This issue will be discussed in 
connection with the reasonable person standard in the next 
section). Second, how do we determine whether or not the 
designated level of threat or harassment was present? 
Clearly this latter question is one which must be settled by 
a close examination of the circumstances in which the 
threats and harassment took place. What if the killer 
imagined them? They are then present as an impairment of 
the killer's autonomy so it seems that they are relevant to 
the determination of the level of moral culpability. At the 
other extreme it is possible that the threats and harassment 
were expressed by the victim but that the killer did not 
hear or understand them. Such a situation can hardly be 
construed as an impairment of the killer's autonomy. If the 
expression is non-verbal then their presence is still more 
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difficult to ascertain and their effect masked. Yet all of 
these examples have one thing in common: They show that 
there is no impairment of autonomy if the killer did not 
comprehend the threats and harassment. Certainly it seems 
to beg the question if we simply assume that the killer 
heard them since he or she did kill the victim. But how do 
we tell that the killer acted in response to the threats and 
harassment? Far from settling any of the ethical issues 
involved in this issue, this discussion has demonstrated 
that there are complex psychological and sociological 
questions involved in setting the ethical policy and in 
applying it to particular cases. If such confusion can 
arise in the enforcement of a reasonably simple ethical 
prohibition, it may be even more difficult to determine the 
ethical ends and appropriate means of bringing them about in 
the socially complex realm of medical ethics. Having 
recognized the need for social analysis to guide 
recommendations for social change, I now turn to a 
particular illustration. Informed consent is one such 
policy that presents a complex of ethical and social 
dilemmas. 
Informed consent 
Informed consent is fundamentally an attempt to 
respect the autonomy of patients in the process of medical 
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treatment or research . It is basically a requirement that 
patients or subjects be qiven the opportunity to consent to 
(or dissent from) treatment based on relevant information. 
Patients are autonomous agents whose choices must be 
honored . Capron lists six functions of informed consent 
(Capron, 1974: 364-376): 
a .  To Promote Individual Autonomy . 
b. To Protect the · Patient-Subject ' s  Status as a 
Human Being . 
c .  To Avoid Fraud and Duress. 
d .  To Encourage Self-Scrutiny by the Physician­
Investigator. 
e. To Fostor Rational Decisionmaking . · 
f .  To Involve the Public [in Promoting Autonomy 
as a General Social Value and in Controlling 
Biomedical Research] .  
Notice that none of these is, strictly speaking, a 
medical goal . The requirement of informed consent of 
patients or subjects is a restriction of medical practice . 
It is a re�uirement that medical practitioners have 
patients' agreement prior to its execution. And the consent 
must be "informed. " That is to say that it must be based on 
information that gives the patient. a basis for rational 
decision. In this manner., individual autonomy is promoted. 
Unless there are strong reasons against it, there is a 
presumption in favor of patients having control over what 
happens to their bodies and lives. 
Requiring that patients and subjects of research 
be told about procedures and give consent prior to treatment 
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is also a means of protecting them . Research with little or 
questionable therapeutic benefit is not obviously in the 
subjects' interests so it is only with their knowledgeable 
consent that their participation can ethically be accepted . 
This is due to the fact that they are put at some degree of 
risk in the procedures and so their protection is best 
served by their being informed of such risks . It is also 
possible that certain researchers or physicians may act 
unethically and treat patients/subjects in a manner that is 
clearly not in their interests . Informed consent is one 
means of making such an occurrence less likely . By 
protecting patients' autonomy in the decision regarding 
participation, their "status as a human being" is 
protected . Thus it is expected that attempts at fraud or 
duress, or any similar unintended effects, will be less 
influential in the presence of informed patients and 
subjects . This too is acheived primarily through 
maintenance of patients' autonomy . 
Capron's last three functions are more abstract or 
general . If the medical profession is expected to present 
information to patients and subjects, it is reasonable to 
expect that the professional will take care not to be 
embarassed by its less scrupulous or thorough members . This 
"self-scrutiny" is to promote reflective rather than 
non-reflective habitual practice . In this sense it promotes 
physicians' increased autonomy . If patients are to consent 
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from an informed basis, rather than from a simple trust in 
the profession or their physician, then it is also expected 
that both practitioners and patients/subjects will give a 
significant role in the decisions to the relevant factors. 
This ought to promote decisions that are as rational as 
possible based on the available information (Capron ' s  "e "). 
If such information did not play a significant role, it 
would be more likely that decisions to treat or do research 
would be based on less rational grounds such as hunches, 
whims and desperation. Finally, it is expected that 
informed consent will involve the public in promoting 
autonomy in general and in controlling biomedical research. 
At the very least this function is thought to be 
accomplished through patients/subjects as members of the 
public, becoming more autonomous in their medical care and 
in the selection of the sort of research and risks for which 
they will agree to be subjects. So these six of Capron ' s  
functions of informed consent reduce to various means of 
promoting autonomy, both that of patients and physicians. 
Before discussing the form that informed consent 
must take to begin to fulfill this function, there are 
limitations that are important to recognize. "Therapeutic 
privilege " is the ethical justification given for 
withholding certain information from p�tients. This is not 
valid in the case of research subjects because the reason 
that is given for treating without consent is always 
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"therapeutic. " It is said to be in the patient's best 
interest to withhold the information. "Presumed consent " is 
when it is in the patient's interests to proceed without 
consent rather than to wait for consent. This action is 
usually justified in cases of emergency treatment of 
unconscious patients. When time is not so limited, "proxy 
consent" allows a responsible person to consent in behalf of 
unconscious or clearly incompetent patients. Beauchamp and 
Childress suggest that the paternalistic act of withholding 
information is justifiable in the case where the medical 
practitioner considers the information to be harmful to the 
patient (Beauchamp and Childress, 1979: 74). Judge Spotswood 
w .  Robinson I II, in his opinion in Canterbury v. Spence , 
expresses this concern: 
The second exception obtains when risk-disclosure 
poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as 
to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a 
medical point of view • • . •  The critical inquiry 
is whether the physician responded to a sound 
medical judgment that communication of the risk 
information would present a threat to the 
patient's well-being. (Robinson, 1972: 789) 
In other words, it is permissible to withhold information 
from a patient when, on the basis of a sound medical 
judgment, the information itself constitutes a serious risk 
to the patient's life or health. The most crucial, and 
ambiguous, terms in this doctrine are "sound medical 
judgment" and "risk" (i. e. , there will be a range of 
5 2  
information which might be construed as imposing a risk to a 
patient who is critically ill on the account that 
maintaining a " will to live" is crucial to recovery and any 
significantly bad news may adversely affect this desire). 
If this is an act of justified paternalism , then 
it ought to stand up to the general requirements for acts of 
justified pate�nalis�. Jane Zembaty argues persuasively 
that paternalism is justified in those cases where the end 
result is a greater promotion of autonomy than if the 
non-paternalist!c action (s) was taken (Zembaty , 1986). This 
is . in keeping with John Stuart Mill's argument that one 
ought not be allowed to sell oneself into slavery for the 
reason that the loss of autonomy is permanent while the 
prohibition on the particular action is only a temporary 
infringement on autonomy. But Mill also argues that in 
other cases a person's physical or moral good is 
insufficient grounds for the suspension of the value of 
autonomy (Mill, 1962: 135). Zembaty's and Mill's discussions 
indicate that the justification of withholding information 
from a patient must be based on the long-term promotion of 
autonomy, not the promotion of the patient's. health. In 
other words, since the paternalistic actions are prohibited 
on the grounds that they violate the person's autonomy, it 
seems that they may be justified in those cases where they 
actually promote the person's long-term autonomy more than 
the non-paternalistic options. Nielsen (forthcoming) has 
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supported a similar position. He { unlike Zembaty) does not 
accept paternalism as justified if the person is currently 
autonomous, rejecting on empirical grounds the ability to 
objectively predict the effect of information on another's 
autonomy. For Nielsen, paternalism is only justified in 
those cases where the person is incompetent, where 
incompetent is defined as not being able to make rational 
decisions {if such is a case of paternalistic action at 
all } . While Zembaty has attempted to make room for at least 
a minimal acceptance of paternalism in medical practice, 
Nielsen carefully circumscribes such practices to those 
cases where the patient is clearly not capable of exercising 
autonomy. 
The treatment of those incapable of giving 
informed consent is usually given a different justification 
from that of paternalism. This is because of a wide 
acceptance of a definition of paternalism along the line of 
Dworkin's: 
[ Paternalism is ] the inter ference with a per son's 
liberty of action justified by reasons referring 
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, 
needs, interests, or values of the person being 
coerced. {Dworkin, 1972: 65). 
Mappes and Zembaty, following Feinberg's discussion 
{ Feinberg, 1973: 7, Chapter 2), consider coercion to include 
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only intentional use of threat and of harm, so they redefine 
paternalism: 
Paternalism is the interference with a person's 
autonomy justified by reasons referring exclusively to 
the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or 
values of the person being .Q..Qn.s..tll�. (Mappes and 
Zembaty, 1981: 12) 
But such a definition excludes the possibility of 
paternalism in the case of those who are not autonomous 
(cf. , Culver and Gert, 1982: 130 ; Beauchamp and McCullough, 
1984: 84) . That is to say that one must be autonomous in 
order for one's autonomy to be interfered with. If one is 
unconscious, irrational or under some severe form of 
constraint, one's actions are not autonomous. In the case 
of not informing a patient who is not autonomous it could 
not be said that the medical practitioner is being 
paternalistic, since the patient's autonomy is not present 
to be infringed upon. In such cases it is preferable to get 
informed proxy consent (Nielsen, forthcoming ; Robinson, 
1972) . And in emergencies, other ethically relevant concerns 
such as promoting the patient's welfare and health are 
generally seen to take precedence over getting substituted 
consent or waiting for the patient to become competent. 
The exceptions to informed consent are typically 
justified either on the grounds that the patient is not 
currently competent and therefore there is a long term 
promotion of autonomy, or that the patient's immediate need 
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for medical treatment outweighs the value of delaying 
treatment for the patient to return to competency or for 
professionals to find a proxy. Since the latter emergency 
exception to paternalism and informed consent typically 
saves a person's life or at least promotes a quality of life 
by preserving certain physiological functions (e. g. , 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation may prevent brain damage; 
immediate treatment may avoid loss of limb, etc. ), it may be 
reasonably claimed that this action also promotes long term 
autonomy. So the doctrine of informed consent, and the 
exceptions to it, are directed toward preserving and 
promoting patients' and subjects' autonomy. This may 
reasonably be referred to as the main goal of informed 
consent. 
Why is it that patients' and subjects' autonomy 
needs to receive such protection? Konold (1978) has pointed 
out that ancient medical codes and prayers tended to be 
paternalistic in nature. He indicates that even the most 
historically persistent of these codes, the Oath of 
Hippocrates, counsels the physician to refuse certain 
patient requests and to judge what confidences to keep 
(Konold, 1978: 164). More recently, the " Nuremberg Code of 
Ethics in Medical Research" was developed to govern medical 
research and to provide ethical and legal standards to judge 
the Nazi practice of human experimentation (U . S . Defense 
Department. Nuremberg Code, Trials of war Criminals Before 
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the Nuremberg Military Tribunals , 1974). In 1964 the world 
Medical Association adopted the "Declaration of Helsinki" to 
guide physicians involved in biomedical research on human 
subjects (World Medical Association, 1975). These 
international concerns about the ethics of research centered 
around the issues of voluntariness and information to be 
provided the subjects. These concerns have been echoed in 
efforts by professions and governmental bodies within 
numerous countries, including the U.S. (National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, 1978) and Canada (Medical Research 
Council of Canada, 1978). In addition to the avoidance of 
such atrocities as occurred in the Nazi experiments, these 
efforts a re a recognition that medical research has a goal 
different from the typical therapeutic goal that 
characterizes the relationship between medical practitioner 
and patient. The fact that the research is aimed at the 
production of medical knowledge which may benefit future 
patients may seem to justify the particular subject bearing 
certain risks. But this decision cannot be made for the 
subject. Even the inherent paternalism in most therapeutic 
relationships cannot justify the medical researcher acting 
in behalf of a subject, since not therapeutic benefit but 
the gain in knowledge and potential benefit to future 
patients would be the basis of the decision to participate . 
This documentation of responses to the perceived 
57 
problem of informed consent in research on human subjects 
points to the obvious conflict that may arise in research, 
where the goal is not unambiguously the patient's health. 
Since the research goal is seen to provide a conflict of 
interest sufficient to require informed consent, it may 
provide a model for understanding the same requirement in 
therapeutic treatments. It may be that establishing the 
ethical issue will help to clarify the reason why the issue 
has received so much public attention. This may need to be 
supplemented with a description of the changes in general 
"societal"  perceptions, which will follow the ethical 
discussion. 
Judge Robinson has already been quoted in 
conjunction with legitimate limitations on the doctrine of 
informed consent. But Robinson also rejects a particular 
justification for the withholding of information: 
The physician's privilege to withhold information 
for therapeutic reasons must be carefully 
circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might 
devour the disclosure rule itself. The privilege 
does not accept the paternalistic notion that  the 
physician may remain silent simply because 
divulgence might prompt the patient to forego 
therapy the physician feels the patient really 
needs. That attitude presumes instability or 
perversity for even the normal patient, and runs 
counter to the foundation principle that the 
patient should and ordinarily can make the choice 
for himself. (1972: 789). 
This legal statement represents quite well the ethical 
concerns expressed in the doctrine of informed consent. The 
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autonomy of the patient is seen to be a principal concern in 
the therapeutic relationship, as in any other relationship . 
The fact that the physician has information that 
is material to the decision as to how to treat a patient 
becomes important in that the patient needs the information 
to make a rational decision . The presumption includes the 
patient's agency; it is expected that the patient is ideally 
the one deciding to accept or reject specific treatment 
options, under the guidance of the physician's knowledge and 
recommendation (cf., U.S. President's Commission Report, · 
1982: 36-39 on joint decisionmaking is critical of this 
presumption). 
This ethical description is noticeably at odds 
with the picture of the doctor-patient relationship depicted 
in the early codes such as the Oath of Hippocrates, where 
the physician is encouraged to decide what i s  in the 
patient's interests and keep within the profession knowledge 
pertinent to such decisions . But the shift of context for 
informed consent from the rather obviously relevant area of 
research into the therapeutic relationship is also due to 
social perceptions which have brought this issue to public 
attention. 
The shift in attitude toward physicians has been 
noted by many authors writing on informed consent. Mappes 
and Zernbaty (1986: 48) claim that the shift is from an 
assumption that physicians were best placed to act in 
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patients' best interests to one which assumes that patients 
should be actively involved in these decisions. They list 
three factors responsible for this change. First, the 
physician-patient relationship has become more impersonal as 
the practice of medicine becomes more technological and 
specialized. Secondly, the increase of illness due to the 
medical treatments that the profession has used (iatrogenic 
illness) has led some to question the "activist " orientation 
of many physicians. Third, physicians are increasingly 
gaining a reputation of being of a particular socio-economic 
class, with implied educational biases, and thus are 
suspected of having significant value differences from a 
large proportion of patients. 
Robert Veatch, in the introduction to his well 
known article, "Models for Medicine in a Revolutionary Age, " 
indicates that ethical issues in health care are gaining in 
publicity partly due to the growing acceptance of a "right 
to health care" (Veatch, 1972: 5). Medicine has only 
recently been able to make significant differences in 
people' s health and the concept of justice is being extended 
to physical and mental wel l-being (Veatch, 1972: 5 ;  World 
Health Organization, 1958). This is lending credence to the 
right to health care and thus to the impetus behind 
increased patient participation in health care decisions at 
both the level of informed consent and allocation of 
resources. Barber argues that in this age of "citizen and 
60 
civil rights, " medical research and treatment has become a 
sort of social problem. He indicates that what is 
considered a social problem is variable since it is defined 
as "a social condition that a sizable group comes to define 
as both bad and improvable or removable" (Barber, 1980: 2). 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, in considering the 
philosophy behind medical practice, recognize that societal 
deference to technology and those educated in it has 
resulted in a loss of control of the "values and purposes of 
that technology." (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1981: 255). 
They also observe that a particular patient's illness may 
result in a loss of the "ability to speak about his 
values." (Pellegrino and Thornasma, 1981: 254). They 
continue: 
Especially in tertiary care settings, we have 
observed that the values of the patient in 
decisions decline and the values of the 
institution or the health care team rush to fill 
that vacuum. (Pellegrino and Thornasrna, 1981: 254) 
While Pellegrino and Thornasrna emphasize patients' 
illness as the source of this loss of autonomous voice in 
health care decisions, there are sociologists of medicine 
who argue that it is the institutionalization of health care 
and the cultural authority of the physician which together 
account for this loss. Though we w ill return to these 
discussions later, it is relevant in this context to point 
out that such social analyses have been based on historical 
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accounts (Stevens, 1971; Starr, 1982; Conrad and Kern, 1981;  
Freidson, 1970b ) , as well as on empirical research into 
current medical practice (Fisher, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986; 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1970 ; Waitzkin and Stoekle, 1976 ; 
West, 198 0, 1982 ) .  
Whatever weight is given to these explanations, 
the social climate has supported a concern for patient 
participation in medical research and therapy. One of the 
chief outlets for this concern is the issue of informed 
consent. Informed consent is an ethical issue in its own 
right as has been shown by the earlier discussion of 
autonomy and paternalism in the withholding of medical 
information. What has yet to be discussed is what the 
precise goal of a doctrine of informed consent should be and 
how such a goal could be accomplished in the complex social 
context that makes up the delivery of health care. 
Capron's six functions of informed consent have 
already been discussed. But a relevant distinction can be 
drawn between function and purpose or goal. A medical 
treatment may be given for a purpose or to achieve a 
particular therapeutic goal and yet may have other effects, 
desirable or not, that it may be said to "function" to bring 
about. Thus one of the functions of certain radiation 
therapies in the treatment of cancer has been the increased 
incidence of certain iatrogenic osteosarcomas. Or a codeine 
prescription for the relief of pain may also function to aid 
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in relieving (or creating) gastro-intestinal problems. In 
an analogous manner, informed consent is meant to be a means 
of preserving patient autonomy by requiring informed 
participation of patients in health care decisions. But it 
may also seive to increase a general respect for autonomy 
and rational decisions. Or it may function to increase 
public input into research. But these are not necessarily 
or obviously the best means to accomplish these ends; they 
are simply unintended though not undesirable results. 
The goal of a doctrine and practice of informed 
consent is the promotion of patient autonomy in the receipt 
and delivery of health care. But what sta te of affairs is 
to be promoted as an expression of such an abstract goal? 
It seems that many discussions of standards of disclosure, 
comprehension, whether consent must be written or oral, and 
other procedural issues all differ on the point of what is 
to be acheived by informed consent. Indeed, Veatch seems to 
recognize this in his discussion of standards of 
disclosure. He argues that the acceptance of a "medical 
community of practice" is based on the principle of 
benefitting the patient (Veatch, 1977: 30 5). This is because 
the decisive factor then becomes whether the physician 
thinks the information would benefit the patient. He cites 
the court ruling in Berkey v. Anderson as supporting the 
conception of the physician-patient relationship on the 
model of other similar fiduciary relationships and thus 
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supportive of the "reasonable person " standard of disclosure 
{cf . ,  pages 11-13). This would emphasize the goal of 
allowing patients access to information in order that they 
may make their own decision, rather than so they can be 
informed as to what they are consenting to. Beauchamp and 
Childress (1979: 73-74) suggest that such a goal might be 
better served by an "individual patient standard " where the 
particular patient' s concerns and beliefs are taken into 
consideration to determine if any additional information not 
required by the reasonable person standard ought to be 
provided in this case. 
In arguing for a standard of disclosure that 
includes purposes of research, as we11· as risks and options, 
Ramsey (1970: 24) has suggested that the patient/subject 
becomes a "joint adventurer in the common enterprise of 
human medical progress" (cf. , U. S. President' s Commission 
Report , 1982: 36-39 on joint decisionmaking). This is a 
recognition that medical research cannot progress without 
the participation of human subjects nor of medical 
researchers. Thus both groups play indispensible roles in 
the advancement of medical science through research on human 
subjects. But since it is the subjects of research that 
bear the risks on their persons, it is reasonable that they 
share with the researcher in possessing such information as 
is relevant to the types and probabilities of risk. 
Ingelfinger argues that informed consent of such a type 
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practically requires that the patient receive not only 
pertinent information but also a medical education that 
allows for proper interpretation of the information imparted 
(Ingelfinger, 1972). He concludes that the requirement of 
informed consent in experimental therapy only serves to 
notify patients that part of their treatment is an 
experiment. He continues: 
Beyond this accomplishment, however, the process 
of obtaining "informed consent, " with all its 
regulations and conditions, is no more than 
elaborate ritual, a device that, when the subject 
is uneducated and uncomprehending, confers no more 
than a semblance of propriety on human 
experimentation. The subject' s only real 
protection, the public as well as the medical 
profession must recognize, depends on the 
conscience and compassion of the investigator and 
his peers. (Ingelfinger, 1972: 466) 
It is not clear what particular level of education that 
Ingelfinger think� patients or subjects would need to have 
in order for the practice of informed consent to be more 
than an "elaborate ritual. " But it does seem clear that 
Ramsey and Ingelfinger have drastically different pictures 
of what can reasonably be expected from a practical 
application of the doctrine of informed consent. 
Veatch has rejected the "collegial model" of 
physician-patient relationship on the basis of its 
unrealistic estimate of the similarities between physicians 
and patients as social classes (Veatch, 1972: 7). He 
suggests a "more provisional model" which he characterizes 
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as a contractual relationship where patient and physician 
work toward a common goal; patient health. This seems to be 
a middle ground between Ramsey and Ingelfinger, insisting on 
patient participation but admitting that physician 
understanding and comprehension may remain more extensive. 
Each normative analyst criticizes the current 
practice of consent and, using ethical principles, suggests 
an altered practice. But their rejection or expectation of 
"collegiality" or of "joint adventurer" or of a "contractual 
relationship" and other descriptive accounts are based on 
some practical estimate of what is realistic. Some. such as 
Ramsey, may be more optimistic about the educability of 
subjects, or may consider the practical constraints 
inconsequential in the face of the ethical arguments. To 
see how a social analysis might unify or critique these 
diverse approaches, it is helpful to describe the social 
circumstances which ethical analysts might be trying to 
achieve. 
All of these descriptions of the problematic state 
of affairs and the improved picture that is to be brought 
about by informed consent are quite vague. It seems that at 
least three different goals or "social pictures" may be 
defended. 
A) The first starts with a critique of the current 
situation as problematic because patients tend to agree to 
procedures whose details, effects and options are not well 
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known to them. This is ethically problematic because most 
patients are autonomous agents who ought to make decisions 
based on rational grounds. The lack of relevant information 
and the rationality of the consent is therefore 
questionable. Such consent may partly be based on trust in 
the medical professional. But this trust is problematic in 
two ways. First, it is an unreasonable burden to place on 
the medical practitioner and is irresponsible of the 
patient. Second, such an attitude allows value differences 
between patients and physicians to go unnoticed even though 
they may affect decisions . The goal of an applied doctrine 
of informed consent is to alter this state of affairs so 
that patients' consents are based on relevant information, 
the ir physicians' advice and their own values. The crucial 
change is that the patient. become aware of exactly ldlfil is 
being consented to and the implications of such a 
treatment. The patient will then be given the opportunity 
to agree with the physician's advice from an informed basis, 
rather than such agreement being based simply on a trust 
which may be rather naive (note that the standard of 
disclosure--reasons and risks of treatment--serves as the 
rationale for physician choice of medical options) .  (Cf. , 
the U. S. President's Commission Report, 1982: 50, for a 
discussion regarding the fact that some apparent trust may 
be due to patients' failure to know or believe that they 
have the prima facie right to self-determination. ) 
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The practical recommendation which follows from 
this analysis and goal is the provision of information and 
time for deliberation to the patient. Agreement, either 
verbal or written, to the procedure would basically be an 
indication that the patient has received the information and 
agreed to the treatment. The change is that where the 
patient formerly trusted the nedical practitioner to deliver 
health care productive of patients' best interests, now the 
patient is to be educated as to the reasons for the 
physician's choice and consent on that basis. 
A criticism of this analysis and response is that 
it produces informed consent only in that patients are now 
given a better understanding of proposed treatments and the 
reasons for them but are not really given more control or 
choices. Such consent is based on the receipt of 
information by the patient and the patient's trust of the 
physician to perform in a manner productive of the patient's 
best medical interests. But the requirement of informed 
consent is based on the ethical importance of autonomy. As 
such the emphasis is on the patient's self-determination. 
In order to fulfill such an ethical goal it is not enough 
that the patient's consent be based simply on an 
understanding of the reasons and implications of the 
procedure recommended by the physician. The moral doctrine 
of informed consent is an attempt to assure that the patient 
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has chosen the procedure over other options, not that the 
patient has chosen the physician and his or her choices. 
B )  So a second goal, to be distinguished from the 
first which aims at servin� patients' best int.erests, is one 
which attempts to change the social picture so that 
patients' interests are served. The difference between 
these two goals is the shift of emphasis from preserving the 
authority of the medical professional to determine what is 
in the patient's best interests, to one which treats such 
determination as a judgment of interests which only patients 
are ethically qualified to make. So any recommendation must 
determine what social change will either guarantee or 
increase the likelihood of this occurring and by what means 
the change can be brought about. 
The distinction between these first two goals have 
been made in such discuss ions as have been referred to above 
(Veatch, 1977: 305 ; Robinson, 1972: 789 ; Ingelfinger, 1972 ) . 
Authors such as Ingelfinger do not suggest that the social 
picture as it currently stands needs to change much, perhaps 
because the patients' medical interests are still served. 
So while he criticizes the unrealistic hopes of others as to 
what informed consent can achieve, he does not argue for any 
new or different measures. Robinson, on the other hand, 
suggests that physicians are legally bound to provide 
patients with information � opportunity to decide for 
themselves among options, rather that that they simply be 
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informed as to the reasons for, and implications of, the 
recommended treatment. Veatch, a much more prolific writer 
and offering an analysis of the situation that is perhaps 
more sophisticated, is more difficult to tie down to one 
position. Through what appears to be exhortations to 
physicians and patients, Veatch seems to encourage a change 
in attitude which is to "permit equality in the realm of 
moral significance between physician and patient without 
making the utopian assumption of collegiality." (Veatch, 
1972: 7). In his discussion of Berkey y, Anderson and 
Natanson v, Kline , Veatch also seems to agree that informed 
consent is to promote the goal of patient choice rather than 
patient's best interest (Veatch, 1977: 306) �ut neither of 
these discussions make concrete recommendations that both 
courts and physicians, and perhaps ethics committees, use 
the reasonabl e  person standard of disclosure, rather than 
that of the practice in the community. 
C) The third possible goal or desired social 
picture treats the ethical issue of informed consent as "a  
tip of the iceberg." Informed consent as an ethical issue 
points to the existence of a larger problem in health care 
practice, the difference in power between physician and 
patient. Power can mean many different things, but in this 
analysis it indicates the reduction of patients' ability to 
choose for themselves. All commentators admit that 
physicians possess the skill and knowledge which patients 
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need when ill. The problem of informed consent arises 
because patients may be treated without the respect for 
their autonomy that is their ethical "right." Initially this 
was seen as problematic because patients' interests were not 
always served, as in research and experimental treatments. 
The first goal of protecting patients' best interests were 
not always served, as in research and experimental 
treatments. The first goal of protecting patients' best 
interests addresses this concern. More recently, the 
concern has spread to allow patients the right to refuse 
treatment that physcians recommended, granting the patients 
the right to determine what is in their best interests. 
This is a better defined and more rigorous normative 
analysis of patient autonomy. But the social analysis of 
the delivery of health care has raised the question as to 
whether such a goal is realistic. Veatch considers the 
"assumpt ion of collegiality" to be "utopian." Further 
recognition of this fact is implicit in Robinson's denial of 
therapeutic privilege for the good of the patient (in the 
physician's opinion) , and in Ramsey's ethical goal of making 
subjects " joint adventurers" in medical research (Ramsey, 
1970: 24) . 
The third goal of informed consent differs from 
the second on the basis more of social analysis than of 
normative analysis. Both positions maintain that the 
ethical goal is to place patients firmly in control of 
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determining what is in their best interests. Achieving this 
goal in the delivery of health care will require more than 
setting disclosure standards and informed consent 
procedures. The third goal differs in its targeted social 
picture by recogni z ing with Veatch that the current social 
situation in the delivery of health care is one which makes 
the assumption of collegiality, which grants physician and 
patient equal moral voice, terribly unrealistic. But rather 
than give up such a social picture altogether, the third 
goal is precisely to actualize this picture. Informed 
consent is then seen as part of a program whose goal is to 
alter the social circumstances of the delivery of health 
care in such a way as to promote pat ients' increased 
autonomy. In order to begin such an ambitious task it is 
important to understand and identify those factors in the 
delivery of health care which are involved in the 
suppression of patient autonomy. Informed consent is an 
excellent place to start since it too is aimed at the 
promotion of patient autonomy. But the typical practice of 
informed consent, while based on the normative concern for 
patient autonomy, is clearly too limited an approach for 
accomplishing even the second goal; that of allowing 
patients to determine their own interests rather than 
expecting physicians to do so for them (cf. , U. S. 
President's Commission report, 1982 : 46. The Commission's 
survey found that 72% of the public wanted to share 
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decisions with physicians while 8 8 %  of the physicians 
surveyed believed patients wanted physicians to choose for 
them. ). 
·The encouragement of patient autonomy through the 
doctrine of informed consent is a very abstract, or not 
obviously applicable, ethical maxim. In attempting to break 
this concept into smaller more manageable and applicable 
ones, the issues of standards of disclosure, competency, 
undue influence, rationality and comprehension become the 
focus. As has been argued, such concepts, especially if 
they are to play important roles in practical 
recommendations, are difficult to define and controversial 
in their application. But even if such concepts were agreed 
upon and their import determined for the concept of autonomy 
in the context of informed consent, any recommendations 
resulting from the normative analysis would need to utilize 
some socially determinable markers to employ the suggested 
parameters. Thus some form of social analysis is necessary 
in any applicable determination of moral responsibility and 
criticism of current situations. Consequently this 
discussion will now turn to consider what form this social 
analysis needs to take and how the ethical analysis relates 
to the social analysis. 
For the purpose of determining a relevant 
framework for social analysis, I now turn to the work of 
discourse analysts, especially Sue Fisher and Jeff Coulter, 
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to construct a framework for social analysis. Fisher's work 
is based on a layered analysis which analyzes medical 
interactions and distinguishes levels of social analysis 
with constraining social factors. Coulter 's  work continues 
the argument that a sociological-contextual approach (like 
Fisher's) is superior to the psychological-intentional 
models . 
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CHAPTER I I  
Social Analysis: A Method 
The task of this chapter is to describe and defend 
a framework for social analysis. In order to be helpful, 
the social analysis needs to provide a basis for 
understanding the genesis of the concrete actions to which 
normative analysis applies. It must supply both the details 
relevant for normative ethical analysis and the details 
relevant for the social construction of effective 
recommendations. Furthermore, the assumptions upon which 
the social analysis is built must be at least reasonable, 
and preferably the most reasonable of all the alternatives. 
This chapter will describe a form of social analysis, called 
discourse analysis. The discussion will then turn to the 
assumptions on which this analytic framework is based. 
Social analysis has traditionally had a variety of 
foci, any of which would be fruitful to explore. In finding 
a place to start, I choose to begin with the fact of 
meaningful communication. It seems an undeniable fact that 
social activities and communication occur. Starting with 
this fact, we can ask how participants in the social world 
successfully perform these activities. One approach to this 
task is represented by reality reconstruction. Generally, 
the emphasis in this approach is to get an "insider's view" 
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of the particular social activity, which may be any 
observable behavior. This qualitative approach proceeds by 
observation and interview, perhaps aided by a familiarity 
with traditional sociological concepts and what has been 
written about the activity being studied. What is studied 
or observed is the significance that interactions and acts 
have for the participant (cf., Blumer, 1969: 4-5). Herbert 
Blumer called this approach " symbolic interactionism" 
because it focuses on whether participants see something as 
real, as evidenced in their interactions, rather than on 
whether what they treat as real is accurate or " true" 
(Blumer, 1969: 4-5) . The reliance on sociological traditions 
and literature need not cause a bias ; it is a means of 
avoiding random observations with the likelihood of personal 
bias. The analytic concepts gleaned from this background 
understanding are to be taken as "sensitizing concepts" 
which may be revised in the field as they are reinforced or 
contradicted by observation (cf., Glaser and Strauss, 1967 ) . 
The focus is on the interaction of persons in 
order to find the significance of the whole event or of 
particular elements. Secondly, the use of background 
understanding is . to suggest what to look for, but is not 
taken as a pre-established "rule." Both data-based and 
theoretical sociology provide conceptualizations as to how 
the social world is " cut up" and how it "works." These 
conceptualizations may be treated by a symbolic 
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interactionist as sensitizing concepts. The traditional 
focus on demographic information is a good example of this. 
One might suppose on the basis of common knowledge, 
theorizing and perhaps some studies, that female patients 
would respond differently than male patients. Rather than 
setting out to prove this as a hypothesis, one could begin 
to observe and record interactions to see if such is the 
case. If we were to find a pattern that is general ly 
supportive of the generalization but had exceptions, it 
might then be interesting to look more closely at the 
exceptions to see what they have in common. Perhaps an 
alternative, or complementary, analytic element might 
provide further clarification of the pattern of action. For 
example, Bernstein and Kane (1981) found that differences in 
labelling was correlated with patients' sex and 
expressiveness. While non-expressive women were more likely 
to be diagnosed as having a psychosomatic disorder, 
expressive men and women were about equally probable to be 
so labelled. Note that an exception is only visible against 
a background of a general ru le. So the general rule may not 
be falsified as much as shown to be an incomplete depiction 
of how "things usually go." It is not that patients' sex 
was found to be irrelevant, but rather that the action is 
more complicated than the broader rule can depict. In the 
example, if women are general ly less expressive than men in 
medical interactions then the general rule holds that women 
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as a class are more frequently diagnosed as psychosomatic. 
The latter general rule, though fai l ing to explain as wel l  
as the two-factor correlation, nevertheless may accurately 
describe a pattern, directing attention to a possible 
problem (sexism in medical practice) and the manner in which 
it occurs. 
sociology and the "Mundane " 
Sociologists who study everyday activities focus 
on the mundane rather than the extraordinary (Schwartz and 
Jacobs, 1979: 235) . This focus on everyday activities, such 
as giving and obeying commands or maintaining a personal 
space in a public place (Goffman, 1963: 3-32), is an 
innovation in both sociology and philosophy. Both 
disciplines have longstanding rationalist traditions for 
which theoretical concerns set the boundaries of the 
discussions. While common knowledge of the world has played 
a role in both disciplines, the focus of most discussions 
has been on theoretically interest ing issues such as 
reconciling mind and body dualism or identifying social 
norms and their effects on groups of people in society. 
Neither trad ition gave much insight into how different 
individuals were able to get along in spite of such large 
scale "problems. " For the "person in the street, " neither 
the mind-body problem nor the influence of social norms ever 
78 
entered into practical considerations which might be used as 
examples by the theorists. My hand just does rise when I so 
choose and a desire to marry and have children in a stable 
social and economic situation seems to be a personal desire, 
not an external social norm. The theoretical issues seem to 
disappear when the focus of analysis is how these everyday 
activities are possible. Nevertheless , this 
"micro"-analysis requires further theoretical work on what 
explanations best account for the actions. 
Ironically, the focus on everyday activities and 
how they are "accomplished, " or successsfully executed, 
yields two problems. Descriptions of what must be 
postulated to underlie these activities in order to explain 
how they are accomplished must account for many of the 
implicit beliefs and shared social activities common to the 
actors. These elements of the everyday activities of people 
may not be recognizable as constitutive of their actions by 
any one but social scientists. So to make the claim that 
these beliefs and activities were second nature to the 
participants, it is important to describe them in a manner 
that might at least be recognizable and verifiable by anyone 
who participates in those activities, though their role 
vis-a-vis the activities might not be recognized by the 
participants. 
The second problem that arises out of the focus on 
detailed description of how the mundane activities of 
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everyday life are carried out is that the role of these 
social features described as underlying the activities, 
making them practically possible, is likely to be considered 
trivial to the participants. Discussions of the accuracy or  
the influence of the social factors postulated as underlying 
their practices would seem incredible to the participants. 
If asked why she used a certain behavior (i.e., avoiding eye 
contact, terse responses, backing away) to keep her personal 
space, the observed woman might well wonder what the 
interviewer was talking about ; at least she might simply 
assert that it is just what she does in some cases without 
thinking about it ; or she might explain why the other 
interactant made her uncomfortable. If a histo�y lecturer 
were asked if he believed that the world existed during the 
period of history he was lecturing on, he would likely think 
we were joking or taunting him. The focus and detail needed 
to carry out the research required to understand these 
mundane activities leads us to describe much of the context 
or  "beliefs" which are even more trivial than the 
interaction studied, from the participants' point of view. 
The description of these elements are quite possibly not 
recognizable by the actors without considerable explanation 
as to what we are trying to portray. 
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Schwartz and Jacobs { 1979 : 2 14) describe such 
participants' knowledge, or Garfinkel's "social facts" as : 
1 .  Features of the society that members knew, 
discovered, used and (above all) talked about 
in the context of daily activity. 
2. Features of the society which were 
"accomplished" by practical reasoning in every 
day life. 
These "social facts" are what members use to 
perform and rationally account for their everyday 
activities. Commonly understood features of the social 
order are rarely made explicit, since they form the basis of 
rational explanation and action. Activities and 
explanations or accounts are based on such implicitly and 
explicitly acknowledged features. That is what mak es the 
activities intelligible and reasonable. This common sense 
of social structures forms the basis of all social 
activity. These "social facts" are real in that they have 
social consequences. Awareness of them allows members to 
use practical reasoning in successfully performing their 
everyday activities. Shared knowledge of them makes 
members' actions reasonable to other members and is the 
basis of cooperative action and conversation. One of the 
central questions for ethnomethodologists is, "What is the 
relationship between social structure and practical 
reasoning in everyday life ?" { Schwartz and Jacobs, 1 979 : 
2 14) . 
81 
The relation between implicitly understood 
practices and practical, everyday communicative actions, is 
an important issue for ethnomethodologists. Theoretical 
sociologists and social-political philosophers have created 
a wide range of social theories, norms and descriptions of 
social structures to account for the functioning of 
societies and groups within them. Qualitative sociologists, 
phenomenologists, existentialists and some Wittgensteinian 
philosophers are more interested in how particular people 
live their everyday existence. The element of truth in the 
theoretical approaches is that there do seem to be certain 
shared social forms which are expressed, and direct the 
activities of people (though not deterministically) .  The 
generalizations that accurately depict patterns of everyday 
activity express social facts which shape our actions and 
communication in a manner that can be described in this 
general form. The founder of "cognitive sociology, " Aaron 
Cicourel (1973) is concerned with an empirically-based 
understanding of how these methods are acquired by 
individuals and then used to create the world within which 
practical activities are manageable. Practitioners of 
Cicourcel ' s  cognitive sociology, together with those of 
linguistics and sociolinguistics, have made various attempts 
to specify what is necessary to account for how it is that 
we come to have such complex abilities (cf. , Chomsky, 1 9 6 6 ; 
Lyons, 1970) . 
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Other sociologists have started with the fact that 
we have the ability to carry out social activities and 
conversations and then they set out to describe how 
particular events are accomplished. Conversational analysts 
such as Harvey Sacks and Emmanuel Scheglof f  concentrate on 
elements within the conversation itself to explain the 
outcome or the joint participation of the actors in 
producing a common understanding of the situation. They 
consider such elements as the patterned · occurrence of 
utterances and they attempt to construct the rules which 
describe them (Scheglof f, 1968 ; Sacks, Schegloff  and 
Jefferson, 1974 ; Schegloff  and Sacks, 1974). Frankel (1983: 
45), another conversational analyst, describes the practical 
value of making explicit such elements of the interaction in 
medical settings: 
The value of an interpretive view in medicine is 
that it radically transforms the nature of the 
physician's participation in the health care 
encounter from an objective, dispassionate giver 
of advice to an interactional partner who actively 
participates in the social construction of 
il lness, its treatment and outcome . 
The description of the function of certain rules 
of conversation shows that the physician plays a role in 
shaping the conception of illness, treatment and prognosis 
which becomes the topic and outcome of the encounter. The 
focus is not specifically linguistic. Rather, the analysis 
of the interview is an examination of how the outcome and 
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conception of illness and treatment is not something 
stipulated but created between the participants. This is a 
functional view of the use of language and the role of the 
participants, although language and meaning are not the 
focus of the analysis. 
Discourse analysts extend this focus on the 
structural and constitutive elements of everyday activities 
to examine an entire language event, discovering that the 
conversation is not entirely produced by elements found 
within the conversation. Rather, as members of a culture, 
participants bring with them a collection of values, beliefs 
and accepted practices. Through these "social facts", and 
in the context of the conversation, a conceptualization of 
appropriate outcomes and means is formed by the 
participants. More specifically, discourse analysts have 
argued that such an event is constrained specifically by the 
"institutional order" within which it is located. The 
mundane activity of medical treatment includes as part of 
its structural and constitutive elements shared knowledge of 
the institution of medicine ; i. e. , how patients and 
physicians must act in order to facilitate treatment. The 
practical reasoning displayed in such interactions reveal 
interactants' understanding of the "expected" or "proper" 
structure of the discourse. Such "structuring" also 
facilitates the achievement of institutional goals. For 
example, the discourse in classroom lessons (Mehan, 1979) 
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and in medical interviews (Fisher, 1979, 1982, 1983 ; Fisher 
and Todd, 1983) are found to be arranged to facilitate the 
accomplishment of institutional goals. 
Shared knowledge of the need and method to 
accomplish concrete tasks within social or institutional 
settings is the locus of the relation between more abstract 
norms and rules and concrete action. Such a connection is 
precisely where discourse analysts argue institutional roles 
and authority come into play in the shaping of discourse and 
subsequent concepts and outcomes. 
The discourse analysts' awareness of institutional 
goals and authority is part of their professional 
familiarity with the relevant literature. But postulation 
of the presence and influence of such abstract concepts 
depend for support on their power to explain the concrete 
action of each interaction, and the common patterns across 
interactions within particular. institutional settings. Thus 
the analysis of social action can be seen as having 
different layers or levels of concreteness or abstractness 
with respect to the analytic concepts. 
Levels of Analysis 
Some discourse analysts have analyzed interactions 
as being constrained by and reflecting elements of the 
social world which are shared either between the two 
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pa rticipants or  by a wider social group . The discussion of 
such an approach follows . My framework is heavily dependent 
upon the work of Sue Fisher (1979, 1982, 1983, 1986: cf. , 
Knor r-Cetina and Cicourel, 1981). 
Fisher (1983: 140-141) suggests that an 
nethnography of speaking n (Hymes, 1962) ought to record and 
analyze naturally occur ring talk, •displaying it as socially 
produced. " This places the interaction in a perspicuously 
described context which p rovides the grounds for its 
understanding as well as for seeing its function. Such 
sociolinguistic studies have been done as complete studies 
of language use (cf . � Labov, 1972: Schutz, 1973, Shuy, 
1983). Labov and Fanshel (1977) found that therapeutic 
discourse, as distinct from everyday conversation, displayed 
an asymmetry in the discour se, which influenced the exchange 
of information between the actors. Fisher further indicates 
the similarity between the asymmetry that Labov and Fanshel 
discuss and the • competence gap" discussed by the social 
critics Waitzkin and Waterman (1974). The latter claim that 
this asymmetry is the result of socioeconomic factors which 
cause the participants to enter the medical .interview with 
different needs and resources . Eliot Freidson (1970a, 
1970b) has also noted this· asymmetry, explain_ing it in terms 
of an imbalance of knowledge between p rofessional and 
client. Fisher refers to Shuy (1983) as demonstrating that 
the difference between normal conversations and medical 
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interviews affect the patients' participation and 
understanding of the information and interview. Cicourel 
( 1 973, 1 975 ) ,  among others, has also claimed that the method 
of information exchange affects how the information is 
understood. These apparently competing analyses of the 
interactional asymmetry may be arranged into a complementary 
framework. 
Beginning with her earlier work ( 1979 ) ,  and 
carried through her later analyses, Fisher suggests that 
there are at least three levels of analysis which can be 
distinguished. As we shall see, there are the 
interactional, organizational and structural levels of 
analysis. It is important to understand that none of these 
levels of analysis is "experienced" or found as different 
types of social factors in the social world. Rather, they 
are of varying degrees of generality; some may be unique to 
one or a few particular interactions, others may be common 
to most interactions of a certain type due to their being 
placed in a particular setting (i. e . , medical) ,  and still 
other factors may be common to an entire society or a 
sector. 
This type of approach may be a means to bridge 
what some have called the "micro-macro" gap in sociology 
( Habermas, 1 970, Cicourel, 1 975; Mehan and Wood, 1 975; 
Fisher, 1 982; Fisher and Todd, 1 983 : 1 1 -12) . At the "macro " 
end of the spectrum are social theorists who construct 
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theories of societies and how groups within them function, 
examining such things as social norms and deviant behavior 
(e. g. , Marx, 1964; Parsons, 1951; Waitzkin and Waterman, 
1974; Krause, 1977; Conrad and Kern, 1981). Within medical 
sociology, recommendations are large scale, such as Waitzkin 
and Waterman's (1974) claim that injustices in the delivery 
of health care can be addressed only by reconsidering the 
capitalist structure of the medical system and the society 
(cf. , Navarro, 1973). This roughly corresponds to Fisher's 
structural level of analysis. At the other end of the 
spectrum are interactionists who set out to increase our 
understanding of the everyday practice of medicine; how the 
medical interviews occur and are understood by the 
participants (e.g., Davis, 1963; Roth, 1963; Millman , 1977; 
Bosk , 1981). More specifically , they are concerned to 
produce a description of how the participants, say Davis' 
(1963) disabled patients, produce a definition of the 
situation and self (in the example, definitions that deny or 
reject the disabilities). An extension of this type of work 
includes that of Garfinkel and Cicourel who encouraged 
empirical study of how individuals within interactions 
contribute to an .understanding of the action for both 
participants (Garfinkel, 1967) or how language is used to 
"create and sustain the social world" (Cicourel , 1973). 
These analyses roughly correspond to Fisher's interactional 
level of analysis. 
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Situated between these two ends of the spectrum 
are sociologists such as Freidson (1970a, 1970b, 1973) , 
Goffman, (196 1) , Mehan (1979) , and Bel lah (1970) . 
Discussions at this level of analysis, called the 
"organizational" level by Fisher, consider how the 
organization of particular professions or settings influence 
the interactions. For example, Eliot Freidson (1970a) 
describes the rise of the medical profession's autonomy in 
terms of the influence of funding agencies, social and legal 
action and educational requirements (cf. , Stevens, 1971; 
Starr, 1982) . As a consequence of this organizational 
development of the profession of medicine, and in particular 
its autonomy, the practice of medicine is shaped in a 
particular manner. The specialized medical knowledge that 
the professional possesses, and of which the patient is in 
need, sets up an asymmetry. Other professional choices also 
influence the physicians' behavior toward patients. If the 
setting is a fee-for-service practice, the interaction is 
more likely to be client-oriented than in a group practice, 
where the setting is colleague-centered (Freidson, 1970a) . 
Fisher labels her three levels of analysis 
"interactional, " "organizational" and " structural" (1979, 
1982, 1983; Fisher and Todd, 1983: 3-13) . She emphasizes 
that the analysis is not that there are disparate levels of 
influences, but that the different levels of analysis must 
be seen to reflexively support one another in a manner that 
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is indistinguishable in the interactions . Together they 
comprise the social facts of which the interactants are 
either tacitly aware or to which they have access (see 
discussion on page 101) . A complete analysis of paradigmatic 
cases which illustrate a pattern common to medical practice 
(in general or, more commonly, in particular types of 
settings) will describe this reflexive relationship between 
interactional, organizational and structural levels of 
analysis . The relationship is reflexive in that the 
interactions are both constrained by and reflect or recreate 
the organizational and structural factors . This is, as it 
were, a two-way street, where structural and organizational 
factors guide, but do not determine in a strict sense, how 
the interactions proceed ; what purposes they serve and what 
treatment outcomes are likely . But since these social 
factors enter the interaction through the shared social 
world of the interactants, they are not external constraints 
as much as tacitly understood shared beliefs, or better, 
practices. As such, these factors are recreated in each 
interaction by the participants, serving as a hermeneutic 
context which enables the actors to engage in functional 
communicational activity . They are shared methodological 
beliefs and activities which are learned common patterns of 
behavior . 
Sociologists like Fisher are concerned with 
understanding communicative action within particular 
9 0  
settings and how the setting differs from other activities 
such as natural conversation in less institutionalized 
contexts. The non-deterministic reflexive relationship 
among: 
1. concrete actions, including recurring patterns 
across different interactions (interactional level of 
analysis); 
2. factors described as unique to particular 
professions or settings (organizational · level of analysis); 
and 
3. factors described as common to the society 
(structural level of analysis), provides us with a model 
within which a comprehensive analysis is possible. 
It may be that we are not likely to be capable of 
identifying or classifying all the factors, though in the 
social analysis that Fisher suggests, it may be that we can 
identify the more important ones. 
Consider briefly how such an analysis would apply 
to medical interactions. The interactions observed and 
recorded may be characterized at the interactional level in 
terms of the recurring patterns of communication, including 
control of topic, number of interruptions, contribution to 
outcomes, etc • .  Paradigm cases may be chosen as 
illustrations of the patterns, though no one element of the 
pattern is intended to be construed as a necessary or 
universal factor. Some analysts, at this level of analysis, 
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have found that the health-care provider shapes the 
patient' s conceptualization of illness and its treatment 
(Frankel, 1983: 45). Paget (1983) has argued that 
practitioners emphasize and de-emphasize patients' fears and 
conceptualizations through subtle interactional nuances. 
Attempting to understand why the professional has a 
preferential role in defining and clarifying even 
non-medical concepts leads us to the organizational level of 
analysis. The unquestioning acceptance · of the physician's 
authority is common to both physicians' and patients' life 
experiences. Though there is evidence of this acceptance of 
professional authority in the interaction, it is construed 
as an organizational factor because it is a general feature 
of the organization of medical practice and the profession 
(cf. , Fisher, 1979, 1982; Fisher and Todd, 1983; Fisher and 
Groce, forthcoming). Throughout her work, Fisher argues 
that the institutional authority of the doctor structures 
the discourse, shapes the flow of the information and 
influences the process of medical decision-making. Not only 
do the professional and institutional affiliations of 
professionals vest them with authority, but since 
practitioner and patient share a common social world, the 
view of the practitioner-patient relationship is shared. 
Consequently patients are, in these instances where 
persuasion is required, often easily persuaded that their 
best interests are served by the physician's 
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recommendations. The emphasis on institutionally situated 
events allows for the consideration of such non-local 
factors on the production of meaningful discourse and 
agreement on outcomes. 
The institutionalization of medical practice did 
not occur in a vacuum. In fact the practice of medicine for 
profit and its network of ties with other profit-oriented 
organizations such as pharmaceutical companies, establishes 
conflicts of interest with patients' best interest. 
Knowledge of this is also common to both patients and 
physicians, yet rarely does a suspicion of profit as a 
motive find expression in a medical interaction. 
Conspicuous in its absence from the content of the 
discourse , such a well known structural factor is a 
taken-for-granted feature of the context of medical (and 
other) practices. Perhaps there is also an assumption that 
professionals' good intentions are a sufficient check on 
this factor (see discussion of profit-motive on pages 94 
ff). The �ispensing of drug samples and the typical use of 
brand names rather than the generic ones are cues that point 
to the influence of pharmaceutical companie� on medical 
practice. These are analyzed · as structural factors because 
drug samples and prescription by brand name reflect a 
monopolistic , profit-seeking enterprise which is common to a 
society as a political and economic entity. Though finding 
unique expression in medical interactions, 
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structural factors could be expected to show up in any 
interaction within that society. Once again, it is 
appropriate to refer to this as a "level of analysis" 
because it is an attempt to describe the social factors 
which serve to "ground" the communication and its meaning 
for the participants . The profit motive is not an element 
of the interaction, but rather explains why practices or 
actions in the interaction occur as they do. 
Consider the example of the influence of 
pharmaceutical companies' profit motive on the prescription 
of a drug to a particular patient . In the interaction, we 
may find a physician prescribing by brand-name a drug which 
she believes will help the patient. Presumably the patient 
will take the prescription and have it filled. Both pat ient 
and physician find this activity intelligible and consistent 
with their mutually perceived goals of efficiently treating 
the patient's ailment . The patient within the context of 
physician-patient encounters, does not typically question 
why he needs the physician's authorization to purchase a 
needed drug . Both are familiar with the social arrangement 
of prescribing controlled substances, and this seems to help 
make the entire activity intelligible . They also share a 
conception of the physician's ability to competently 
diagnose and prescribe. This also helps to make the 
exchange intelligible. Pointing out these institutional 
arrangements would likely seem trivial to the patient and 
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physician. Conversely, the patient may not fully accept the 
legitimacy of this arrangement; but, since he has no 
recourse outside of the system, nevertheless considers the 
observation moot. 
This description of the institutional context 
makes explicit some of the tacit understanding which enables 
physician and patient to engage in intelligible and 
effici ent communication. It describes the institutional 
conventions on which the communication depends for its 
intelligibility. As a social analysis of the 
institutionally-located interaction, these details help 
account for the actors' ability to accomplish the apparent 
goals of the exchange, as well as for why it was 
accomplished in this manner rather than in another manner 
(e.g., the physician could suggest that patient buy a drug, 
but does not give a prescription, or suggests the drug by a 
chemical or generic name). Such details having been made 
explicit, two questions guide further analysis. First, a 
social and empirical issue, is whether this particular 
institutional arrangement currently exists (in the example, 
whether and how much influence pharmaceutical companies have 
on medical practice). This leads us into further social and 
historical exploration. Note, however, that the "reasons" 
or social factors which shape institutional contexts (e. g., 
profit, efficiency, distribution of labor) may be quite 
different from the goals which actors within the institution 
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are pursuing (i. e. , health in general or particular health 
needs). The second issue arises from this social analysis 
of the raison d'etre of the institution (i. e. , the delivery 
of health care) in comparison to particular goals of 
physicians and patients within it (e. g. , inexpensive 
treatment, conservation of time). The issue is whether the 
social factors which shape the institutional context of 
medical practice have a neutral, complementary or 
antagonistic effect on the achievement of the particular 
actors' goals. This question directs further social 
analysis to the examination of social factors which may 
shape the context of the interaction in a manner that is 
antagonistic or complementary to the goals of the physician 
and patient. Furthermore, the context so evolved may also 
set physician and patient at cross purposes, though there is 
still the common institutional g�al of patient health. This 
might be manifested by a patient's desire to receive 
inexpensive and effective medical care, which a generic 
prescription might most efficiently accomplish, and a 
physician's desire to treat efficiently and safely, combined 
with an incomplete knowledge of the drugs which are 
alternatives for the brand-name drug. The explicit 
discussion of these details sets the stage for the analysis 
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of normative issues (i. e. , informed consent, deception, 
etc. ) • 
The profit motive of pharmaceutical companies can 
reasonably be said to stimulate a considerable amount of 
advertising and educative activities. Since it is 
physicians, not patients, who prescribe drugs, they are 
included in the companies' target population. The goal of 
these activities, including seminars, informal "education" 
and dispensing free samples, is quite clearly to influence 
general prescribing practices. The larger companies 
dispensing brand-name drugs, engage in the most aggressive 
research and advertising endeavours. Practicing physicians 
who have severely limited time to read about new 
pharmaceutical advances, will of course find it easiest to 
depend on those drugs with which they are most familiar and 
have had experience. In this manner, the profit motive of 
pharmaceutical companies results in promotional activity 
which shapes the prescribing habits of physicians. The 
institutional context, as has been discussed, sets the stage 
for physicians to prescribe as they see fit and for patients 
to comply without considering those institutional 
constraints on the options. 
This influence on the context which constrains and 
socially legitimates the interaction is antagonistic to the 
patient's interest. Patients could reasonably be assumed to 
want the least expensive of identical treatments. 
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Brand-name prescribing does not allow for this. A patient 
might also benefit from some difference in drugs which has 
not been made a sales point of a brand-name drug. Having 
grown dependent on this source of information, a physician 
may be unaware or inadequately informed of such a 
therapeutic advantage. Thus the indirect influence of the 
pharmaceutical companies on particular therapeutic 
interactions may actually be antagonistic to patients' 
interests. 
Methodological Assumptions 
The assumptions which form the basis for this 
analysis may be controversial. The idea that understanding 
communication must be done by means of a 
contextual-sociological process rather than an 
intentional-psychological one is widely debated. It is not 
my purpose to enter into this debate here, but rather to 
briefly indicate the philosophical bases for my approach. 
The role of intentions in ethics has a long history ; but, as 
was discussed in Chapter I (pages 38-48), it presents us 
with considerable difficulties. Though seldom discussed, 
there is good reason for a shift toward a social basis for 
understanding ethics, primarily due to the increased 
explanatory power and sensitivity vis-a-vis understanding 
communication and social behavior. This was argued (in 
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Chapter I) to be relevant to both the analyses and 
recommendations of applied ethics. The crucial assumptions 
of this analysis are as follows: 
1. Communication and social action can best be 
analyzed by specifying the actors' intersubjective 
understanding of the context of the action (rather than 
analyzing intentions, motives, beliefs etc. on an 
intentional-psychological model). 
· 2. The effectiveness of such an analysis is due to 
the fact that the performance of everyday activities is 
based on common practices and tacit presuppositions (not on 
cognitive structures or systems of rules, or even responses 
to interactional stimuli). 
3. These common practices and beliefs "structure" 
discourse and action (in a non-necessary, non-determinative 
predispositional manner). 
4. From a sample of similar interactions we can 
deduce the "structuring" elements, buttressing our 
observations with literature review, information about the 
setting, and the testimony of the interactants (rather than 
searching for conscious or unconscious beliefs). 
5. Some of these structuring elements serve to 
promote class or institutional goals, in some instances 
directing discourse or action contrary to one or more 
actor's desires or interests (rather than such social 
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factors being influential only when they are · known by the 
actors). 
I will discuss the philosophical bases for these 
assumptions, drawing heavily from Jeff Coulter's book, � 
Social:...ConstroctiQILQf- Mind (1979, esp. Chapter Two). 
Aiternative-Accoonts-of-Hnman-sehavior 
There_ has been considerable effort devoted to 
finding referents for mental ascriptions such as intention, 
motive, and thought or for the processes of intending, 
remembering, understanding, thinking , etc. Mentalists, 
including contemporary cognitivists, assume that there must 
be such mental states or processes which can be typified and 
provide insight into human behavior. Behaviorists have 
assumed that such efforts are in vain due to the "privacy" 
or introspective nature of any access to such phenomena. · 
They have focused on operational definitions of such 
ascriptions. The analysis of intentional action , 
remembering , knowing, etc. is . then to be based on 
observable patterns of behavior which justify these 
ascriptions. Conceptual analysts have tried to describe the 
logical grammar of mental concepts. This too has led to a 
priori theorizing, resulting in general concepts, which are 
frequently inapplicable to some mundane contexts of use. It 
is this de-contextualized characterizations of the . 
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"psychological phenomena", shared by these theorists, which 
Wittgensteinian analysts have rejected. 
As Wittgenstein endeavored to illustrate, 
philosophical problems result when we consider mental 
predicates out of their context of everyday use. Rather 
than looking for conceptual or referential "common ground " 
of mental predicates, we are advised to observe their 
non-problematic usage in mundane contexts and search for how 
interactants make sense of them in context. This, as 
Coulter (1979: 36, 37) indicates, lays a foundation for a 
social-organizational approach, rather than a 
psychological-mentalistic one. 
Consider Coulter' s discussion of the analysis of 
the mental predicate "understanding. " Some cognitive 
psychologists have characterized understanding as a mental 
"click of comprehension" (Coulter, 1979; R. Brown, 1968; 
Bransford and Mccarrell, 1974). Ryle (1973: 163) has 
criticized this account. He indicates that this is rarely 
the case phenomenologically, and is defeated as a legitimate 
claim should the claimant fail to provide evidence of 
comprehension. There are public criteria for the claim to 
understand which are suppled by the context of use. Each 
context provides such practically "sufficient" criteria "and 
no experiential or mental process can in itself fully 
constitute understanding nor count as a determinate 
criterion" (Coulter, 1979: 38). And, as Coulter indicates, 
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Wittgenstein takes a similar approach; "but for us it is .th.e 
circumstance� under which he had such an experience that 
justify him in saying in such a case that he understands" 
(Wittgenstein, 1958: paragraph 155). 
What is rejected by this account, and what 
behaviorists and cognitivists have in common, is the attempt 
to fix a referent for "understanding "  in general, 
independent of any context of use. As Coulter ( 1979: 39) 
explains: 
The criteria for understanding, for having 
understood, cannot be private, inner menta l or 
experiential states or processes, but must be 
scenic. 
Coulter goes on to explain what he means by 
insisting ·that the criteria for understanding must be 
"scenic. " Most practical contexts do not al low or require 
the continual checking and rechecking for fulfillment of the 
criteria for understanding. Rather, social interactions 
typical ly occur in such a manner that the context and flow 
of communicat ion or act ion provides pract ically "suf f icient " 
grounds for the assumption or questioning of actors' 
understanding. Decontextualized or abstract discussions of 
understanding (or any other mental predicates) omit this 
context-specific element. The resulting esoteric notion of 
understanding bears little resemblance to the particular 
contextual uses of the term. For any mental-state 
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description, there are likely to be contexts where 
fulfillment of the abstract conditions for "understanding" 
(if they can be formulated at all), will be rejected by 
participants in the context as insufficient or irrelevant. 
And any generalized behavioral description of 
"understanding"  will meet the same fate. It is only through 
a detailed examination of a particular context of use that 
the relevant practical criteria for understanding can be 
formulated. And there is no a priori reason to assume these 
contextual criteria to be generalizable to other contexts or 
to be characteristic of any "essence" of understanding. 
Fodor and Katz (197 1) have criticized such 
Wittgensteinian approaches to language and meaning (cf. , 
Coulter, 1979: 46). They claim that the Wittgensteinian 
focus on context-specific elucidations of meaning cannot 
account for novel utterances. The rejection of semantic 
structures or generative rules, claim Fodor and Katz, makes 
it impossible to account for the construction and 
understanding of never-before-encountered sentences. In 
order to account for these, they claim that it is necessary 
to posit recursive encoding and decoding rules which operate 
unconsciously. So any account of an actor' s novel 
utterance, and its being understood by another, must have 
reference to shared unconscious rules according to which the 
utterance is constructed by one actor and understood by the 
other. 
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Hunter (1 973: Chapter Seven) responds to this line 
of criticism by indicating the oddness of the abstract 
question, "How do we produce and understand new 
utterances?, " which is the basis of the Fodor-Katz critique 
and their project (cf. , Coulter, 1 979: 47) . Either the 
question lacks a context for its reasonable understanding, 
or, in any particular context where it might be asked, it is 
misleading. 
The question of how we creat ively communicate in 
general has the form of a request· for instruction for 
communicating creatively. But Fodor and Katz are not 
seeking instruction, they are seeking a scientific 
explanation. Their analysis is based on the assumption that 
we are capable of such communication. They must be asking 
for some account of our ability to communicate creatively. 
The question can then be rephrased to read "how do we 
construct utterances that express [creatively ] what we have 
to say?" (Coulter, 1 979: 47) . Since they are positing a 
generative system of rules, Fodor and Katz must argue for 
actors' possession of tacit knowledge of a propositional 
sort. Another alternative is Ryle's "knowing-how , "  a tacit 
non-propositional sort of practical knowledge. What basis 
is there to prefer one alternative over another? 
Coulter (1 979: 48) suggests that the only evidence 
for the Fodor-Katz account is that speakers can do what the 
Fodor-Katz account explains. But the tacit and 
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·inarticulatable nature of this propositional knowledge is 
suspect. As Michael Polanyi's work has made clear, tacit 
knowledge of how to perform tasks is very familiar to us as 
the non-propositional and inexpressible awareness which is 
possessed by people who are able to perform the practical 
tasks. Coulter draws on Polanyi (1958: Chapter Four) 
earlier in his book to illustrate just this point: 
it is clear that many people know how to ride 
bicycles without in the least having formulable, 
propositional knowledge of the geometric and 
ergonomic alignments involved. Expressed as a 
principle, a cyclist must keep his balance by 
adjusting the curvature of his forward path in 
proportion to the ratio of his unbalance over the 
square of his speed. Clearly, knowledge of this 
propositional form is not available to most people 
who manage to keep their balance very well, just 
as detailed knowledge of syntactical principles is 
unavailable to speakers of English whose speech 
can nonetheless be found to accord with them. 
(Coulter, 1979: 21) 
There is no reason to attribute unconscious 
propositional knowledge to account for such abilities. At 
least, the only reason could be that there is no other way 
to account for such ab ilities . That i s  not the case, a s  I 
will now endeavor to show. 
context-Bound. sociological Analysis of 
Presupposition-Ascription 
The alternative to unconscious propositional 
knowledge and semantic structures is the tacit knowledge of 
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"how to. " Intersubjective familiarity with the context of 
concrete communication enables actors to understand and 
communicate. It is shared conventions, knowledge of the 
"how to" variety, which guides the communication in 
particular contexts. It is not a common set of 
propositional rules, but a shared practical understanding of 
the context, which enables actors to act and communicate 
meaningfully. The ascription of presuppositions which 
describe this understanding of the context makes 
intelligible how actors are able to perform and communicate, 
even creati vely. The ascribed presuppositions make explicit 
the contextual factors which limit possible interpretations 
of the novel communication. Nevertheless, these 
presupposition-ascriptions are neither determinative nor 
indefeasible. 
Alfred Schutz (1973) maintained that any social 
activity is founded on a "presupposed stock of common 
knowledge. " Everyday conversation frequently draws on 
context and presupposition to understand, clarify and 
communicate. Pointing out that the store is closed to 
someone who has just said "Let's go to the store." draws on 
the presupposition that the speaker would only want to go to 
the store if it were open. On the other hand, if the 
speaker were the owner of the store, the fact that it was 
closed could be irrelevant, and would not arise as a part of 
the conversation. Context, including location, identity of 
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actors, current topic or activity, time or day, tone of 
voice, bodily positioning, etc., furnishes "common sense 
warrants" (Coulter, 1979: 51) for our ascribing certain 
presuppositions to the speaker. Of course, if their role is 
to make evident the meaning of the utterance, the contextual 
elements are unlikely to become part of the conversation. 
As Wittgenstein's rules of a game, they are typically 
discussed only when one fails to act in the conventionally 
expected manner. In learning to speak, we learn h.ml to 
attend to the conventions of the relevant culture and 
language. Tolerances for different degrees of adherence to 
these conventions are also learned. Sociologists such as 
Labov (1972) have noted this fact with respect to phonetic 
and grammatical "rules." Conver�ational and discourse 
analysts note these tolerances, explained by the former in 
terms of the role of the speaker in the interaction (cf., 
Frankel, 1983) and by the latter in terms of shared 
presuppositions of social rules and conventions which may be 
analyzed as a feature of the setting (eg., medical or 
educational settings; cf., Mehan, 1979; Fisher, 1979, 1982, 
1983, 1986). 
Coulter (1979: 53) brings Ryle back into this 
discussion to illustrate the common-sense priority sometimes 
given to "assignable propositions: " 
Ryle's (1973: 173-177) remarks on what he terms 
"disclosure by unstudied talk" are pertinent here; 
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we do not usually think of a person' s (or his 
utterances') presuppositions as continually and 
consciously self-monitered, [sic] and so tend to 
think of them as less subject to deceptive 
manipulation than the contents of avowals, and 
thence as more likely to reveal his .r..e.al states of 
mind. 
Coulter (1979: 54) continues to explain that 
our way of discovering what another "has in mind" is to be 
found in common conventions or practices, not in the form of 
propositional knowledge. The "properly sociological focus 
upon the psychological and subjective · phenomena must consist 
in the technical specification" of such methods. But 
analysts must also be careful not to posit these 
socially-organized methods as rules or structures somehow 
located in the mind (Coulter, 1979: 61). The "attending to" 
such features of communication constitutes tacit "knowing 
how" and is no more known by actors than competent cyclists 
know the mechanical description of their forward motion and 
maintenance of balance. 
For example, our linguistic activities can be 
characterized in terms of a sequence of turn-taking, where 
one utterance is expected to be tied to the previous. This 
provides a constraint on the ascription of presupposition. 
If the conversation was not interrupted by a request for 
clarification (i . e . ,  if it "went smoothly"), then any 
presupposition-ascription must make the sequencing 
practically reasonable . That speakers are aware of this is 
evident from the use of conventions by them to mark an 
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utterance which might be confusing because it does not 
follow the usual sequencing. Schegloff and Sacks (1974) 
call these "misplacement markers" (e.g., "by the way ", 
"incidentally"). Of these, Schegloff and Sacks claim that 
the "display of such orientation and recognition apparently 
entitles the user to place an item outside its proper place" 
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1974: 258). 
Coulter (1979: 54) suggests that members' 
presupposition�ascription of other members are defeasible in 
that they may be contested or falsified. This is not, 
however, an obstacle on which communication falters, since 
the context of any particular communicational activity 
typically provides enough clarification for the members to 
understand one another. But the use of these methods, 
however "technically specified" are similarly context-bound 
and defeasible. It is for this reason that the analysis of 
particular communicational events needs to include a 
description of the setting of the communication and as 
accurate as possible a reproduction of the communication. 
Review of this ethnographic and interactional data by other 
analysts ought to lend credence to or challenge, the 
analytic claims (i.e., presupposition-ascriptions) of the 
analyst. (See Chapter III for illustration . )  
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organizational and structural Direction of communication 
Fisher {1979, 1982, 1983, 1986) has found it 
useful to distinguish levels of analysis {see pages 85-98). 
The presupposition-ascriptions which can be made on the 
basis of physician-patient communication do more than 
display the micro-processes of this communication. Certain 
activities and their ascribed presuppositions are typical, 
though perhaps not universal, of communicational events of a 
particular sort in a specified setting. In Chapter III, the 
communicational events examined are those of first-contact 
female patients with third-year residents in one particular 
family practice setting. As Coulter has carefully argued, 
the analysis by presupposition-ascription does not assert 
that the interactants hold these presuppositions to be true 
or have even consciously entertained them in the past. 
Rather, the conventional practices which constitute, for 
example, physician-patient interactions are learned as 
methods of achieving practical goals ; and communication can 
be analyzed in terms of the presuppos it ions which make more 
intelligible or rational the action or communication. 
Historical-sociological reflection and research may lead to 
further understanding of why these presuppositions shaped 
the conventions, as well as increasing credibility of the 
analysis by supporting the claim that the presuppositions 
have been, and are, influential. 
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This analysis is still sociological, not 
psychological. It is of the context or culture that 
ascriptions are made, not of the minds of individuals. The 
analysis of mental-ascriptions in Coulter' s work is scenic 
in that it describes a context which enables concrete 
individuals to intend, understand, remember, etc • •  The 
psychological question "How do individuals intend, 
understand, remember, etc. ?"  can only be answered in thi s  
manner. To look for a psychological or mental process i s  to 
construe actors' knowledge of "how to" as requiring 
individualistic explanation . Thus it assumes the need for 
some mental machinery or unconscious set of propositional 
rules. As has been argued, this is neither necessary nor 
justified. 
Since presupposition-ascriptions are made of 
conventions, practices and settings, they can be classified 
in terms of the scope of the practice or contexts to which 
they can reasonably and consistently be ascribed. Some 
practices, such as turn-taking or sequencing, seem relevant 
to all conversational events. Social communication which is 
not conversational, such as lectures and sermons, obviously 
does not share the convention of turn-taking. Some 
practices may be unique to a context, or, if they occur in 
various contexts, their organization in a particular setting 
may be unique. An example of the first would be certain 
diagnostic and treatment procedures: they are likely to 
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occur only within a particular medical setting, and thus 
some of the presupposition-ascriptions which explain how the 
procedures are "accomplished" are relevant only to those 
settings . This would be an example of Fisher's 
organizational level of analysis, as would the 
presupposition-ascriptions which distinguish casual 
conversation from conversation in a physician-patient 
interview. 
There are also presupposition-ascriptions which 
are either ascribable to types of contexts (perhaps due to 
similarities in the activities practiced in each), or which 
are so common or "basic" that it is a strained analysis to 
consider them as interactional or organizational. Deference 
to professional authority on the assumption of superior 
knowledge is an example of such a structural factor or 
presupposition-ascription . Fisher (among others), building 
from an interactional analysis of physician-patient 
communication, notes that participation is imbalanced, with 
the asymmetry in terms of control of floor, topic, number of 
interruptions, etc., distinguishing the conversation in 
physician-patient interactions in general from that of 
casual conversation . An organizational feature or 
presupposition of the context is that the physician is the 
expert and needs such control to effectively diagnose and 
treat the patient. Other contextual features or 
presuppositions also help to explain this particular social 
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organization of the interview (e. g. , that physicians need to 
be efficient and unencumbered by the usual conventions of 
conversation in order to fulfill the heavy demands on their 
time). The acceptance of this asymmetry is not, however, 
unique to physician-patient interactions. It extends to 
other professional-client relationships (e.g. lawyer-client, 
teacher-student). It may also be detected in less 
institutionalized communication such as parent-child or 
"experienced advisor-inexperienced listener" conversation. 
Such a breadth of convention requires extra-organizational 
presupposition-ascriptions in order to reasonably account 
for the commonality of the activity. 
Howard Waitzkin (1983: 142) suggests that 
physicians' "relative dominance", as manifested by their 
special privilege in the physician-patient interaction and 
ascribed as an organizational feature of the context, allows 
them to "make ideologic statements. " Waitzkin continues: 
These messages reinforce the hegemonic ideology 
that emanates from other institutions--the family, 
educational system, mass media, and so forth--a.rui 
that pervade a society. The same messages tend to 
direct clients ' behavior into safe, acceptable, 
and non-disruptive channels ; this is the essence 
of social control in medicine. (Waitzkin, 1983: 
142-143 ; My emphasis--M. B. ) 
Although this excerpt is from a chapter in 
which Waitzkin engages in a "micro-analysis" of 
physician�patient communication of the type that I have been 
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discussing, I do not know whether he would agree with the 
present discussion. His political focus, however, is 
helpful in identifying structural presuppositions. 
"Emanating from other institutions " and "pervading a 
society" are "messages " which shape behavior. On the 
present analysis, these "messages " are the 
presupposition-ascriptions which analysts may make of a 
society and its institutions. Physicians are the 
professionals in medical institutions, and are allowed the 
dominant role in medical interactions. Their role in 
medical activities match broader cultutal conventions of how 
to accomplish concrete tasks in the context of authority 
found in institutionally situated interactions (e. g. , 
between physician-patient, professor-student, lawyer-client 
and parent-child). It is true that this presupposition of 
authority "manifests " itself in, or can be ascribed to, 
observed physician-patient relationships. But to treat it 
as an isolated interactional or even organizational factor 
is inadequate, since those aspects of the communication 
which justify the presupposition-ascription also occur in 
other institutions. As Waitzkin claims, such a widespread 
pattern of activity across organizational or institutional 
settings must be ascribed of the society rather than 
uniquely to the organization of medical practice. The 
presupposition, if it is scenic in the sense of applying to 
a context of action, applies to all contexts with 
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authoritative agents whose authority has been more or less 
institutionalized (i. e. , has gained wide cultural 
acceptance). 
This could be contrasted with the particular type 
of authority which physicians have in medical interviews. 
Theirs, for example, allows them to ask personal questions 
which no other professional authority would be as likely to 
ask (or to receive a cooperative response if they did ask). 
Were lawyers or parents to inquire about an adult's sexual, 
dietary and drug use habits, they would not be likely to be 
answered as frankly as physicians may reasonably expect. 
This type of authority needs to be understood in terms of 
the presuppositions ascribed to certain types of contexts 
within medical care. It is therefore an organizational 
factor, while the pattern of institutionalized authority in 
general is a structural factor. But these are distinctions 
in analysis, since their concrete manifestation will be 
interactionally and practically indistinguishable. The 
analytic distinction helps us understand the cultural 
breadth of the presupposition-ascription, and perhaps 
enables a more detailed understanding of its history of 
influence on the formation of the observed conventions. 
In this manner, any concrete interaction exists 
within a context of practices which actors know in Ryle's 
"knowing how" sense, but which practices are expressive of 
conventions. The varying levels of analysis represent a 
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recognition that some conventions are "accepted in practice" 
more broadly than only in the particular context. 
Historically , the conventions of a culture enable the 
conventions of institutions to be adopted for practical 
purposes , as the society-wide acceptance of professional 
dominance and paternalism enables the particular type of 
medical professional dominance to develop in practice. 
These , of course , only "exist" in concrete interactions ,  but 
the acceptance of authority in� institutional setting 
(e.g. , parental or political) is a convention which is 
likely to be manifested in similar practices in other 
settings. So the broader , more abstract levels of analysis 
indicate factors which have shaped the practices and 
conventions in institutionally-situated interactions. But 
these organizational and structural "factors " are manifested 
only in the concrete interactions. They are ascribed to the 
social context as a means of better understanding how the 
actors are able to accomplish their tasks and 
communication. 
The more abstract presuppositions ascribed to 
interactions are restricted by their explanatory usefulness 
and by their being consistent with other practices and 
conventions manifested in the interaction . Certain 
presupposition-ascriptions will be inconsistent with the 
action or communication. For example , we could assume that 
physicians and patients interacted in a context in which 
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conventional practices would justify ascribing the 
presupposition that physicians practiced medicine primarily 
out of an effort to accumulate profit. Practices which cut 
into profits {e. g. , referring , preventive care , d iscouraging 
unnecessary visits ,  suggesting less expensive treatments) 
would require special explanation. Furthermore , the degree 
of patients' trust would be inexplicable. In a context of 
sales , where this presupposition is more justifiably 
ascribed to the setting , the customer typically responds 
very differently than patients in medical interviews. 
Though profit from illness and expensive treatments may well 
influence some of the conventional practices in medical 
settings , it is not a tacitly-accepted presupposition of the 
interactional context for physician-patient interactions. 
The preceding discussion has suggested a 
sociological method for understanding commun ication. The 
micro-analysis of particular interactions is to be conducted 
by specifying presuppositions which render understandable 
the communication and action in the interaction. The 
crucial assumptions of a social-contextual analysis (see 
pages 98-10 0) have been supported (see pages 10 0-117). The 
super iority of accounting for social action by examining 
actors' intersubjective knowledge of "how to" over ascribing 
unconscious propositional rules is supported by examining 
how actors accomplish practical and communication tasks. 
Thus any account of how participants successfully 
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communicate (especially creatively) must be context-bound 
(page 99 ; assumption one). This methodology is successful 
in explicitly displaying why the action or communication 
occurs as it does because that is an account of the 
construciton of the action, not of intentional or mental 
states or propositional rules postulated in order to explain 
the action (page 99 ; assumption two). Participants in 
social action know how to do things, and that is what is 
explained by the social-contextual account. What is 
explicitly accounted for by the analysis is how 
intersubjective practical knowledge "structure " discourse 
and action: They form the conventions which enable 
participants to achieve communicational and practical 
activities (page 99 ; assumption three). The recurrence (or 
absence) of certain social factors in different interactions 
increases support for the claim that they are social 
conventions. Buttressing the observations is accord among 
different analysts, as well as the factors' occurrence in 
other sociological, political and philosophical 
discussions. Analysts' presupposition-ascriptions are 
propositional descriptions of the social conventions and 
their genesis, not to be confused with actors' "knowledge" 
of them, which is constituted by their practical 
understanding of how to accomplish practical activites and 
communication (page 99 ; assumption four). The explicit 
description of these "social facts" also shows how these 
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factors may serve to undermine, conflict with or support 
actors' practical interests (pages 99-100 ; assumption 
five). These social factors may support individual, class, 
or institutional interests which particular actors might 
consciously oppose (or support). This last claim will be 
affirmed by the social-normative analysis of concrete cases 
(Chapter IV and V). These presuppositions are not 
propositional beliefs of the actors ; they are propositions 
which describe the intersubjective understanding of the 
context. Therefore, some explanation must be given 
regarding why the actors' practices seem to justify the 
presupposition-ascriptions. Historical-sociological 
examination of the context of both the interaction and the 
methods whereby actors accomplish their tasks supply social 
factors which explain the formation and intersubjective 
comprehension of the methods. Many of these factors reflect 
prevailing social and political norms and practices. The 
next two chapters provide a concrete application of this 
methodology to recorded medical interactions. 
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Chapter III 
Paradigmatic Cases for Analysis of Informed Consent 
The following two chapters are a practical 
application of the preceding chapters' theoretical 
discussion. The present chapter (Chapter III) presents a 
description of the setting in which physician-patient 
interviews were recorded, three cases that illustrate the 
ethical issue of informed consent (discussed in Chapter I) 
and an expanded discussion of the three interviews, 
highlighting the details of particular interest. The next 
chapter (Chapter IV) is a contextual social analysis. The 
analytic framework is derived from Fisher's work in 
discourse analysis (discussed in Chapter II). These two 
chapters roughly duplicate the presentational approach used 
by discourse analysts who are concerned with showing the 
influence of interactional, professional and 
social-political factors on the communication and 
negotiation of treatment in the delivery of health-care 
(Fisher, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986; Fisher and Todd, 1983). 
cases 
The cases presented are not ones in which common 
medical practice would require explicit informed consent. 
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Informed consent is usually an attempt to assure that the 
patients themselves accept the risks involved in a 
procedure . When the risk is substantial, as in major 
surgery, the need for informed consent is well recognized . 
In routine medical procedures the degree or type of risk is 
usually considered negligible or minimal; thus explicit 
informed consent is not typically sought (cf . ,  U . S .  
President's Commission, 1982: 108; Graber, Beasley, and 
Eaddy, · 1985: 4 0 -4 3 ) . I will argue that this is partly due to 
the social fact that in physician-patient interactions, 
patients typically allow the physicians to take 
responsibility for the decision . Whether or not the 
information is given, patients usually simply take 
physicians' advice . That this is acceptable to both parties 
is based on the "presupposition" that the nature of the 
decision is routine as well as on the shared expectations of 
the participants (this will be discussed later in more 
detail ) .  
The purpose of the empirical research is not to 
evaluate either the individual physician or the profession 
as a whole . Rather, it is an attempt to illustrate how 
varying levels of risk and influence are managed in everyday 
medical practice by patients and physicians . The cases are 
not chosen because they are exceptions to the general 
practice, but as illustrations of this practice whereby 
medical practitioners and patients do not concern themselves 
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with informed consent for routine cases. The issue came to 
my attention as a pattern in the interactions only after 
recording, transcribing and analyzing forty-th ree 
doctor-patient interactions.1 
Ethnographic Description 
The data for this study were collected over a 
three month period in a family medicine model practice in a 
teaching hospital that serves a largely rural area. I 
participated in the project from its inception through data 
gathering and analysis. 
The family practice model office is simultaneously 
a setting for the training of residents and a facility 
delivering health care. First-, second-, and third-year 
residents work in an ar rangement that simulates a group 
office practice. Patients may request a particular 
physician when they first call or walk in for an 
The medical information used was obtained as part 
of a larger study conducted by Sue Fisher in a family 
practice residency. The research was partially funded by a 
Research and Development Award from the University of 
Tennessee in Knoxville. The data and some of the analysis 
originally appeared in my Master' s Thesis, "Informed Consent 
in Routine Contexts" (the University of Tennessee , 
Knoxville, 1983). I also wish to thank Ablex Publishing 
Corporation for permission to use material published in "An 
Empirically Grounded Approach to Ethical Analysis and Social 
Change" in Fisher and Todd (eds.), The Structure of 
Discourse and Institutional Authority: Law. Medicine. 
Education , (1986). 
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appointment. Typically, however, an appointment is set with 
a resident assigned by the receptionist, and that resident 
is the patient's physician on subsequent visits. Another 
resident will substitute when the assigned physician is 
absent, as would occur in a group practice. 
Four full-time staff physicians and some members 
of the local medical community are either in attendance or 
on call to the practice for the residents to consult. 
Nurses in the family practice model office are assigned to a 
particular resident for a month at a time. There are also 
professional support personnel on staff. A nutritionist, a 
health psychologist and a social worker are available for 
consultation with residents and patients. These 
inter-professional relationships further simulate the kind 
of practice the residents will experience in private 
practice. 
The patient population is set by the National 
Family Practice Charter and purports to represent a 
population similar to that of a private practice. The 
charter is set up by the American Board of Family Practice 
and requires, for example, that any accredited residency 
have no more than one-half indigent pat ients (including 
medicaid but not medicare). The family practice model 
office also simulates the fee-for-service billing character 
of group practice, and pays physicians by salary. 
On their first visit, new patients are given an 
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appointment time half an hour prior to when they are 
scheduled to see the physician. In this half hour the 
patients are individually called into an office off the 
waiting room where a questionnaire is administered by a 
clerical worker. The questionnaire asks about social and 
medical factors in patients' lives as well as means of 
payment (rnedicare, medicaid, insurance, personal payment). 
The patient information sheet is placed with a note 
regarding the presenting complaint in a holder on the 
examining room door. Before meeting the patient, the 
resident reads the note which lists the presenting complaint 
and thus also has access to social and financial data. 
Generally, the residents first interview patients 
regarding presenting complaint and medical history and they 
leave the room for the patients to change clothes if the 
examination requires that the patient be undressed. Nurses 
are sent in ahead of the residents to prepare some patients 
(such as women scheduled for pelvic exams) and to collect 
samples for lab tests (drawing blood, urine tests, etc. ). 
Following the examination, patients are asked to dress 
before the resident returns to close the interaction. 
During these breaks the resident may consult with other 
residents or with a staff physician. Staff may also be 
asked to examine the patient for a second opinion. Sometime 
during the day the residents dictate notes which are typed 
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and placed in patients' files. At a later date these are 
reviewed by staff physicians. 
The research project from which these examples are 
drawn was conducted with new women patients corning to the 
family practice center for the first time. After bringing a 
new woman patient to an examining room the nurse would 
notify the primary researcher or myself. One of us would 
then approach the appropriate resident and ask for 
permission to video- or audio-tape the medical interview. 
Then we would approach the patient to explain the research 
project and ask her to sign a written consent form 
permitting the recording and observation (see Appendix). 
When audio-tape was used one of us would sit in on the 
interaction to take notes on non-verbal and impressionistic 
aspects of the exchange. In situations where the 
interaction was video-taped one of us would monitor the 
taping from a separate room. 
The tapes were transcribed and served as a basis 
for analysis. These typed verbal accounts were augmented by 
our knowledge of the setting, non-verbal elements of the 
interviews, casual discussions between physicians or with 
us, field notes and patient files. It was in the process of 
reviewing the transcripts that interactional patterns 
regarding informed consent emerged as a topic of interest. 
These routine medical interviews were found to involve both 
patient risk and inconvenience and as such may be 
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interactions which should  include an explicit informed 
consent procedure. The cases presented here are at tempts to 
reconstruct for the reader typical interactions which 
illustrate this pattern and to empirically ground the 
ethical claims. They represent a variety of degrees of risk 
or inconvenience, as well as different interactional 
techniques. What is typical about these interactions is 
that the reasons for the particular treatments are not fully 
explicit, the patients do not ask for reasons or 
clarification, and the treatments are not obviously the only 
available ones nor necessarily the best for the patients. 
What is important about the interactions is the underlying 
practices or beliefs, not the particular details of the 
practice's expression in the interactions. But positing a 
ground or common practice underlying the interactions is a 
part of the analysis and so will be left for the next 
chapter. We now turn to the descriptions of the three cases 
and a summary of the relevant details for analysis. 
Sheila 
In the first case the patient, whom we will call 
Sheila, is a young Anglo woman who is from out of town. The 
physician is a third-year male Anglo resident. Sheila has 
been staying in her husband's hospital room for three weeks 
while he is being treated for injuries resulting from a 
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motorcycle accident. Her presenting complaint is a sore 
throat . The resident orders a strept screen and prescribes 
penicillin for five days, to be increased if the screen is 
positive. 
On physical examination, the resident notes that 
one of Sheila' s ears is "a little retracted but not red." 
After examining her throat he says: 
D. 
P. 
D. 
P. 
D. 
P. 
D. 
P. 
D .  
P. 
D. 
P. 
D. 
P .  
Okay, you may 
I, I' ll tell you 
ahead and get a 
slash lines-- // 
have a little strept throat, 
what we will do . We' ll go 
throat culture// (double 
--indicate an interruption) 
//Uh huh. 
and I' ll 
go ahead and start you on some antibiotics. 
If the culture, the culture could still be 
(unintelligible to transcriber)// 
huh. 
if it' s uh, if 
won' t need to take 
but if it' s strept 
and take a course. 
penicillin are you? 
No I' m not . 
//Uh 
it is ______ then you 
a full course of antibiotics 
well we' ll have you go ahead 
You' re not allergic to 
Take a deep breath . Okay. Again. Just a 
couple more times. All right. I' ll be back 
momentarily. The prescription, I' ll go have 
the nurse come do a strept screen on you. 
Okay. 
At that point what we' ll do is g ive you f ive 
days worth of penicillin// 
//Uh huh. 
I want you to go 
ahead and take that. If your strept screen 
comes back negative then you can stop taking 
it. 
Uh huh. After what, five days, or after? 
Five days, after five days, what I' ll do is 
give you five days worth, one refill . If it' s 
positive I want you to take it for a full ten 
days// 
//Uh huh. 
You' ve taken penicillin before? 
127 
P. Yeah, uh huh. I've had to 
D. I'd like to see you again in two weeks just to 
make sure this is all cleared up. Hopefully 
you'll be all cleared up. 
In the interaction the physician tells Sheila that 
he does not know whether her sore throat is due to 
streptococcus (a common bacteria which can cause sore 
throats and is usually treated with antibiotics), that he 
will not know for two days, and he gives her a five day 
prescription for penicillin. Sheila is to take the 
penicillin for two days and then call to see if she should 
take the other three days and fill another prescription for 
five more days. So we can reasonably assume that Sheila is 
informed regarding when the strept screen can be read 
(forty-eight hours), that if it is negative she does not 
need to continue the antibiotic, that she should be better 
within two weeks. 
The attending physician has attempted to cover two 
aspects of this type of presenting complaint in his 
treatment plan. First of all, he starts the patient on 
penicillin immediately. The usual reason for this is to 
prevent the somewhat rare occurrence of rheumatic fever and 
reduce the risk of other possible complications. Secondly, 
he takes a culture and arranges for an opportunity to 
terminate treatment if the screen is negative. The 
unnecessary use of antibiotics is discouraged due to the 
slight chance of various allergic reactions, increasing 
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sensiti zation to a valuable drug which reduces its later 
efficacy, depressing the growth of normal bacteria  and 
contributing to the development of resistant strains of 
bacteria  in the population at large. So this physici an has 
treated Sheila in a manner that shows his sensitivity to the 
attendant problems in the treatment of sore throats with 
antibiotics. 
Are there any factors of which Sheila is left 
ignorant? Clearly the medical criteria specified above are 
not disclosed. Consequently there is good reason to believe 
that Sheila is not aware of why she has been given the 
particular treatment plan.  
Maria 
The next patient, whom we will call Maria, is a 
24-year-old Mexican-American woman. She is a heavy-set, 
outgoing woman who during the interview discloses that she 
came to this area with her boyfriend and is currently living 
in his house. Her presenting complaint is persistent pain 
in her leg following a motorcycle accident. The motorcycle 
she was driving slid on gravel and she fell off injuring her 
leg. The physician is a third-year male Anglo resident of 
conservative religious persuasion.2 During the medical 
This resident' s conservative religious beliefs 
were common knowledge in the clinic. 
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history she reveals that she has had three abortions and one 
miscarriage and thinks that she may be pregnant again. If 
she is pregnant, she states she plans to have an abortion 
and asks the physician if they do abortions at the teaching 
hospital or if he knows of anywhere she can get one without 
having to pay in advance. He tells her that hospital 
abortions are very expensive and that he does not know about 
other places in town : He then has her leg x-rayed. The 
x-ray does not reveal any fractures or breaks. The 
following dialogue begins just as the resident re-enters the 
examining room. He is reading the package insert on the 
pain medication he has brought for her: 
D. Well, I'm real hesitant about medication// . 
P. //Yeah. 
D. You're 
not sure, even though, you know, you think you 
may want to have an abortion// 
P. //Definitely. I could 
make the mistake but it's not mine. 
3 
There is a practice in the univer sity hospital of 
referring abortions to the only licensed clinic in town--a 
women's reproductive health clinic. The center, in order to 
be licensed, had two physicians on call. In casual 
conversation in the family practice clinic I have heard the 
reproductive clinic referred to as practicing "ethically". 
Furthermore, abortion was frequently discussed in the family 
practice clinic conference room. In the discussions that we 
were privy to, the general attitude toward abortion was 
negative. This particular resident at one time said that no 
doctor "worth his salt " would get "messed up" with 
abortions. 
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D. You may, it looks like uh, well the medication 
I want to use it's not recommended during 
pregnancy for treating nursing mothers or 
during pregnancy, tell you what to do. What 
kind of work do you do? 
P. I'm a cook. 
D. A cook. Uh, where do you work at? 
P. I work at Hefty's Truck Plaza on Dixon Road. 
(names have been changed) 
D. Uh huh. Are they pretty good to you? 
P. Yeah, but they won't pay me (laughs) . 
D. They won't pay you// 
P .  II Except peach pie. 
D. Okay, I bet within another 
day or two you'll be able to get up and stand 
on it without a whole lot of pain, and right 
now I would just use extra-strength 
Tylenol// 
P. II Okay 
D. and stay with that. The x- ray is 
negative, if the pain persists you need to 
get back in touch with me. // 
P .  //Okay . 
D. but I don't see 
anything there that// 
P. //I just wanted 
to make sure that it wasn't fractured. 
After emphasizing that Maria ought to consider 
birth control and denying knowledge of abortion clinics 
around town, the resident closes the interview: 
D. Alrighty, I'd like to see you back if you've 
got time to come back in and _see me// 
P .  //Okay . 
D. otherwise 
if you still haven't had a period in ten days 
you probably ought to consider yourself 
pregnant and probably come back in and get a 
pregnancy test or// 
P. //or start praying hard and 
heavy. 
D. Yeah, or start going to Mass two or three 
times a day. 
P. (laughs) For sure. I appreciate your time. 
D. Yes maam, it was nice meeting you. 
P. Same to you. I'll come back whenever I need 
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to see a doctor cause I'll never have a doctor 
here . 
D .  Hopefully 24-year-old ladies don't need many 
doctors . 
P .  Yeah, okay . Thanks a lot, bye bye . 
In this second interaction, the physician 
recognizes Maria's need for pain medication, yet does not 
provide it. The pregnancy is considered to be a 
contraindication for such medication, notwithstanding the 
patient ' s  declared intent to abort if she is pregnant and a 
history of three earlier abortions .  Maria is informed of 
the fact that her x-ray does not reveal any fractures, that 
the physician decided not to give her a prescription for 
pain medication because it is contraindicated for pregnant 
women. She knows that, in her doctor's opinion, the leg 
should feel better in a few days and that she can take 
extra-strength Tylenol (tm) for the pain. 
The drug which the physician was going to 
prescribe and dispense presents a threat to the health of 
the fetus, not to Maria ' s  health . The physician has said 
that the drug was contraindicated for pregnant and nursing 
women . The physician has not presented information 
regarding abortion which Maria requested . He has suggested 
that Maria consider birth control and explained that if in 
ten days she does not have her period she is probably 
pregnant and could get a test done at the family practice 
clinic . 
So Maria is not informed on where to go for an 
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abortion and that the pain medication is contraindicated for 
the possible fetus' health, not her own (for further 
discussion of this case, see Fisher and Groce, 
forthcoming). 
Vicki 
The third patient, whom we will call Vicki, is a 
26-year-old Anglo woman. Vicki works in a university 
library while her husband attends graduate school as an art 
student. The physician is a third-year male Anglo resident 
also in his late twenties. Vicki has several presenting 
complaints; a cyst on her tailbone, a skin rash and several 
moles. The moles are brought into the discussion by Vicki 
after the physician has examined her rash: 
D. What other problems or questions do you have? 
P. Okay. Urn I was wondering if you could take some 
moles off for me? 
D. Okay. Where abouts? 
P. (unintelligible) There' s one on my forehead. 
Right there. _______ (unintelligible). 
D. Any others? 
P. Um, how many can you do at once? 
D. Half dozen. Well, the problem is that, ah on 
ah, young attractive females I don' t usually 
take them off the face. But I can do it and 
probably everything will go well, but those 
are best done by either a dermatologist or 
a plastic surgeon. But I' ll be glad to do it. 
We can do one in another location and see how 
it goes, and if you feel comfortable with it and 
I feel comfortable with it we' ll do the one 
on your forehead. 
P. I would not be afraid to have you do it all. 
First of all I can' t afford anybody else. 
D. Okay. 
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P. But it' s like (unintelligible) I would not be 
ashamed to have a scar. 
D. Okay. Well it shouldn' t leave a scar// 
P .  II Okay. 
D. unless 
they infect or something like that. Okay? 
So what else would you like? 
After discussing Vicki' s presenting complaint, 
taking a medical history and doing a physical, the physician 
explains what he is going to do about the cyst: 
D .  Okay. Uh, if it' s all right with you I want to 
have one of our old doctors come look at this 
mole on your forehead and get his opinion on 
it. I was telling him about it, you know, 
describing it and uh, you know, as I was saying 
family practitioners normally don' t take moles 
off faces, faces just because of, uh, mal, you 
know, they have to go up on your malpractice 
insurance and things like that, that we 
normally handle by people who do it .all the 
time, however, I have removed them off people' s 
faces without any problems before . It' s just 
that we are being conservative and protecting 
ourselves when we do so. But I wouldn' t 
hesitate at all to take that one off. 
P. Okay. 
D. But I' ll get him to look at it and get his 
opinion on it, okay? 
P. Okay. 
The staff physician enters the room, lists Vicki' s 
three complaints and examines the moles: 
SD. Okay, uh, if you remove it you' re gonna will 
have a little scar but it probably won' t be 
but about an inch or more, you' d have a scar 
that' ll match this little line right here// 
P. // (laughs) 
SD. parallel, 
that way it' d be easy to hide it. Now see what 
you got here . Has that been there for a long 
time you say? 
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P. Uh huh. Can you get rid of  that? But I was 
never sure what it was • • • • (interval) 
SD. We're reluctant to cut on women's faces. 
P. Well I'm not very vain on my face. 
SD. Well, we are (laughs) 
The family practice resident works through his 
lunch hour and a noon conference to remove the mole on 
Vicki's face. After removing the one mole, he explains that 
he would like to remove the others later: 
D. You know what? It may be, uh, best if we do  
these others in a, at a different time? 
P. Why is that? 
D. Well, uhrn, we've already run way over this 
morning, for one thing. 
P. Okay. 
A few minutes later the resident refers to the 
dif ficulty the nurse had in getting the proper instruments 
set up: 
D. Next time I'd like to use, make sure that I 
have the exactly instruments I want, too. 
Finally, as he closes the interaction, the 
physician makes special arrangements to  check on the 
incision and remove the stitches on his day off: 
D. But I'll tell you what. I may just, I may just 
come in Monday since I'll be in town. What 
appointment will be best for you Monday? 
P. Anytime before four. 
D. Why don't we make it early in the morning. 
I'm actually on vacation but I'll come in just 
to make sure that this is okay. 
P. All right. 
D. And don't be grossed out by the fact that the 
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incision is little longer than you might have 
expected but I opened it a bit like that so 
that it would be, leave less of a scar. 
P. I won't be. 
D. You're not too particular are you? 
P. No I'm not. I was plann ing on taking the 
stitches out myself. I// 
D. //Well, on this one I'd 
like to see it, on the others I might go 
along w ith that idea, okay? 
P. Uh huh. 
D. This one is on your face. I can't have that, 
you know. Turn around. 
(un intelligible). 
Vicki has come in for, among other things, the 
removal of moles. The resident has introduced himself as a 
doctor, indicated h is d iscomfort w ith removing moles from 
women's faces and his preference to at least do a less 
conspicuous one fi rst. He has said  that it is better to go 
to a dermatologist or surgeon but that he is capable and 
willing to do it. In fact he has taken moles off other 
people',s faces at prior times. He explains that family 
physicians do not routinely do such removals because it 
would increase their malpractice insurance. He also informs 
the patient that he would like to have an "old doctor " 
(staff phys ician) give a second opinion before proceeding. 
The surgical room does not have the proper instruments, the 
operation takes longer and the surgical scar is longer than 
the resident apparently thought it would be. He makes 
special arrangements to come in and remove the stitches and 
examine the incision even though he is on vacation. 
Vicki asked the family practice resident to remove 
1 3 6  
her moles--all of them. The reasons she gave were that she 
could not afford to have anyone else ( a  higher level 
specialist is implied) do it and that she was not concerned 
about having a scar. She is told that this particular 
physician has done such removals before and is not hesitant 
to do hers, though he might prefer to do a les s  conspicuous 
one first. She has been told by the resident that the 
removal should not leave a scar and by the staff ( "older") 
physician that the scar will not be more than an inch long. 
Vicki is also informed that the physician can do about six 
removals at a time. After the removal, she is told that the 
physician has "run way over time, " that the instruments were 
not exactly the ones he wanted, that she should return to 
get the stitches removed and to have the other moles 
removed. 
This third-year resident expres sed hesitancy about 
removing the mole from Vicki's face, consulted with a staff 
phys ician and worked through lunch hour to remove it. He 
has, despite his suggestions to the contrary, removed the 
most conspicuous mole first. After noting that 
dermatologists and plastic surgeons are best qualified to 
remove facial moles, he explained to the patient that he was 
capable and experienced if she really wanted him to perform 
the removal. 
What factors are there of which Vicki is not 
informed? She was never explicitly told that her attending 
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physician was �esident and that the "older " physician was a 
supervising staff physician . She was incorrectly informed 
that all of her moles could be removed on that day . It 
appears as if neither she nor the resident knew that the 
equipment would be below the standards the resident 
expected, nor that the removal would take as long as it 
did . She also apparently operated under the assumption that 
the removal performed by a family physician is less 
expensive than when performed by a dermatologist or a 
plastic surgeon .
4 
similarities and Differences 
In all three cases treatment decisions are arrived 
at by the physicians without giving the reasons for their 
decisions and seeking the patients' agreement . There is no 
opportunity for the patients to question the sufficiency of 
the reasons, or the choice of one among other possible 
options (which may also be medically sound , as discussed in 
the next chapter) . I n  the case of Sheila and Maria, the 
decision is simply expressed in the form of a treatment , and 
they accept the recommendation without comment or 
The fee scale at the family practice would allow 
for fees for the removal of three moles in two or three 
visits to vary from $30 to $ 153 . Local dermatologists 
claimed that they would complete the removals in one 30- to 
45-minute appointment . 
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clarification. There does not appear to be any patient 
choice or deliberation over options or reasons in these 
cases . In Vicki's case, the treatment is in harmony with 
her presenting complaint and very specific request for a 
particular treatment. Though he expresses hesitancy, the 
resident does eventually comply with Vicki's request. What 
is not expl icit in the interaction is why the resident does 
comply despite what he expresses as the usual practice and 
such adverse factors for him as running through the lunch 
hour, a noon conference, lack of desired surgical equipment 
and the expressed desire to do a less conspicuous one 
first. So in all three instances, the residents have not 
d isclosed the reasons for their actions in treating or not 
treating the patients, consequently the women did not have 
the opportunity to agree or d isagree with the reasons or 
choices. 
In the cases of Sheila and Maria, there is not any 
opportunity for the women to give their consent to the 
treatment or non-treatment. At no point are they asked if 
they agree with the physician's choice. Nor are they 
explicitly informed of any options. They do not seem to 
find this at all unusual. Vicki's case seems to be 
different. She specifically requests a certain procedure, 
among other things, and is given the requested treatment. 
Furthermore, she is given the treatment that she requested 
despite the resident's expression of hesitance. So she has 
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taken the opportunity to request specific treatment, and her 
consent might more reasonably be implied. 
It may be that this apparent difference is 
mitigated by other features of the interaction. Vicki 
leaves the interview with more of a sense of why family 
practice physicians might not remove facial moles than with 
knowledge of why hers were removed. This is similar to the 
first two cases in that there is no communication of the 
reasons why the physician chooses to treat Vicki instead of 
referring her or removing a less conspicuous mole first. 
Discussion of why the physicians' expressed hesitancy and 
yet proceeded will have to be delayed until the analysis, 
since it is not an explicit part of the interaction. 
Another difference between Vicki's case and that 
of Sheila and Maria is that Vicki was obviously aware of 
options and her physician explicitly mentioned them. Vicki 
had apparently deliberated, or at least knew of the option 
of going to a dermatologist or plastic surgeon to get her 
moles removed. The resident expressed that the usual 
practice was to refer such cases to these specialists. In 
contrast, Sheila was not told that she could go untreated or 
wait on the screen. Maria was not told that she could take 
pain medication and risk her fetus. Of course, it is so 
rare as to seem odd for a physician to append to 
recommendations " or you can get another opinion or do 
nothing at all. " Nevertheless, the explicit discussion of 
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the possibility in Vicki's interaction is a difference 
between hers and that of Sheila and Maria. It is more 
reasonable to say of Vicki that she consented to the 
treatment than it is of Sheila and Maria. 
The next task is to examine the particular cases 
to see what consequences the treatment decisions have for 
the patients. This discussion will have relevance for both 
the sort of questions asked in a contextual analysis as well 
as for the normative analysis. 
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Chapter IV 
Social Analysis 
Consequences of outcome to Patients 
Each interaction resulted in the treatment of the 
woman. Most traditional normative analyses of cases involve 
a consideration of the outcome of the case, whether for the 
purposes of a consequentialist evaluation or to aid in 
deliberating whether there was any infringement on the 
patient's "rights" or "person." As will be evident, a social 
analysis examines the outcome for different reasons, such as 
to consider how the outcome was arrived at and what social 
and interactional processes were involved in shaping the 
treatment outcome for each woman. Note that even at this 
level of analysis, we need to draw heavily on our knowledge 
of practical effects on patients' everyday routines of 
advice given by the physicians. Each case will be 
considered individually, then they will be compared in 
Tables I, II, and III (pages 158-162) . 
Sheila 
Sheila presents with a sore throat. She receives 
treatment that is quite routine and probably as effective as 
any she would receive elsewhere. The treatment pla� also 
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shows that the resident is sensitive to the problems 
attending the use of antibiotic treatment. She is given a 
five day prescription of antibiotics, with another five 
days' worth to be filled if the strept screen is positive. 
She is to call the physician in two days to check on the 
strept screen. There are medical and practical consequences 
of this treatment outcome. 
Medically, Sheila is immediately placed on 
antibiotic treatment, an effective method of combatting 
strept infection. She is likely to be less contagious and 
less likely to be subject to rheumatic fever, a rare 
side-effect of strept infections. It is possible that 
Sheila may recover from her sore throat earlier and with 
fewer complications because the resident did not wait to 
read the screen before prescribing the antibiotic. 
If the screen is positive, Sheila will have 
benefitted from earlier treatment without any additional 
medical risks to later treatment. Since the only difference 
waiting for the screen would have made, if it is positive, 
would be a delay in starting the treatment, there is no 
difference in the risks of treatment itself. Treatment with 
wide-range antibiotics has the accompanying risks of an 
infrequent occurrence of allergic reaction, a possible 
reduction of the drug's later efficacy due to sensitization, 
depression of normal bacterial growth {sometimes related to 
yeast infections) and a societal impact of contributing to 
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the development of resistant strains of bacteria. The 
medical issue of whether or not the risks of such treatments 
are worth the usefulness of treatment prior to reading the 
screen is controversial (Lasagna, 1980 ) . 
If the screen is negative, Sheila will have been 
exposed to these possible negative side effects 
unnecessarily. The antibiotic would prove inefficacious, 
unless by the coincidence of another bacteria being present 
which the antibiotic is effective in treating. Sheila would 
have been exposed to all the attendant risks of the 
treatment. 
Practically, the treatment has several 
consequences for Sheila which are evident only if we first 
understand that there were alternatives to tpe chosen 
treatment plan. The physician could have given Sheila the 
entire prescription to be filled at the same time, or he 
could have had her wait until the screen was read before 
beginning the ten days of antibiotics. Alternatively, he 
could have withheld dispensing of the prescription until he 
knew that she had strept. Medically, the only relevant 
difference between these options rests on the issue of 
treatment with antibiotics prior to or after reading the 
screen. The physician had clearly made up his mind to treat 
prior to the screen's being read , so this alone could not 
have been the only reason for the particular choice among 
the different means of achieving that medical goal. 
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On the treatment plan the physician chose, Sheila 
will need to call him to check on the screen in two days, 
and may have to return to the pharmacy to fill the second 
half of the prescription. If the screen is negative, Sheila 
will have spent money and time on the treatment plan that 
was unnecessary, though not as much as if he had given her a 
full ten day prescription. These are practical consequences 
for Sheila of the physician's treatment plan. The trips to 
the pharmacy could have been reduced to one or eliminated by 
dispensing one prescription, or having Sheila wait until the 
screen was read before filling the prescription. The extra 
expense and effort of taking unnecessary medication could be 
avoided either by not prescribing before the screen is read 
or by having Sheila wait two days. If the medical 
indications were of minimal concern to the physician, then 
it  would probably be most convenient for Sheila if, at the 
time of the in terview, a ten day prescription were given. 
It could then be filled if the screen is positive. If the 
medical indications were strong, so that the resident 
thought it important for Sheila to be treated immediately, 
the choice between two five day or one ten day prescription 
seems arbitrary, with neither obviously more convenient. 
The medical indications for antibiotic treatment 
are controversial, though it is possible that here were some 
clinical indications in this particular case that might 
reduce the controversy for this instance. Barring this 
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event, unexpressed in the interaction or patient records, 
the treatment decis ion is not fully d ictated by the med ical 
factors. The decision to accept the med ical risks, expenses 
and practical inconveniences is made for Sheila by the 
phys ician. She is neither asked for her preference, nor are 
the options (of non-treatment or alternative d ispensing 
arrangements ) mentioned. Sheila is uninformed regard ing the 
fact that there are options and regard ing the reasons for 
the phys ician's particular cho ice. 
In this case the d ifferences in treatment plans 
and their consequences seem to be more or less triv ial. 
Sheila received adequate medical care and th is care was not 
prescribed in the most inconvenient manner (Which  would 
require that Sheila return to get the second prescription 
after the screen was read ) .  But the controversial and 
uncertain nature of the med ical ind ications reduces the 
strictness with which the treatment decision �an be said to 
be determined by the med ical factors involved in this case. 
Consequently, it is more reasonable to weigh the practical 
factors in determining the treatment plan. But such factors 
are not ever explicitly mentioned in the interaction. It is 
interesting to note that Sheila never raises these factors. 
The practical consequences of the treatment plan are 
effectively removed from Sheila's control or negotiation by 
their implicit treatment. This will later be d iscussed in 
terms of the medicalization of non-med ical factors 
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(Waitzkin, 1983: 141-142), which effectively removes from 
patients ' control aspects of their everyday life . 
The fact of there being options to the treatment 
plan, together with the lack of clearly or strictly 
indicated medical treatment and the practical consequences 
of the treatment plan, raises the question of Sheila ' s  
silence regarding her inconvenience and expenses . Why is it 
that she never asks if the complicated treatment plan is 
necessary, if she could just fill the ten days of 
antibiotics at once, or if she could just wait until the 
screen was read? This question is one which also arises in 
the next two cases . 
Maria 
Maria presents with a sore leg from a motorcycle 
accident and is probably pregnant . She plans to abort and 
has had three previous abortions . The resident re-enters 
the examination room with pain medication but does not give 
it to Maria, tel l ing her that it is contra ind icated for 
pregnant and nursing mothers. Instead the resident tells 
Maria to take an over-the-counter medication, and to return 
if the pain persists (and later, "if she has time" } . It is 
likely that Maria could have received better pain medication 
from a different physician who would have followed one of 
the options to be discussed below . This non-treatment, 
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referred to from here forth as her treatment-plan, has 
medical and practical consequences for Maria . 
Medically, if pain management is a medical matter, 
Maria has not been given any better pain management than she 
could have received by self-treatment. It is possible that 
she really came to the physician for information on where to 
procure an abortion, and that her leg pain was just an 
excuse. If such was the case, she did not get any aid on 
this issue either. The resident did have Maria's leg 
x-rayed, so she does know that it is not fractured. If she 
has benefitted medically from the encounter, it is in the 
assurance that there is nothing seriously wrong with her 
leg. Even this assurance, however, may be mitigated by the 
resident's request that Maria return if the pain does not 
cease. 
If the over-the-counter medication is effective in 
treating Maria's pain, she has received some assurance that 
such is all she can do and the health and life of her fetus 
is not at risk due to pain medication. It is possible that 
Maria will be less likely to do further damage to her leg by 
overuse since she is on a weaker pain medication and would 
likely feel pain . sooner than if she were on something 
stronger. 
If the over-the-counter medication is ineffective 
or only partially effective in relieving Maria's pain, she 
has only benefitted in that she now knows that her leg is 
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not fractured . ( it would not be unreasonable to think that 
she may already have tried the over-the-counter 
medication . )  The pain medication that the physician decided 
not to give her due to the contraindications probably would 
have been more effective pain relief. Had he dispensed the 
medication, he would have endangered the life or health of 
the fetus . This was not a concern of Maria's since she 
planned to have an abortion . 
Practically, Maria may be more inconvenienced by 
the over-the-counter medication than if she had received the 
stronger prescription. She indicated that her leg hurt at 
work and that she would not be paid if she had to take time 
off work while her leg healed. So a "practical" consequence 
of the treatment plan is possible continued pain, possible 
loss of income, and perhaps the inconvenience of having to 
return to the clinic for further medical attention . The 
fetus she is carrying, and planning to abort, is protected 
from possible side effects of the stronger pain medication . 
She may possibly be protected from further injury to her leg 
due to over-medication of her pain. 
As in Sheila's case, there are options to the 
treatment plan Maria received . Most obviously, the 
physician could have given her the medication, even though 
it was contraindicated for pregnant women . The 
contraindication is due to fetal health and in this case 
Maria intends to abort, and informs him of this fact . This 
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treatment plan would relieve her of pain more than the one 
chosen and would bear only the possible medical risks of 
threat to the fetus and further damage by overuse of the leg 
since she would be less sensitive to the pain. Of course, 
the latter is a risk she may bear anyway since she may 
choose to work regardless of the pain. Another means of 
approaching this risk would be to warn her not to overuse 
it, perhaps with concrete descriptions of what might be 
damaging. The risk to the fetus seems immaterial since 
Maria plans to abort. 
The resident came in carrying the medication he 
decided not to give Maria. There are other pain medications 
which do not present a threat to fetal health. At no point 
did the resident mention this as an option. It may be that 
the clinic did not have any samples of such a medication, 
but since Maria was to buy the over-the-counter medication 
anyway, it is reasonable to wonder if she would not have 
been just as willing to purchase a more effective 
prescription. 
In light of the fact that Maria intends to abort 
the fetus and that she has carried through with this 
intention on three previous occasions, the protection of 
fetal health does not seem to be a valid reason for the 
treatment option chosen by the resident. If the decision is 
based on protection from further damage to the leg, it is 
never explicitly stated in the interview and there may be 
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better ways of dealing with this possibility. The 
contraindication is stated in an ambiguous fashion which 
leaves open the possiblity of interpreting it to mean that 
the pain medication is dangerous to Maria because she is 
pregnant. The options of alternative pain medication, 
stronger than the over-the-counter medication and not 
threatening to fetal health, or of taking the other 
medication despite its threat to fetal health, are never 
explicitly discussed in the interview. Neither does Maria 
ever raise them. Why does Maria not ask if there is 
anything that her physician can do for her more than simply 
advise her to take the over-the-counter medication, and call 
him if there is any problem? Once again, there seems to be 
good reason for the patient to question the physician's 
choice of treatment plan, or at least ask for clarification, 
but no such attempt is made. 
Vicki 
Vick i has presented with a var iety of  complaint s, 
among them the removal of moles, one on her face. This is 
not a medically indicated treatment. It is one for which 
the medical profession is consulted due to its technical 
expertise and the possiblity of complications which are 
medical in nature (i. e. , infection). It is a little out of 
the ordinary for a patient to consult a family practitioner 
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for the removal of facial moles, due to the fact that 
plastic surgeons and dermatologists have more experience 
with such procedures (an exception to this may be rural 
family practices, where specialists are not as accessible) . 
Informed of this fact, as well as the fact that the problem 
is not considered formidable by her physician, Vicki is 
"treated" for her facial mole. 
Medically, this procedure has several risks . Some 
of the risks are difficult to categorize as strictly medical 
since the whole procedure is more "cosmetic" than medically 
indicated. Since the procedure is treated under the rubric 
of a medical treatment, and its success is the removal of a 
mole with a minimum of scarring, I will treat all 
consequences besides financial and practical inconvenience 
as "medical" consequences. With this clarification, the 
risks of this procedure are present regardless of who does 
the cutting and suturing. Varying levels of experience and 
quality of equipment are the only factors which affect the 
probability of the risks. The only benefit is removal of 
the moles, which would be the probable result of any 
clinical encounter around this presenting complaint (unless 
of course there were some sort of medical contraindications 
around the removal of the moles) . So the only deliberation 
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over risks that is relevant is that of degree of 
likelihood. 
There are several factors which seem to increase 
the risks for scarring and disfiguring in Vicki's case. 
First of all, she has come to the lowest level of 
experience, generally speaking, in terms of those medical 
practitioners who are qualified to remove moles. As the 
resident points out, usually dermatologists or plastic 
surgeons are the best qualified to remove facial moles. 
Secondly, she has come to the family practice model office. 
So within the lowest level of experience of the medical 
specializations, she has elected to come to the setting 
where she is likely to get a physician who is in training, 
rather than an experienced practitioner. Finally, as is 
revealed through the interaction, the clinical setting is 
not very well equipped to perform the procedure that Vicki 
has requested. 
It is possible to argue against this evaluation of 
the risks. It could be claimed that family practitioners 
are better equipped to deal with cosmetic surgery because of 
their concern with the whole person. One result of such a 
concern would be to avoid unnecessary or ill-advised 
cosmetic surgery. This is not explicitly discussed in 
Vicki's case, and since the surgery was performed, Vicki's 
attendance at a family practice did not have a different 
result ·than would be likely from the more 
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surgically-oriented specialists. Another advantage might be 
that family practitioners are more likely to pick up on 
later infection and avoid unnecessary disfiguring. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that those training for 
medical practice are more careful, more recently schooled in 
new techniques. Though possible, this does not seem as 
likely for a family practice resident. Residents have been 
said to be more attentive to patient's desires and needs and 
under the careful scrutiny of experienced staff physicians. 
The supervision, however, is by a family practitioner who is 
not likely to have much experience in facial surgery. I 
cannot imagine any counter-argument to the lack of suitable 
equipment. 
Practically, time and expense are highly variable 
considerations. Second to the removal of her moles, Vicki's 
concern seems to be expense. She gives as her reason for 
not going to a specialist that she cannot afford one. She 
also asked how many moles the physician could do at one 
time. This may be an expression of a concern with the 
inconvenience of needing to make return trips, or of having 
to pay for each visit. The actual effect · is that she will 
have to make return trips for the removal of stitches, as 
well as to have the other moles removed. This is despite 
the resident's original expression of the intent or ability 
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to remove six at one appointment, and to reduce risks by 
doing an inconspicuous mole prior to the one on Vicki's 
face . 
The options to the treatment plan are many. None 
of them would have removed the medical risks or had a long 
term effect different than the option taken. The moles 
would all be eventually removed and there would always be 
some risk of infection or disfiguring. The practical 
consequences and the probability of the medical consequences 
could all have been improved on by many optional treatment 
plans. Vicki could have been encouraged to reconsider 
whether the expense would not be any or much greater if she 
had gone to a specialist (cf. , page 138, footnote 4) . 
Another option would have been to do one or more removals at 
different sites to see if she were really comfortable with 
the family practice resident operating on her face. Or she 
could have him do all but the facial mole, going to a 
specialist for that one alone. Simply verifying that the 
proper or desired equipment was available in the clinic, and 
then postponing the surgery until it was, would have reduced 
the risk . Or another appointment could have been set for a 
time when the resident would have adequate equipment, time 
and supervision to do a larger number of moles under optimal 
conditions. 
None of these options, except the original 
intention of doing a less conspicuous one first and a rather 
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cursory discussion of the higher level specialist , were 
mentioned to V icki. Perhaps she could reasonably be expected 
to have thought of the latter possibility herself , prior to 
presenting at the clinic . 
The Treatment Decisions 
The question of whether or not the treatments were 
in the patients' interests , when compared to the obvious 
alternatives , is difficult to answer . This is due to two 
factors: First , there are different means of achieving the 
medical goals , and these different means have efficacies and 
side effects which result in controversial cost-benefit 
ratios. Secondly , the non-medical advantages and 
disadvantages , such as cost and time , are dependent on 
non-medical factors (income , work schedules , etc . ) ,  and are 
so mundane that it is not at all obvious how the women would 
have chosen , had they been given the opportunity . 
The medical treatments which the physicians chose 
were more or less  effective means of achieving certain 
medical goals for the�e patients. Presumably patients come 
to physicians to have their medical interests looked after 
and physicians' treatment of patients serve these 
interests . An examination of the alternative treatments 
which might serve the same medical interests gives us a 
basis to consider whether the treatment decision made was so 
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clearly the "best" that there was no need for the physician 
to consult the patient nor for the patient to ask for 
reasons or clarification. If there are other courses of 
treatment which might be preferred by the patient, then it 
is reasonable to consider why the physicians did not consult 
the patients regarding their preferences on the non-medical 
concerns, or why the patients did not inquire about these 
options. 
If the medical cost-benefit ratio of a particular 
treatment is controversial in comparison to the others, then 
it is also reasonable to consider why the patients' opinions 
were not sought. In order to see the relevance of such 
questions, it is helpful to get a clear picture of the 
medical risks and potential benefits, as well as the 
non-medical practical advantages and disadvantages, of the 
different treatment options which are suggested by the 
medical concerns expressed in the physicians' treatment 
decisions. Tables I, II and III describe for each patient a 
few available treatment options, together with the medical 
and non-medical advantages and disadvantages. 
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TRF.AT!-tEm' OP1'IONS 
A. No Screen, 
.Imnediace full 
c.."Ourse of 
ancibiocic 
B. Strepc Screen, 
Inmediate iull 
course of 
a'ltibiotic, to 
be stopped if 
screen negative 
Table I .  SHEILI\ - Sore throat ; suspected strept inieccion. 
POI'i:NJ'.I.AL Bl:l'JEFITS 
l .  /\void rheumatic fever 
2. Reduce chance of 
contagiousness 
3. F.arlier recovery chan 
waiting for screen 
l. Avoid rheumacic fever 
2. Reduce chance of 
contagiousness 
3 .  E3rlier recovery than 
waiting for screen 
NID'\TIVE SCREEN 
4. None of the above 
benefits apply 
S .  Cease tmneeded 
treatment, reduce 
risks 
tmITIVE SCREEl� 
6. Known effective 
treatment 
AJN/\flmGF,S 
1 .  No recurn trip co or . 
2. No return trip to 
phar:necy 
3. No need co call Dr . 
1 .  No return trip to Dr . 
2. No return trip co 
pharmacy 
tb additional 
advantages 
3 .  EXf>ellSe for needed 
drug 
4. Avoid second (needed) 
trip to IX)annacy 
MEDICAL RISKS 
1 .  Allergic reaction 
2. Reduction of later 
efficacy 
3 .  Sl!c)pression of 
nornal baccer ial 
growth 
4. Contribute to 
developrent of 
resiscant strains 
5 .  Treatment may be 
ineffective 
DISJ\DVJ\Nl'l\GES 
l .  Possibly unnecessary 
Expense 
2 .  Possillly wmecessary 
trip co txiarrnacy 
1 .  Allergic reaccion 1 .  NeecJ to call or . 
2. Reduction of later atout screen 
3.  
4 .  
efficacy 
Suppression of nornnl 
i:>3cterial growch 
Contribute to 
developnent of 
resistant strains 
5. 'l'reatrnent may be 
in-effective 
6 .  Risks borne without 
need for treac.<nent 
No additional 
risks 
2. lbnecessary expense 
of ten days • 
antibiotics 
3. lllmecessary trip to 
pharmacy 
No additional 
risks 
,-a 
\JI 
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Table I (Continued) 
TRFA'.l'Mllll' OPI'IOHS 
c. .Scrept Screen, 
'.lw-five day 
prescriptions, 
one to be iilled 
and started 
Jnmediately, 
second to be 
filled and taken 
if screen is 
positive 
D.Strepc screen, 
dispense 
antibiocic only 
if screen 
positive 
ror1::t-1rIAL BENEFITS 
1 .  Avoid rneumatic fever 
2. Red•.1ce t:hance of 
contagiousness 
3 .  F.arlier recovery chan 
waiting for screen 
N!;Xil\TIVE SCP.EEN 
4 .  None of the above 
benefits apply 
5.  Cease wmeedecl 
treatment, r�uce 
risks 
POOITIVE OCREEN 
6. Known effective 
treatrnenc 
1. No wmecessary risks 
IF TRE.I\TED 
2. Known effective 
treatment 
3.  (Delayed) protection 
f com rhewnatic tever 
4. (Delayed) protection 
from contagiousness 
AfNANrAGFS 
1.  No return trip co Dr. 
for prescription 
2. Avoid expense of 
5 days of drug 
3 .  Expense for needed 
drug 
1. Expense is for drug 
that is known to be 
effective 
2. One (needed} trip to 
phaanacy 
Mill!C:I\L RISKS 
1. Allergic reaction 
2. Reduction of later 
efficacy 
3. Suppression of nornal 
bacterial growth 
4. Contribute to 
developneit of 
resiscant strains 
5 .  Treatment may be 
ineffective 
6. Risks borne without 
need for creatnent 
No additional 
ris!ts 
1 .  Delay in treatment 
2. Rheumatic fever 
3 .  Contagiousness 
4 .  Delayed recovery 
5 .  Allergic reaction 
6 .  Reduction of later 
efficacy 
7.  Suppression of nornal 
bacterial growth 
8. Contribute to· 
develq:menc of 
resistant strains 
DISJ\INAflfAQ;S 
1.  N-?ed to cal! Dr . 
about screen 
2. 'l\.lo trips to piannacy 
3 .  Need to keep track of 
prescription 
4 .  U'Ulecessary expense 
of first 
prescription 
S. U'Ulecessary trip co 
phamacy 
4. Second trip to 
p,armacy 
1 .  Need to call !le . 
about screen 
2. Trip to phannacy 
3 .  Recurn crip to Dr. 
if he cannot phone in 
prescription 
� °' 
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Table I (OXltinued) 
TIU::ATMENl' OPl'IONS 
£. Strept screen, 
dispense 
antibiotic 
:inmediately 
co be cak.en if 
screen is 
posicive 
POI'I::NfIAL BE."IBFITS 
1 .  th mnecessary risks 
IF TRFATID 
2. Known effective 
treatment 
3.  (Delayed) protection 
fran rhewnatic fever 
4. (Delayed) protection 
fran contagiousness 
AfNI\NrAGES 
1 .  Expense is for drug 
known co be 
efiective 
2. Ole (needed) crip co 
(Xlaanacy 
3 .  Prescription already 
in possession of 
patient 
MEDICJ\I. RISKS 
1. Delay in treatnent 
2. Rheumatic fever 
3 .  Contagiousness 
4 .  Later recovery 
5 .  Allergic reaction 
6. Reduccion of later 
efiicacy 
7. Suppression of 
normal bacterial 
growth 
a. Contribute co 
developnent of 
resistant strains 
DIS/'.DVANr/\G'.S 
1 .  Need to call Dr . 
about screen 
2. Trip to pharmacy 
3 .  Need to keep track oi 
prescription 
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'rRf:A'IMENr OPTIONS 
A. Give pain 
medication sauple 
though it is 
contr.:!indicated 
for fetal health 
B. Suggest. less use 
of leg and over-
the-counter 
medication 
C. Prescribe a 
medication to 
be purchased 
which· gives 
better relief 
than over-the­
counter 
rnedicacion and 
does noc 
threacen t.ne 
fetus 
D. Refer Maria to 
a physician in 
the clinic who 
has no rooral 
concern over her 
fecus ' health 
and her intention 
to abort . This 
physician gives 
Maria the drug 
sanple of 
treatment A. 
Table II . HI\RIA - PrL>gnanc (intending to aborc) , with leg pain from injury. 
PCTl'ENrIAL BEl-lEFITS 
1. Effective pain relief 
1. No risk to ietus 
2. Less chance of 
further damage to leg 
due to desensicization 
1 .  lb risk. co fetus 
2. Effective pain relief 
AfJVl\Nr/\GF,S 
1 .  Less or no time off 
wor,c ; income 
maintained 
2. Less inpairment of 
other life 
activities 
3. Save room�y (sample 
not purchased) 
1. May be less eY.f)eflsive 
chan filling a 
prescription 
1 .  Less or no time off 
t10rk ; income 
11\3.intained 
2. Less impairment of 
life activities 
MEDICAL IUSKS 
1 .  Risk to fetus 
2 .  Possible iurther leg 
da!Mge due to 
de3e0sicizacion 
1. Less effective pain 
relief 
1 .  Possible furcher leg 
damage due to 
desensitization 
(Tile sarne as for treatment A, above, except that 
a diiferent physician is re�-ponsible for the 
decision. ) 
DI SNJVN:lr/\.GES 
1 .  Risk to fecal health 
or liie 
1. nay need to take 
time oii work and 
reduce income 
2.  Cost oi mediec1tion 
3 .  May be greater 
L'lp!irmenc of life 
activities 
1 .  Cose oi IDl..'Ciicat ion 
2. 'l'rip to pharnucy 
...... °' 
N 
TRFA'..l."MElll' OPI'IONS 
A. Renova! of facial 
roole by a famil}' 
practice resident 
with sub-standard 
equip11e11t 
B.  Renova! oi less 
conspicuous 
body roole(s) 
first, return to 
have facial 
1wles renoved 
c. Do bodily rooles 
and suggest thac 
Vicki call and 
check prices for 
dearatologists 
D. Refer Vicki to 
a dernacologist, 
suggesting that 
they are better 
prepared to do 
the surgery and 
not as expensive 
as she thinks 
Table III . VICXI - Facial and bodily rooles ; patient requesting rerooval.  
PO.l'ENl.'IAL BDIBFI'l'S 
1 .  tbles removed 
1 .  Risk of 
disiigurement and 
iniection to less 
conspicuous 
location 
2. l'bles renoved 
3 .  Increase in 
experience on part 
of resident prior to 
rerroval of facial 
roole 
1. Bodily ooled rerooved 
inmediately 
2. Facial roole nay 
receive higher level 
of expercise 
1. More experienced 
surgeon, reducing 
chance of risks 
2. r-t>les all rerroved 
inmediately 
NJVANf/\GES 
1. Facial roles reooved 
irrmediately 
2. May be less expensive 
tnan some other 
specialists 
1. Some reuovals 
i.nmediate 
2. Less expensive than 
plastic surgeon; 
perhaps than 
dernatologist 
1. Bodily rooles rerooved 
inmediately 
2. May not need to 
return for stitches 
3. If Family Practice 
clinic is less 
expensive, save rooney 
for reuoval of bodily 
moles 
1 .  Removals all done in 
one visit to 
der:macologisc 
2. May save uoney: 
deanatologists in 
oormunity charge $25-
$175 for three 
reroovals 
MmlC.1\L RISKS 
1. Disfiguremenc and 
infection 
2. Non-specialise care 
3 .  Resident, not an 
experienced Dr. 
4 .  Sub-standard 
equipnenc 
1. Disfigurement a'ld 
infection 
2. Non-specialist care 
3. Resident, not an 
experienced Dr. 
4 .  Sub-standard equiprent 
1. Disfigurement and 
infection 
2. Non-specialist care 
3. Resident, not an 
experienced Dr. 
4. Most conspicuous 
(facial) nole has 
reduced t isks if 
deDIBtologist 
�riorms 
1 .  Disfigurement and 
infe,;tion 
01 SI\IJVANl'ArnS 
1 .  Nt..>ed co return for 
rer,ioval of stitches 
and ocher rooles 
2. C.Ost approximacely 
$30 - $150 for all 
noles 
1. Need co return for 
removal of stitches 
and other nol�s 
2. C.Ost, $30 - $ 150 
for all rooles 
1. May need to return , 
for stitch renoval 
2. Inconvenience of 
pnone calls to 
check prices 
3 .  •rrip to 
dernatologist 
4 .  TWo fees : Family 
Practice, $30 - $150 
Deaetologist, $25-
$175, so may or may 
not save 
1 .  �bne rerroved at 
first visit 
2. Inconvenience of 
second appointmenc 
at a different 
ott'ice 
3 .  Probably need to 
· return to have 
stitches rerroveJ 
4. C.Ost of both Family 
Practice clinic bill 
and dennatologists 
Each t reatment dec i s ion had med i ca l ly sound 
a lternat ives. In each case, though med ical ly sound 
t reatment was given, ther e was  at least  one al ternat ive for 
wh ich  i t  could  oe a rgued that medical  and p ract ical  concerns 
would  be better served. Yet the women pass ively accepted 
the physic ians ' dec i s ion s. Cons ider ing eacn case 
indiv idua l ly, cwo quest ions a re relevant to th i s  analy s i s : 
1. Was the t r eati�ent dec i s ion obvious ly the best 
pos s i ole, or  was tn e r e  some alte rnat ive tnat was a rguably 
as, or  more, medically sound and pract ical ? 
2. Were the women consul ted rega r ding the r i s� s, 
oenef i t s, advdntages  and di sadvant ages of the  c reatment 
dec i s ion? 
In  She i l a's case, the phy s i c i an chose a t reatment 
plaa chat  showed  n i s  Knowl edge of tne cont roversy over tne 
p resc r ipt ion of ant ibiot ics  p r ior  to reading che st rept 
sc reen . In t n 1 s  sense he showed concern no c to expose  
Sneila  unnec essa r i ly to tne r i sk s  of  ant ibiot i c s  a s  wel l as  
ove r  tne de lay in  t r eatment i f  t1e had  wa ited  for t he st r ept 
sc reen. He  nad a l so gi ven Sheila  some " cont rol" ove r  her 
healch  care oy giving her · the respons ibil ity to call  about 
tne sc reen and eitner to stop ta� ing the ant ibioc ici  or  to 
i i l l  a pres c r ipt ion wn ich sne al ready nad in her pos sess ion. 
At that point, Shei la  nad as  easy an access to the 
ant ibiot ics  as ii they were over-the-counter medicat ion . 
What i f  the phys ic ian had g iven Shei l a  the ent i re 
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ten day prescript ion eitner to be started immediately 
( treatment A)  or to be neld unt il the screen had been read 
( treatment D ) ? I f  he was concerned to avoid the 
cont inuat ion of the treatment i f  the screen was posit ive, 
treatment B, which includes a screen and cessat ion of the 
regimen if the screen was negat ive, could nave been used. 
In treatment c ,  the only d i t ference was the inconvenience of 
a return crip to the pnarmacy if the screen was posic ive 
( under treatment C ) . Treatment B had the d isadvantage of 
added cost of six to eight days ' wortn of unneeded 
medicat ion if  the screen is negat ive. She ila was not ask ed 
wnether she would prefer the extra cost or the extra trip. 
I t  is at l east arguabl e  that She i la mignt have found 
treatment A or B preferable to treatment c .  
Treatments D and E would have Sheila wait unt il the 
screen is read before taK ing the ant ibiot ic. These 
alternat ives el iminate any unneeded trips co tne pnarmacy as 
wel l  as any unnecessary cost. They also would have 
avoided unnecessary treatment and its attendant medical 
risks (and tne potent ial benefits ) . While  these are medical 
factors , tney are also controversial within �he prof ession 
and it  is possible that Sheila had a strong preference for 
one set of · risks and benef its. For exampl e, it  may be that 
She ila nad a recurring problem with yeast infect ions which 
tne suppression of normal bacteria by ant ibiot ics would 
exacerbate. I t  is reasonable  to think that this might make 
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so@e d i f f erence  to tne det erm inat ion of  wn ich treatment 
She i la would  nav e cnosen. I t  m ignc nave been her 
preference, for good reasons, to  avoid  ant i biot ics  unl ess  
they were �nown to  oe  needed in  order co  recover her health. 
The only d ifference  between treatments D and E was the  t ime 
at wn icn Sne i la is g iven tne prescript ion. Tne pnysic ian 
had already demonscraced a wil l ingness  to  dispen se  a 
poss ibly unneeded prescri�c ion, and tui s  was certa inly  a 
more conven ienc  treatment for Sne i la. Consequently, 
treatraenc E see1ns co  nave oeen tne more v iabl e and 
� ract ical  al cernat ive wn icn She i la mignt nave chosen Detter 
over treatment D o r C. 
So treatment B and treat1�ent E are arguably net ter 
than che crea t inent C wh ich was selected by the phy s i c ian. 
Of co urs e actual  determ inat i on o f  what She i la would  pref er 
cannoc oe raade w i tnout  consult ing her. Fu rtnermore, t he 
pnys ic ian J� ighc not have agreed w ith Sne ila ' s  est imat ion of  
ner interest s. On cne  otner nand, ne mignt have agreed or 
She ila  might nave been so determined as to see� otner nealtn 
care. Th i s  inceract ion, tne  pny s i c ian ' s  f irst  exposure to  
Sne i la, naa no re ference  to  sne i la ' s pract i cal and medi cal 
prei erences. Nor d i d  Sne i la inqu ire whetner tnere were more 
conven ienc  ways, or l ess expensive, tnan tne opt i on tnat was 
given by the physic ian. sne i l a  was ask ed whetner sne was 
al l erg ic  to  tne drug, and responded tnat she was noc. 
Beyond th i s, she was no t  consulted aoouc  any o i  tne medical 
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risKs and poten t ial  benefits oi  t r eat ing  befo r e  o r  a i t e r  tne 
s c reen was r ead. 
In Ma r ia's case, tae phy s i c i an cnos e a t r eatmenc 
plan that snows concern f o r  ietal  health  wn ic� r es u l ts in  a 
comproraise  in  pa in rnedicacion f o r  Ma r ia . Any o f  tne othe r 
tn r ee t reac1aent opt ions sugges c ed in  Ta�le I I  appea r to have 
oeen mo re  practically and med ically sound. This is not to 
sug9est  tnat tae t r eacraenc caos en i s  d i sast rous  or  med i cally 
in adequac e. I t  i s  gu i ce poss i ol e  chat Ma r i a r eceived 
acteyua ce  paiD r el ief  f rora tn� ov� r-cne-coun c e r  med ica t ion. 
On ·c.he  otne r nand, it ll1ay be t11at s 11e nad been us ing  s uch 
hled icat ions w itnout success and came co ge e sometning  
s t r ong e r. T�e protect ion whicn t il e  pny s i c ian gave  tne fetus  
seems inetiecc ive s ince  Ma r i a pl anned to abo r t  and  nad a 
h is co ry oi  being aol e to ca r ry tn rough with  sucn pl ans. 
Witn tnis co11s ide rac i on in mind, it seems thac che physician 
would  nave oest  s e r ved Ma r ia's inte re sts oy g iv ing ne r the 
sample  med ication �e brought inco tne  room to  d ispense 
( T reat1nent A )  . This would  nave saved he r tne expense and 
inconven i ence of  buying anotner  p r esc r ipt ion or ove r-the­
counter  .meaicat ion. 
Tne @o ral  value of  cne  fetus is a con t r oversial 
issue . Ic  is a l so one about wn i ch tnis physician had ve ry 
strong convict i ons. It raay oe tnat ne simply could not 
countenance any invol vement w i cn th r eatening fecal  wel l­
being. As a mo ral  ag ent, not s imply a technic i an ( cf. ,  
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Veatch, 19 7 2, 19 7 8 ) , n i s  conv i c t i on snould not oe 
d i s r eg a r ded, r equ i r ing tue pny s i c i an to act  against  n i s  
mo ral  con sc i ence . T r eatrnenc s  C and D p rovi de a lte rnat ives  
tha t woul d not  involve cne pnys i c i aD w i th an  act ion tnat 
woul d pos e  a th reat  to fecal  Dea i ch . 
Tr eatmenc C p rov ides  an alce rnat ive tnac  r es u l ted 
in no threat to  the ie tus but prov ides  st rong e r  pa in  
medicat ion for  Ma r ia .  I c  had the d i sadvancage  over 
t r eatment A oi  cost ing ,�o r e  than a f r ee  sampl e and of  
r equ i r ing  cnat  Ma r ia go  co  a pha rwacy to  pu rcnase  the 
medicat ion . It wo uld, noweve r, avo id  involv ing tne 
pnys ic i an in  whac he m1gnt cons ider  an immo r a l  ace  and 
p£ov iaes  �a r ia w i th s t r onger  pa in medicat ion wni cn may a l low 
ner  co  con t iD ue a c  wor�  and noc  s uf f e r  a l o s s  o i  income . 
T r ea tment D i s a r ef e r r a l  to a phy s i c i an who does 
not  sna r e  tn i s  res 1den � 1 s �o ral  conv icc ion . Ic  is  pos s i ole  
cnat  tne  r e s i deDc w i l l  s t i l l  con s ide r tnis  to  be  per sonal  
involvemen t, aloe 1 t  i 11d i r ecc, w i cn an immo ral  act ion . Th i s  
a lone may ma� e t r eatment C mo re  des i r aole t o  t n e  res i dent . 
As suming that tne  r e i e r r al could  have been to  anothe r 
pnys i c i an in  tne c l in ic ac  the moment, t h i s  c r eatment would 
nave �ad the same advantages  as  A .  These  a r e  c lea r ly the  
ones wh i cn are  most  to  Ma r i a's advantage, sav ing he r the 
cost  and t r ip t o  the pna rmacy and g i v ing ner  the s c rong e r  
pain med icat ion . 
Ma r ia ' s  p ref e r ences  r eg a r d ing tne factor s  wh i ch 
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were mat erial  to the trea tment aec ision we r e  not so ught . 
Tne physi c i an doubl e-cnec� ed to mak e sure she is considering 
an abort ion, and that she would  not be pa i d  for any t ime she 
needed to tak e ofi . These facts notw i t nscanding, ne chose 
tne l east effec t ive  creatment which might  wel l have nad the 
greatest di sadvantages . Ma r ia accepted th€: treatment 
dec ision w incout  aay requests for clari i i cat i on or opt ions .  
I n  Vick i ' s  case, tn�  physic i an ag reed  to  remove 
Vick i ' s  mol es . Consider ing cne  opt ions l isted in Table  I I I  
the  dec ision t o  f ul f i l l  VicK i ' s  requesc seemed to oe tne 
l ease advantageous  and toe one w i th che highest degree of 
risK and f ewesc. po ten t ial  oenef i t s (Treatmen c A ) . Vick i 
seemed to be most concerned w itn  expense  and l east concern ed  
w i cn the med ical  risK s of  d isf ig ureraenc . The  pnysic ians 
s e eri1 e ct to  a cc  e p·c Vick  i ' s asses sm enc o :t t n e f in an c i a 1 
conc ern  as accurace  and as outweighing cne  medical  risks 
over wh i ch cney 11ad expressed concern . Two oi the crea tment 
a l t e rnac ives  seeined impl ied  in tne concerns expressed oy 
tne pnysic ians . T r eatment B, removal o f  a l ess conspicuous  
mol e  f irsc W d S  actually  sugges ted by cne resident, never co 
enter into c.ne d iscuss ion again . Treatment D, ref erra l to a 
de rmatolog i s t  ( o r  a plas t i c surgeon ) ,  was expressed as the  
usual  pract ice . Ic may be chat  treatment C, wn ich impl ied 
tha t VicK i m ignt go  co  tne  more spec ial i zed pny s i c ian f o r  
t h e  fac ial  mol e, i s  impl i c i t ly acknowl edged as a n  opt ion i n  
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the physicians' expressions of  concern over the facial mole 
in particular. 
The treatment chosen was not medically disastrous, 
though it did present the poorest sum of medical and 
practical advantages and disadvantages. Vicki had chosen 
this treatment, if her request is taken at face value. It 
was, however, based on inf ormation about costs that did not 
seem accurate. The physicians did not seem to share Vicki ' s  
lack of  concern over scarring, but certainly - �hey were aware 
of her attitude. The only discussion of the inconvenience 
of  return visits cl osed with the physician estimating that 
he coul d do about half  a dozen at one time. There was no 
discussion of the fact that the physician was a resident, 
therefore, less experienced than would have been a more 
experienced physician. With the reference to " ol der" rather 
than "staf f" doctor, Vicki certainly was not of fered any 
clarification on this issue. The " less than desirable" 
quality of  available equipment only arose in the process of 
the actual facial surgery, so it was not a part of either 
the physicians ' agreement to do the surgery, nor part of  
Vicki's request. It is reasonable to suggest that the 
treatment actual ly given (A) , when compared to the 
alternatives, was not the one most serving of the relevant 
medical and practical issues even though Vicki requested it. 
She was consulted about the option of  referral, but her 
possibly inaccurate cost evaluation and rejection was not 
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challenged. Many of the factors wh ich made th i s  a treatment 
less  serv ing of the pat ient ' s  concerns were not part of the 
explicit  d i sc u s s ion nor among the ascribable 
presupposit ions. The treatment chosen did  event ually f ulf ill 
Vicki's request, though the phy sic ians d i d  not check to 
ascertain her agreement to accept the part icular ri sks and . 
d i sadvantages whi ch were immediately apparent or arose as 
the s urgery was proceeding. 
All three women received treatment that met their 
medical needs. They . also received treatment s whose 
alternat ives either pos s ibly or act ually were better serv ing 
of their and their caregivers ' concerns. Sheila was asked 
i f  she was allergic  to med icat ion. Beyond that quest ion, 
she was not informed - of the reasons for the treatment 
dec i s ion, nor asked for her preference regarding a 
controvers ial medical choice or non-medical convenience and 
cost  factors. Maria was asked whether she would get pai d  
t ime of f work and had ind icated that she intended t o  get an 
abort ion. The treatment dec i s ion was one wh i ch confl icted 
with serv ing her concern about work and respect ing her 
intent to abort. She was told that the sample of medicat ion 
that the physic ian contemplated giving her was 
contraindicated for pregnant and nursing mothers. She was 
not told that it was fetal health that was protected. Any 
of the alternat ives ment ioned would have been better choices 
if  fetal health was di scounted, but Mar ia was not asked for 
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her preference nor given reasons for the treatment decision . 
Vicki ' s  treatment fulf illed her request though it is at 
ieast questionable whether to do so was in her interest, or 
whether her request was based on accurate information. , She 
was given reasons why the usual practice was not to treat as 
she was requesting ; malpractice insurance, risk of 
disfiguring and the availabil ity of special ists who are 
better equipped and more experienced. She was not told why 
her case was treated d i f ferently, though she might 
reasonably have concluded that it was due to her request. 
As the treatment developed, it became more inconvenient for 
both Vicki and the physician. · The physicians clearly knew 
that Vicki wanted treatment by them for financial reasons. 
They did  not question the accuracy of her judgment, though 
they explained their hesitancy in terms of professional 
liablili ty . They treated her in a . manner which she might 
not have chosen if she were better informed. Vick i d i d  not 
complain or ask for clari fication when the mole removals 
were clearly going to be more inconvenient than she had 
thought a�d the resident had initially indicated. 
In all three treatments, the women were treated 
w ithout reasons given as to why the treatments were 
preferred by the physicians. The treatments were productive 
of inconvenience and costs for the women. The women did not 
take initiative to request such information or to suggest 
alternatives. The fact that the women came with compla ints 
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wh ich were treated in a medically adequate manner, together 
with the interactional observation that they d i d  not · express 
hesitancy to follow the treatment, may be taken to imply 
consent. The absence of information about the treatment 
decision and alternatives is a good reason to question 
whether the consent was informed. Another · approach would be 
to argue that the consent to th is sort of routine treatment 
is consent to medical paternalism for routine treatments of 
minor ailments. Rather than moving into th is normative 
analysis at th is point, I will ask two different questions 
in continuation of the social analysis: 
1. Why did  the women passively accept the 
treatment decisions? 
2. How did  the physicians make the treatment 
dec isions without inquiring into the patients ' preferences? 
�� Docto�tient Relationshi� . 
Note that as th is social analysi s  progresses, the 
questions and is sue s under cons ideration are more a bstract 
or general. The issues of what patients were told and how 
they were treated are answered with direct reference to the 
content of the interactions. Though th is part of the , 
analysis takes a particular perspective on the interaction 
in the sense of being d irected by the type of questions 
asked and the analytic goals, the questions are raised by an 
attempt to understand the communication and action in the 
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interaction. Consideration of the consequences of the 
treatments and their alternat ives is a l ittle further 
removed from the interaction. Though these discussions are 
directed by the information gleaned from the interaction, 
the consequences and alternatives are drawn from a broader 
understanding of the patients ' and physicians ' social world 
wh ich we may reasonably ascribe to the interactioq�l context 
as presupposed. 
Our abi l ity to understand the interactions and the 
consequences and alternatives to the treatments is an 
impl icit understanding of the "grounding"  of these isolated 
interactions in the larger social world of the participants, 
wh ich we share. The analysis is an expl icit discussion of 
th is impl icit understanding. But i t  is also an expl icit 
discussion of elements of our l ived- in social world. These 
elements are, as was discussed in Chapter I I, part of our 
methodology. Expl icit discussion and conceptual ization of 
these elements gives them a sense of concreteness that they 
do not have in our communicational activ ities. The 
description of how the presuppositions play a role in the 
interactions make them sound l ike necessary and suf f icient 
conditions or causal explanations. But there is not any 
necessity intended in th is analysis. Rather, th is analysis 
is a depiction of a shared social world ;  more a l iterary­
sociological than a scienti f ic�normological account. As 
such, it can of course be questioned, but the chal lenger 
173  
must prov ide an al ternat ive account of tne interact ion wh ich 
situates the behav ior in the larger social world wh ich we 
share w i th the pat ients and physician�. 
Th is is not a d i fferent sense from Glaser ' s  (Glaser 
and Strauss� 1967) use of "grounded" in "grounded theory. " 
Glaser uses the term to  refer to  the use of background 
readings in the relevant sociological l iterature as 
preparation f or observat i on. As was brief ly ment ioned in 
Chapter II (page 76) , the issues and conceptualizat i ons 
ga ined from th is fam i l iarity with the l iterat ure serve as 
"sensit iz ing concepts" wh ich can be checked and conf irmed or 
ref lected as the observer gathers data and engages in 
analysis of  the informat i on. Th is l iterat ure prov ides 
characterizat ions of social patterns and mor� abstract 
theories of social structures and behaviors. As such they 
are more or less accurate (or inaccurate) depict ions of  what 
is observed in the interact i ons. They are open to  rej ect i on 
or mod i f icat ion to  increase their abi l i ty to  show how the 
concrete interact ional behavior ref lects and val idates the 
social norms , inst i tutions and social struct ure of society. 
These latter ent it ies are not " f ound " in the social world , 
but are descript i ons of  how layers of habits , pract ices and 
communicat ion shape the concrete interact i ons under 
considerat ion. The only "real i ty "  wh ich these descript i ons 
have is that of being represented in the concrete 
interact ions between members of  the social world. They do 
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not "exist" independent of these man i festations. As 
characteri zations they are expressions of how people have 
come to interact. As general i zations or theories, they 
typi fy rather than present deterministic causal pictures. 
Al l three interactions are communications between 
patients and physicians in a particular setting. They have 
been chosen as typ i f ications of a pattern of behav iour 
observed in the interactions recorded. The f irst focus of 
the analysis was to describe the patients ' lack of input 
into the decision-making process. Discussion of the 
alternative treatments and the consequences of each were to 
establ ish that the context is one with in wh ich it is 
adv isable for the patients to be involved in the decisions 
. and to ask questions in order to decide on the most 
effect ive and practical treatment. The fol lowing discussion 
attempts to account for the lack of participation of the 
patients. These are of interest because the interactions 
are being examined for the normative purpo�e of evaluating 
the qual ity of the consent in such routine care. 
The interactions have been typi f ied as doctor­
patient communication. Th is is recognition of the physical  
location of  the interact ion in a medical  setting and of the 
"goal " of the exchange as the dispensing of medical  care . 
The analysis now focuses on describing the social context 
in a manner that makes understandable the women ' s  passive 
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acceptance of the treatment decisions and the particular 
treatments which the physicians chose. 
The women asked no questions and the physicians did 
not seem to think this strange. This is a typical pattern 
in recordings of physician-patient interactions. Fisher 
(1979 , 1982 , 1983 , 1986) has characterized the social 
presupposition ·behind this pattern as a reciprocal belief 
that "doctor knows best and is acting in the patient ' s  best 
interest. " Others have suggested that the passive 
ac ceptance of this authority of the ��dical role is 
descriptive of most physician-patient encounters (Scully , 
1980; Fisher , 1979 , 1982 , 1983 , 1986; Todd , 1982 , 1983; 
Fisher and Todd , 1983; Shuy ,  1983; Ehrenreich and English , 
1978; Rothman , 1982; Starr , 1982; Waitzkin , 1983) � These 
various accounts are based on empirical , historical and 
theoretical evidence. 
It is fruitful to unpack what is implicit in 
Fisher • s · characterization. "Doctor knows best" implies an 
asymmetry of know ledge , with the physician knowing much more 
about health care , treatments and consequences. Physicians 
are trained for years an� patients are quite aware of that 
fact. There has also been a significant increase in the 
ef fectiveness of medical treatment over the last century , 
which has added to the cultural authority of the medical 
profession (Starr , 1982 : 3-21). The trust implied in the 
second part of the characterization " and is acting in 
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the patient ' s  best interest" shows the widespread acceptance 
of this knowledge and the trust that patients have come to 
have in the medical care dispensed by physicians in 
medical institutions {cf., Friedson, 1970b). I t  may also be 
that the assumption includes the expectation that the 
physician will also take care of the patient ' s  general 
health by providing medically adequate care (Fisher and 
Groce, forthcoming). This is why it makes sense to speak of · 
"agendas" which depict why the patient really came to the 
clinic. If, for example, we heard Maria complaining that 
the physician did not give her information on the abortion 
or birth control, her disappointment would be 
understandable. Physicians are expected to address all 
health issues that are mentioned in the interview. 
The patients in the three interactions are not told 
the reasons for the physicians ' choice of treatment. They 
do not seem to take exception to this lack of explanation. 
If they are seen to operate from within a context which 
presupposes the view that doctor knows best and is acting in 
their interest, this becomes quite reasonable. The 
physicians do not expect otherwise, and this is also 
reasonable from the perspective of the reciprocal assumption 
{ Fisher), or presupposition-ascription (Coulter, 1979). If 
the patients recognize personal inconvenience, they may 
assume that the treatment suggested simply inevitably 
entails such inconvenience for medical reasons or be 
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unwill ing . to break with the practice of minimizing demands 
on physicians ' time. Not knowing the reasons for, or 
alternatives to, the treatment chosen, they may assume that 
there must . be good medical reasons. It  is the 
presupposition of physicians • expertise and authority wh ich 
makes such an assumption reasonable. I f  patients assume 
that the particular treatment plan is unambiguously in their 
medical interest, then there is l ittle reason for them to 
consider whether there are less inconvenient or more 
effective treatments. Nor is there any reason to assume 
that otner factors besides their interests �ight influence 
the physician ' s  choice of treatment. The patient simply 
does not have .the knowledge necessary to ask questions about 
aiternatives and consequences of treatments (Friedson, 
1970a). 
Starr (1982) has discussed in great detail  the 
development of the cultural authority of the medical 
profession in America (cf., Stevens, 1971). Starr describes 
how th is authori ty is social in that physicians regulate 
behavior through medical def initions wh ich only they have 
the "expertise" to make, classifying the problem as one 
wh ich is appropriately treated under the med ical model. 
But prior to making any recommendations, physicians 
have to def ine and evaluate their patients ' 
condition. Patients consult physicians not just 
for advice, but f irst of all to f ind out whether 
they are "really" sick and what their symptoms 
mean. "What have I got, doc?" they ask. " Is it 
serious?" Cultural authority, in th is context, is 
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antecedent to ac tion. The ·authority to interpret 
signs and symptoms, to  diagnose heal th or il lness, 
to name diseases� and to of fer prognoses is the 
foundation of any social authority the physician 
can assume. By shaping the patients ' understanding 
of  their own experience, physicians create the 
�onditi6ns under which their advice seems 
appropriate. ( Starr, 1 9 82: 14) 
The patients sought medical advice in a cul ture where the 
cultural authority of the medical profession is s�rong. 
They passively accepted the treatments prescribed within the 
traditional medical setting where the physicians ' cultural 
authority is strongest. The treatments were f or problems 
which the physicians labelled f or the patients, or confirmed 
that they were appropriate problems f or medical care . 
Sheila is told  "you may have a lit tle strept 
throat" and that the physician is going to  start her on 
antibiotics before reading the strept screen. If the screen 
is negative, she "won ' t have to take a ful l course of 
antibiot ics but . . •  [if ] it ' s  strept wel l  we ' l l have you 
go ahead and take a course." Sheila has come to the 
physician with a sore throat and he has defined it as 
potential strept infection. The discussion is ambiguous 
enough that Sheila may not realize from it that the 
antibiotic ' s  effectiveness is expected to  be conditional 
upon her having this infection, which can only be determined 
through the culture. Nevertheless, there does seem to be 
enough evidence present to  make it reasonable to  wonder why 
she did not ask if the purchase of  pencil lin coul d  wait 
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unt i l  the screen was read. Moments later, when the 
physician writes two prescript ions to be filled at different 
t imes if necessary, Shei la st i ll does not ask why this is 
necessary or if there is an�ther more conven ient procedure. 
To most of us, th is may not seem except ional. Both Sheila's 
lack of concern and our acceptance of it  as " normal" is 
reasonable in light of the cultural authority of the 
physician and the reciprocal assumpt ion that physicians are 
best placed to decide our medical i nterests. Or, 
alternat ively , we may consider such concerns too trivial to 
· raise , based on the concept ion of the physician as being 
" too busy. " 
Maria ' s  physician enters the examinat ion room with 
pain  medicat ion in hand, asks if she w i ll get paid  for t ime 
off, and expresses doubt over her abort ion; "Well, I ' m real 
hesitant about medicat ion . • . .  You ' re not sure , even 
though , you know, you th ink you may want  to have an 
abort ion. " Maria confirms that she wi ll definitely pursue 
an abort ion, but does not ask why her abortion is relevant 
to the contraindicat ion of the pain medication, or if there 
are any other medicat ions that would not be �ontraindicated. 
The assumpt ion that the physician is look ing after b.ei: 
medical concerns makes this a reasonable omission. Were her 
employer laying her off after expressing doubt about her 
abort ion, she m ight . be more argumentative. The cultural 
authority of the physician together with the assumpt ion of 
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taking care of her medical interests describes a social 
context in wh ich th is feature of the interact ion is not 
except ional. 
Vicki. is told that the physician can remove half a 
dozen moles at one t ime. She is also told that he might do 
a less conspicuous one first to make sure they are both 
comfortable with h is performance. But she does not ask any 
quest ions when he prepares to remove the mole on her face, 
nor when he sends the nurse to look for better equipment. 
When he comple�es the ·removal of the facial· mole and 
expresses a preference to do the rest later , Vicki asks "Why 
is that?" He says that tney have already gone over t ime and 
she simply accepts that as a reason. We might ask what t ime 
limits he was referring to or why he does not honor h is 
claim earlier that he could do six at a t ime. Vicki , 
however, does not ask. She cont inues in the apparent trust 
that she had on entering the clinic and maintained even with · 
the resident ' s  and staff physician ' s  expressions - of 
hesitancy to remove her facial mole. Wh ile it  may appear 
that Vicki negot iated for her treatment, the very 
willingness to trust a family pract ice resi dent , or 
physician , to do the removal reflects once again the 
cultural authority and pat ient ' s  fai th in the good will and 
expert ise of the physician. 
All three pat ients have not sought clarification of 
reasons or alternat ives to treatment decisions wh ich 
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presented them with iome degree of inconvenience and 
expense. This common interactional pattern was seen 
throughout many of the recorded interactions. I t  is a 
reasonable omission within a social context of the cultural 
authority of the physician and the shared assumption that 
the physician is well qualified to take care of the 
. patient ' s  medical interests. Earlier consideration of the 
alternative treatments cast some doubt on whether the 
physicians in fact selected the treatment which most 
convenient ly or practically served patients • interests. I t  
may even be true that the best medical care, as opposed to 
adequate medical care, may not have been provided. Having 
briefly characterized the social context which makes 
reasonable the patients '  behavior, we now turn to consider 
the social context within which the physicians made their 
treatment decisions. Once again, there is not any causal 
analysis intended. Rather the description of social factors 
present in medical practice and the larger social context 
wil l  be explored to see if they make more reasonable the 
treatment decisions. 
The S.Qtili_context of Medical Practice 
Starting at the interactional level of analysis, 
there are several factors which make reasonable the 
physicians ' treatment decisions. Most obviously, the 
patient ' s  presenting complaints and relevant medical factors 
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influence physicians ' treatment decisions. All three 
patients received medical dare that probably fit well within 
community standards and which they would stand a good chance 
of receiving if they went to another medical office, or to  a 
different physician. Sheila presented with a sore throat 
and apparently had clinical signs of strept infection. 
Antibiotics would be effective for treating strept, so the 
physician set out to verify - whether or not it was a st rept 
infection and treated Sheila in manner that would most 
likely be effective if it was. He also asked Sheila if she . 
was allergic to penicillin. Presumably he would have 
dispensed a different antibiotic is she had turned out to be 
allergic to the penicillin. 
Maria ' s  leg pain and pregnancy were among the 
formative interactional factors which shaped the treatment 
decision. The physician first had the leg x-rayed to check 
for a fracture. He then deliberated over dispensing a 
sample pain medication, deciding against it because Maria 
was pregnant. He checked to see if she would be paid sick 
leave, likely either to see if he should write a letter to 
her employer and/or as part of his deliberations over the 
medication. 
Vicki requested that the physician remove her 
moles, including the facial mole. The physician ' s  treatment 
was removal of the facial mole. Clearly he was guided by 
Vicki ' s request. He checked to see if she would rather go 
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to a specialist, accepting her economic reason for settling 
for h is treatment. After explaining that he could do a mole 
removal from "another location" besides Vicki' s face, Vicki 
says, "But it ' s  like (unintelligible) I would not be ashamed 
to have a scar." The resident removes Vicki' s facial mole. 
It seem reasonable to assume that Vicke ' s assurance had some 
affect on th is decision. 
So there are interactional factors which help to 
produce the treatment outcomes. Predominant are the 
presenting complaints, allergies and conditions wh ich are 
contraindications for particular treatments. Of course, the 
patients have already conceptualized their problems as 
medical problems and present themselves to the physicians to 
be treated. Their complaints are ones which are seen as 
routine medical problems with in the larger social context. 
It would be unusual for any of them to go to a n�n-medicai 
person for treatment of these problems. Thus the 
interactional influence of the presenting complaints and 
contraindicating conditions are defined as legitimate 
medical complaints prior to the patients '  presenting to the 
clinic. Even th is interactional factor reflects a broader 
cultural acceptance of the authority of the medical 
profession over these aspects of peoples ' lives. 
These interactional factors do not explain, or even 
make reasonable the particular choice that the physicians 
made. Since they did not consult with the patients about 
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their preferences, and the alternatives are reasonable, 
there may be other factors wh ich make the behavior more 
understandable. Th is part icular family pract ice uni t  
contains social or medical factors wh ich influence the 
treatment decisions. For example, the part icular drug that 
the physician considered dispensing to Maria may have been 
influenced by the availabili ty of samples in  the qlinic. 
Perhaps th is was the only available pa in medicat ion. That 
might make it more reasonable that he would consi der giving 
a drug wh ich he shortly thereafter deci des is  
contraindicated. 
Vick i 1 s medical risks are increased by the shortage 
of medical tools for the mole removal. Th is is a factor 
wh ich does not become apparent unt il the resi dent has 
already started the removal. I t  might  typically dictate 
against the removal unt il the proper equipment is available. 
In th is case, however, the late discovery of the fact does 
not seem to influence the decision to treat, though i t  
affects · the risks entailed. 
Sheila ' s case does not seem to have any influences 
unique to this part icular sett ing. Her treatment does not 
involve any free samples nor any unique equipment. She does 
have a throat culture done, but there is  good reason to 
th ink that th is would have been the case regardless of the 
medical sett ing; even if she needed to go to an independent 
laboratory. As a matter of fact, suspected strept infected 
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throats are fairly routinely treated with a screen and 
immediate initiation of antibiotics (Lasagna, 1980 : 2 33). 
This pattern of medical practice may wel l have inf luenced 
the treatment deci sion in Sheila ' s  case. But why woul d th i s  
routine practice form when there is controversy over the use 
of antibiotics before they are known to be needed ? This 
question sh i fts the focus of our discussion to the formation 
of profess ional practices and the inf luences other social 
contextual factors might have on them. 
Are there any advantages to the chosen treatment 
options for the phy s icians ? Therapeutic medical 
interactions are typical ly presented as free from conf l ict 
w ith patients' interests: What is in patient s '  interest i s  
in the physician ' s, since the physician ' s  reputation and the 
patient ' s  continued trust in the physician are both sai d  to 
depend on the ef fectiveness  of the treatment. The 
phy sician ' s  good wil l  is also sometimes used to buttress  
th i s  position. The physician has trained long years to be 
able to treat the patient and spends most of his waking 
hours doing just this. There seems to be little reason for 
the patients to suspect that the physician has anything but 
patients '  interests at heart. 
Somewhere between benevolence and maliciousness 
there exists a more realistic state of disinterested 
concern. The delivery of medical care is, among other 
things, a job for physicians with the mundane aspects and · 
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recurring tasks of most jobs. It is reasonable to assume 
that routine treatments and procedures become automatic 
responses to certain presenting complaints and cl inical 
signs. Routinization carries with it the advantages for the 
physician of minim izing the del iberation required for the 
most frequently occurring routine complaints. Th is economy 
of attent ion may result in the physician not noticing some 
medical ly relevant . fact unique to the patient. The 
routinization of behavior always occurs in a complex social 
context with a consteilation of inf luences, only one of 
wh ich is concern for patients ' medical interests. I�  order 
to understand the treatment decisions made by the 
physicians, the content of the treatment decisions require 
careful attention. 
Since a sicker patient is more di f f icult to treat, 
it  seems that the therapeutic goal of preventing 
compl icat ions and treat ing as soon as pos s i ble could  not 
provide a conf l ict of interests. In this manner, it may be 
argued that the immediate treatment of Shei la with 
antibiotics served both her physician ' s  and her interests. 
She will  l ikely recover earl ier and he will  not have a more 
di ff icult medical problem to deal with, such as a 
spread of the infection, fever, or a more distressed 
patient. But Shei la ' �  immediate . treatment may also be seen · 
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as an instance of _ a wider prof�ssional tendency to initiate 
antibiotic treatment prior to testi�g for specific 
appropriateness of the drug. The ordering of _the screen 
even though treatment has begun may also be an instance of 
the profession's heavy emphasis on diagnostic testing. The 
information about the prescription of antibiotics dispensed 
by pharmaceutical companies and duplicated in the 
.fb�cian ' s  D.e.sk �f.eu�� is heavily regulated by the Food 
and Drug Administration. This literature recommends that 
antibiotics only be given af ter the presence of the 
particular bacteria and its sensitivity to the drug has been 
verified (�hysician ' s  �k R.eu�� , 1979 : 1874). This 
precaution is designed to avoid the sort of side effects 
that have been noted. 
Though far from universal, there does exist a 
pattern of practice within the profession which qoe s not 
follow this recommendation (Lasagna, 1980) . The possibility 
that Sheila might have particular objections to this 
practice, . perhaps due to a predisposition to yeast 
infections , has already been discussed. The issue here is 
not the formation of the particular treatment decision, but 
of a professional practice which is reflected by Sheila ' s  
treatment . There are less obvious advantages to this 
pattern of prescription practice whose pursuit may not be 
the goals of any particular interaction . This routine 
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pract ice is formed within a larger social context whose 
elements aid in understanding the format ion of the pract ice. 
One of the concerns regarding treatment w ith 
ant ibiot ics is pat ient compliance. Pat ients may not fill a 
prescript ion immediately, result ing in a delay in init iat ing 
the treatment. Further, they may cease the regimen 
prematurely because they are feeling better. Dispensing the 
ant ibiot ic prescript ion to be filled immediately stands a 
better chance of gett ing the pat ient onto medicat ion 
earlier. If the pat ient waits for two days, calls to see if 
the prescript ion is needed, and then fills the prescript ion, 
there is a better chance of further delay before the regimen 
is begun. Tne medical authority of the physician is most 
obvious and influent ial in the context of a medical 
encounter, so the immediate prescript ion may be more likely 
to be filled without delay than would be the case if it  was 
cont ingent on hearing over the phone from the doctor or a 
nurse that the screen was posit ive. This recommends the 
immediate prescript ion of ant ibiot ics, whether due to 
explicit professional observat ion or a habit formed-in­
practice. Note too that if the physician had given Sheila 
two- and eight-day prescript ions, that there could have been 
a delay in filling the second prescript ion. As i t  happened, 
the regimen prescribed gives Sheila three days to fill the 
second prescript ion if the screen is posit ive. 
The medical profession has also come under public 
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. crit icism for not treat ing pat ients ' present ing complaints. 
In react ion to th is crit icism, it  is at least possible that 
there is a predisposit ion to treat when in doubt and the 
side ef fects of treatment are unlikely or minor. In th is 
manner, the public have pressured the medical profession to 
treat them with drugs where such treatment may not be 
needed, with ser ious risks (cf. , Silverman and Lee, 1974: 
xiv). 
Silverman and Lee (1974) have written a cri t ical 
assessment of the current situat ion of drug use, describing 
the role of pharmaceut ical companies in promot ing the use of 
drugs. Notwithstanding the tremendous benef i ts that have 
come about through pharmaceut ical research and market ing, 
typically at the ini t ial expense of the pharmaceut ical 
companies, the advert ising campaigns and inter-relat ions 
among medical professional organizat ions and pharmaceut ical 
companies reas�nably cast . suspicion on the ef fects such 
pract ices have on pat ient care. Much of the drug trials on 
eff icacy, proper prescribing pract ices and dosages are 
formed as a result of pharmaceutical industry sponsored 
research and promot ion. As the struggle for patents and 
control of market is fought by the companies, the 
proli ferat ion of brand names and modi f icat ions make i t  quite 
diff icult for the pract icing physician to keep up with new 
innovat ions. Th is combines with other factors of medical 
practice, such as severe r�strict ion of t ime for reading, to 
create a situation where the physician is dependent on the 
pharmaceutical companies ' literature and representatives for 
inform�tion. Combined with the industry ' s  considerable 
support of the profession ' s  journals, conferences and 
clinical research, such factors foster a (perhaps 
inappropriate) degree of trust and dependence of the 
profession on the industry. The current situation ris one of 
widespread overuse of medication, notably antimicrobials 
(Silverman and Lee, 1974: 282-292). The ability of 
individual practitioners to make appropriate therapeutic 
recommendations in such a confusing social context has not 
gone unchallenged (U. S. DHEW Task Force on Prescription 
Drugs, Final �tl, 1969 : 22). As early as 1968, AMA 
president Dwight Wilbur thought this situation serious 
enough to comment that medical students should be educated 
to consult pharmacologic experts rather than the advertising 
of pharmaceutical manufacturers (Wilbur, 1968). 
Note that such an analysis is a direct criticism of 
the defense that a medical treatment is acceptable if it  is · 
in keeping with the community standard of practice. Since 
professional prescribing practices are formed in a context 
which casts doubt on whether the routines are in patients' 
medical interests, this appeal carries no weight. It is in 
fact an appeal to misplaced authority. The research and 
actual authority behind some prescribing practices is that 
of the pharmaceut ical companies. But it is clearly in their 
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interest to form pract ices which -sell their products and 
establish promise of future profi ts. So the rout ine 
prescript ion of ant ibiot ics prior to reading the screen is 
not just ified by an appeal to profession-wi de practice, 
since the context within which such pract ices are formed 
contain significant conflicts of interest with that of 
pat ients. The treatment that Sheila receiyed, immediate 
prescript ion of ant ibiot ics, may have been influenced by the 
physician ' s  concerris about medical factors. But the 
part icular responses in the form of rout ine pract ices may 
also have indirectly been shaped by research and market ing 
pract ices of those with major concern for such market values 
as sales and capturing a market. This is a fact that 
pat ients could reasonably want to know about, or perhaps 
should know about. Yet it  is not obvious what a pat ient 
could do with such informat ion. 
This latter fact is further elaborated by 
considering what Eliot Frei dson has described as 
professional dominance (Freidson, 197 0a). Frei dson has 
described the profession's abili ty to regulate the pract ice 
of i ts members as uniquely well established by the medical 
profession. Once a practice is well established in the 
profession, the profession's authority within a culture is  
strong enough to  prevent any other group from having 
sufficient authority to challenge the pract ice. This 
cultural authority has historically been fought for by the 
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profession (Starr, 1982 ; Stevens, 1971 ) .  It also has 
�deological force, as Howard Waitz kin (1983 ) has discussed 
at length, which is derived in part from scientific ideology 
(Waitz kin, 1983 : 140-143 ; Habermas, 1971 ) .  The cultural� 
authority of  the profession is based on its ability to claim 
that its expertise uniquely qualifies its members to judge 
patients ' medical interests and how they are best served. 
This is also extended to include the claim that they ' ought 
to be able to control the form that their practice will 
take ; whether fee-for-service, socialized, group practice, 
etc. , (Freidson, 1970a : 91-1 0 0 ) .  This claim is buttressed 
by the appeal to a scientific basis f or medical treatment. 
Such a claim is based on the idea that scientific issues and 
methods are objective and value-free, consequently above any 
political or personal bias. As Habermas has argued of  
scientific ideology that it is expansionistic in its 
definition of  problems which are amenable to scientific 
solutions { Habermas, 1971 : 83-84 ) ,  so Waitzkin argues that 
scientific medicine, using scientific ideology as its 
legitimating device, "medicalizes "  social and other 
non-medical problems (Waitz kin, 1983 : 1 4 2 ) . This is a 
manifestation of the cultural authority of the medical 
profession which makes it quite effective as an enforcer of 
social norms since the profession is not as accountable to . 
the public as are other institutions (Freidson , 1970a : 2 0 5-
30 1 ) .  The cultural authority is also the basis f or the 
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interactional asymmetry that has been discussed earlier. In 
the interaction, the cultural authority tends to prevent 
patients from questioning physicians' judgments and 
recommendations. Even those factors which are not obviously 
medical are considered to be within the purveyance of 
physicians ' authority. But this medicalization of 
non-medical needs is a reflection of the larger cultural 
pattern of defining more problems as solvable through 
technology, . a process which serves to legitimate and 
reinforce current patterns of technological . rather than 
personal or political change. In turn, this furthers the 
interests of the "advantaged " in society who own and profit 
from technology as well as from maintenance of the current 
socio-economic systems. Technological responses also 
depoliticize the social difficulties of the disadvantaged. 
This social-control function of the medicalization of social 
distress and removal from patients' control of controversial 
medical judgments is neither the design nor intent of the 
medical professionals. As Waitzkin comments: 
Social control in medicine is often an unintended 
process, dimly perceived by the participants in 
doctor-patient encounters. With the holistic 
purpose of caring for the totality of a 
client ' s  needs, health professionals assume 
control over wide facets of social and personal 
life. (Waitzkin, 1983: 142) 
So the choice to treat before reading the screen is 
typical of a professional practice, but this alone d�es not 
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justify, though it does help to explain, the physician's 
presuming to make the decision for Sheila. The two-part 
- p�escription is not in anyway medically necessary. It  is  
accepted by Sheila as part of  the med ical treatment of  her 
illness without challenging the inconvenience. This is a 
concrete instance of the extension of medical authority to 
factors of treatment wh ich are not medical, and a consequent. 
extension of medical authority into the patient ' s  li fe 
activities. 
It is reasonable to assume that the resident's 
choice of treatment for Sheila was motivated by a concern to 
meet her needs. Considering what those medical rieeds were-­
a sore throat with �he possibility that it is due to a 
strept infection--there are several treatment regime�s that 
are reasonable alternatives. The resident ' s  choice among 
the alternatives is not strictly determined by Sheila' s 
presenting complaints nor by universal medical practice. 
The choice to treat Sheila with antibiotics prior to reading 
the screen is a common but controversial practice with in the 
medical profession. It  may well be a means of reducing the 
risks that Sheila will bear due to the immediate initiation 
of the treatment. But since Sheila is not aware of the 
controversy surrounding .antibiotic treatment prior to 
reading the screen, th is concern over the unintended and 
undesirable effects of the drug does not raise any 
questions. Both of these common practices in medicine are 
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formed as routines with in a context wh ich presents factors 
that are either potential or actual conflicts with patients ' 
medical and practical concerns. As a reflection of routine 
practices, Sheila ' s  treatment has indirectly been influenced 
by these factors. 
The decision was not simply a reflection of these 
routine practices. It  was a decision to combine two 
alternatives ; immediate treatment and avoidance of 
unnecessary treatment. In case the strept screen is 
negative, · the resident has divided Sheila' s prescription 
into two five day prescriptions, saving her the expense of 
the second one if the screen is negative. Th is may also 
have the medical benefit of assuring that Sheila calls to 
check _ the screen before taking the full ten days ' worth. As 
such, th is represents a d irect decision to regulate a non­
medical aspect of Sheila' s life ;  time and money. But th i s  
is  an expected _ consequence of medical treatment, as i s  
illustrated by the fact that Sheila does not ask for 
explanation of the odd prescription's rationale, or for 
alternatives. The choices involved in the treatment 
decision include . the exposure of Sheila to the side effects 
of antibiot ic treatment whose need is  yet to be established, 
the running of the strept screen to verify need, the 
possible _saving· of money for the second half of the 
prescription and the inconvenience of an extra trip if the 
second half is needed.· Sheila accepts the treatment wh ich 
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includes these risks, benefits and inconveniences without 
comment (other than seeking clarificat ion of the confusing 
direct ions} . At no point is  consent expl icitly sought, nor 
are these consequences of treatment, or their alternat ives, 
ever discussed, alt�ough Sheila may refuse treatment by not 
fil l ing the prescript ion or taking the pills .  
. r 
I t  also appears that there is no appirent confl ict 
of interests for Maria and her physician . The physician' s 
cont inued reputat ion and accumulat ion of pat ients depends on 
his t reat ing his pat ients to their sat isfact ion . · If Maria 
is dissat isfied with her treatment by him, she could go to 
another physician for this or future problems . Of course, 
i t  would only make sense for Maria to go to the extra 
inconvenience and possible expense of gett ing another 
opinion on her leg pain if she thinks that she is  l ikely to 
get more sat isfactory treatment . 
As has been discussed, i t  may well be the case that 
Maria would have received pain rel ief medicat ion from 
another physician . And she may not be pleased that she can 
only get whatever rel ief from her pain that acetaminophen 
offers . The resident' s rel igious convict ions seem to be a 
key factor in the treatment decision . The lack of 
expression of these conv ict ions which d irect Maria's 
treatment, Maria' s unquest ioning acceptance of his 
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withholding of the medication, and the failure of the 
medical context to guarantee Maria the care she desires and 
avoid conf licts of value are al l factors which deserve 
attention . 
There are interactional cues as to why the 
interaction does not serve Maria' s interests nor that of her 
physician (i. e . # assuring the physician of her future return 
and promoting his reputation as a competent physician) . 
· These cues will  lead to a consideration of the particular 
institutional context. Note the close of the interview: 
P. Same to you . I' l l  come back whenever I need 
to see a doctor cause I ' l l never have a doctor 
here . 
D. Hopeful ly 24-year-old ladies don' t need many 
doctors � 
P. Yeah ; okay . Thanks a lot, bye bye . 
What is not apparent from the interactional script 
as presented earlier is the tone of the interaction . The 
resident, and a medical student accompanying him, were 
clearly quite entertained by this woman who was so dif ferent 
from most they encountered in this set ting. The detail with 
which they pursued how she injured her leg was not required 
for medical diagnosis or treatment . When Maria comments 
that if she does not have a period she should "start praying 
hard and heavy " this conservative protestant physician 
responds by suggesting that she could also go to Mass "two 
or three times a day . " This is a clear recognition of the 
cultural dif ference between himself and the patient. The 
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above quoted close of the interview suggests that he is not 
anxious to deal with Maria again. All of this suggests that 
the physician is not influenced by the consi derati on that 
for .further income and reputat ion he needs to culture a 
certain relat ionsh ip with the pat ient. 
Th is "att itude of withdrawal, " if i t  can be so 
characterized, ·is subtly expressed throughout the interv iew. 
The only t ime that the resident suggests that Maria ought to 
get back in touch with h im is if the pain in the leg 
persists. When talking about the pregnancy test, he 
suggests that she should "come back in" with no personal 
reference (i. e. ,  rather than "come back to see me " } . When 
Maria had asked about abort ions, he simply denied knowledge 
of the available places, and d id  not offer to look further 
into th is aspect of her medical concern. Despi te h is easy 
and casual style, it  seems that the physician is 
uncomfortable with Maria. 
Eliot Frei dson has discussed how the medical 
profession has gained control over the condi t ions of their 
pract ice, as well as over the content. He has ind icated 
that the organi zat ion of a medical practice ·influences the 
type of med ical care that the pat ients receive. Fee-for­
service organizat ions tend to be more pat ient oriented, 
while .group practices tend to be more colleague oriented 
( Freidson, 1970b} . The university family pract ice uni t  is 
organized to simulate the group pract ice form of 
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organization (cf., ethnographic description in Chapter I I I). 
Maria ' s  physician is salaried and his income would not be 
affected by her failure to return to him for future medical 
care. Combined with Maria ' s  request for abortion 
information and cultural dif ferences which may set the 
physician ill at ease, it is not hard to understand why he 
might feel this way. 
So the interactional cues give reason to construe 
the resident as taki�g full responsibility for treating 
Maria ' s  leg, but less or no responsibility for her pregnancy 
and desire for an abortion. His knowledge of Maria ' s  
possible pregnancy influences his treatment decision for her 
pain relief. Though it is belied by the subtle 
interactional cues, an apparent concern for Maria ' s  general 
health ("the medication I want to use, it ' s  not recommended 
during pregnancy • • • •  ") combines with the physician ' s  
cultural authority to give a superficial rationale for his 
rejection of the pain medication for medical reasons. 
Without explicit expression of his religious convictions, or 
an awareness of the discomfort he has with Maria ' s  previous 
abortions and general lifestyle, Maria has no reason to 
question his treatment decision. The organization of the 
setting has failed to establish an order within which 
patient and physician concerns are communicated to result in 
mutually accepted treatment. 
The cultural authority of the medical profession 
2 0 0  
has already been discussed in connection with Sheila' s case. 
In · Maria ' s  case this cultural authority helps to explain why 
the physician' s convictions are able to influence the 
treatment decision without ever becoming an explicit part of 
the interaction. The cultural authority and the scientific 
ideology upon which medicine has established its authority 
make reasonable the presupposition that the physician is 
withholding the pain medication for medical reasons-­
scientifically based concerns for Maria' s health. Maria 
does not expect an education in scientific medicine from her 
physician, just appropriate care. This presupposition of 
scientific appropriateness enables the physician to decide 
how to treat Maria, complete with moral judgment, affecting 
her everyday life in a manner that is not necessary and 
protecting the fetus which Maria intends to abort. This 
authority extends to controlling access to the pain 
medication, the . x-ray and abortion. As a member of the 
medical profession, and particularly as a family 
practitioner, these medical concerns are controlled by the 
physician. His ordering the x-ray was a necessary condition 
of Maria receiving the x-ray and the subsequent assurance 
that her leg was not fractured. His denial of the pain 
medication leaves her with only the weaker over-the-counter 
medication. His denial of knowledge as to where or how to 
procure an abortion leaves Maria with the need to search for 
further medical advice. 
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The physician ' s  unintended but effective role as an 
agent of social control is now obvious. The physician is 
able to prevent Maria's threatening the fetus ' health by 
denying her access to the medication, and less effectively 
by denying knowledge of how to get an abortion. Thus the 
influence of this medical encounter extends to some degree 
of control over Maria's sexuality, work and leisure. The 
only concern that the physician explicitly raises over not 
treating Maria's pain is over her ability to continue to 
work. This may be intended by him to be a concern over her 
loss of income, but it is also a manifestation of the 
tendency to define health in terms o� ability to be 
productively employed (Waitzkin, 1983: 141-142, 149). That 
this concern is the only one which appears to qualify the 
physician's protection of the fetus seems to be an 
indication of either the importance he attaches to it or his 
acceptance of a work-per�ormance oriented definition of 
health and illness (cf. , Waitzkin, 1983: 141-145, 147-
161 �  E. Brown, 1979: 112-134). 
The physician did not offer a prescription drug 
which would not threaten the health of the fetus. Given his 
concern over the _fetus and Maria ' s  ability to continue to  
work, it seems reasonable that he would consider this 
alternative. There are at least a couple of factors which 
might have influenced this ommission, since they are common 
to the organization of medical practice within capitalist 
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societies. The first is that there may . not have been any 
other appropriate pain medications available in the unit as 
free samples. The family practice unit , as in most clinics 
and medical offices , : are sto�ked with samples that 
pharmaceutical representatives leave in an effort to get the 
practitioners to try new drugs or to establish a habit of 
using their drug over their competitors. The drug choice 
. i' 
then is not simply a choice of effective treatment , but also 
a reflection of what is available due to the generosity and 
profit motives of pharmaceutical . companies and their agents 
(cf. , Silverman and Lee , 1974: 4 8-84) . So the choice of 
drug for Maria may have been influenced by the choices of 
the pharmaceutical companies and what happened to be left in 
the unit ' s  pharmacy. 
As was the case for Sheila , there is also indirect 
influence. The physician could have prescribed · a drug for 
pain relief that would not have presented a threat to the 
fetus. Maria may well have been willing to spend money for 
relief of her leg pain. In fact there might be a riet gain 
if she spends money on a prescription that allows her to 
work, rather than having to take time off. wor k until the 
pain eases. If the resident simply did not think .of this 
alternative , then it seems that Maria received less than 
optimum care. That she did not ask for it may be evidence 
that she assumed that if there was an option , he would have 
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thought of it. But there may be further contextual evidence 
which h�lps explain this event. 
First, Maria has asked for an abortion where she 
will not have to pay _ prior to receiving the service. She 
works as a cook at a truck stop where she will not be paid 
sick time. The resident may perceive Maria' a economic 
status as one which is quite precarious. Perhaps he 
initially brought the medication in as an effort to save 
Maria the expense of a prescription. It may even be that he 
considered setting aside his concern for the fetus, thoug� 
he did not in fact do so. Yet the economic factor is not 
explicitly discussed in the interaction. Consequently , 
Maria ' s  financial status, if it influences his decision, 
serves to limit her treatment options without ever being 
communicated to her or allowing her to express her opinion. 
That this is unchallenged by Maria is partially explained by · 
cultural authority, including control of access to 
prescription drugs. If Maria had been a wealthier client, 
it may be that she would have received a prescription for 
pain relief. 
This practice may be an instance of the pattern 
noted by many critical medical sociologists. · conrad �nd 
Kern ( 1981) argue that the poor need more medical attention 
and have less access to it that do higher socio-economic 
classes whose need is less. In the analysis of a doctor­
patient interview, Waitzkin has discussed how physicians 
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may use their 9iscretion regarding whether and how financial 
concerns may af fect treatment, and this 
in turn may af fect patients '  leisure and work activities 
{Waitzkin, 1983 : 16 3 ) .  These interactional patterns ref lect 
what has been characterized as a "two-class system" of 
health care--one for the poor �nd one for the wealthier 
(Waitzkin and Waterman, 1974 : 66 -6 7 ) ;  Ehrenreich and 
Ehren;eich, 197 0 ; Fisher, 1 � 79, Navarro, 197 3 ) .  While some 
analysts are critical primarily of the organization of the 
health care delivery system (Waitzkin and Waterman, 1974 ; 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, · 197 0 ; Navarro, . 197 3 ) ,  others 
include the interactional element in their critique. So the 
institutional context (Fisher, 1979, 1983 ; Cicourel, 1983 ; 
Robil lard, White and Maretzki, 1983 ) combines with the 
cultural authority of the physician to make more 
understandable th� resident ' s  behaviour and Maria'a 
acceptance . Through the probably well-meaning actions of a 
resident trying �o be sensitive to a patient's financial 
status, the two-class system of health care is ref lected . 
Rather that asking if Maria would prefer a sample, a 
prescription, or to take less expensive analgesic, the 
physician simply acts in a manner that decides the issue in 
Maria's behal f without her even being aware that there was 
any option . 
Second, Maria is a woman whose pain may be 
interpreted as being les s serious than it is . There is some 
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controversy over the actual extent of sexist practices in 
the delivery of medical care (Verbrugge and Steiner, 1981; 
Mccranie, Horowitz and Martin, 197 8; Verbrugge, 1980; 
Cooperstock, 197 8). Some hold that physicians do have 
presumptions about women patients which affects their health 
care (Armitage, Schneiderman and - Bass, 1979; Wallen, 
Waitzkin and Stoekle, 1979; Milliren, 197 7). Others 
maintain that the sex roles and attitudes are either 
irrelevant (Verbrugge, 1980; Mccranie, Horowit z  and Martin, 
197 8) or insufficient factors to explain differences in 
diagnosis and treatment of illness (Bernstein and Kane, 
198 1; Cooperstock, 197 8; Verbrugge and Steiner, 198 1). 
Nevertheless, there is some indication of a pattern of 
differential treatment of women due to conceptions of their 
"proper " role and of their responses to pain and emotional 
problems (cf. , Waitzkin, 1983: 161; Fisher, · 1979, 1983; Fee, 
1973). Such accounts are supported by discussions of the 
literature used to train physicians (Paulshock, 1976; 
Scully, 1980; Scully and Bart, 1973). Feminist accounts on 
a more theoretical and historical level also make such 
claims (Chesler, 197 2; Daly, 197 8; Gordon, 19 7 4 :  1-91; 
Fisher, 1979; Fisher and Todd, 1983: 9-11;  Barker-Benfield, 
1976; Henley and Thorn, 197 5; Ehrenrei6h and English, 191 8). 
Since it seems from the interaction that the one thing that 
almost overruled the physician ' s  concern for fetal health 
was Maria's ability to work, which apparently was not 
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sufficient reason, it is at least plausible to think that 
she might have been treated with the sample drug if she were 
a man. Of course, if she were a man, she would not be 
pregn,ant and so that  could not be considered a 
contraindication for the medication. But she is neither 
given the choice of protecting the fetus or receiving the 
pain medication nor is it an explicit element of the 
interaction tha t  she might be over-reacting to the pain. 
That  this may be an influence though not expressed in the 
interview is feasible if we consider the education of 
physicians as described by those who critically �nalyze the 
. overt and covert messages about women (Scully and Bart, 
1973; Scully, 198 0). As discussed in Chapter I I, many of 
the ascribable-presuppositions of our actions are learned 
not as explicit beliefs or propositions, but rather as 
methodological assumptions. As any of the factors which 
form the larger context within which these interactions 
occur, these posited assumptions only arise as part of an 
analysis of routine behavior. 
A third factor may help explain the withholding of 
pain medication, whether in the form of a sample or a 
prescription. To a �onservatively religious physician in 
the culture within which the family practice unit is found, 
Maria presents as a very liberal and perhaps promiscuous 
woman. The hi�tory of three abortions and a miscarriage, 
apparent non- or misuse of contraception resulting in yet 
207  
another pregnancy, living with her boyfriend, corning from 
California and driving a motorcycle (as opposed to being a 
passenger) combine to make Maria an oddity in this 
physician' s experience. It is possible that the physician 
is concerned to keep from putting Maria into the position of 
being able to abuse the pain medication. This might serve 
to reinforce his conviction about protecting the fetus; or 
may simply affect his judgement as to whether to prescribe 
medication. All of the literature cited to this point 
supports the contention that social criteria are used in the 
dispensing of medical care (cf. , Fisher, 1979, 1983 ; Todd, 
1983 ; Fisher and Todd, 1983: 9-1 1 ; Ehrenreich and English, 
1978). Once again, the implicit nature of the medical 
decision and the cultural authority of the physician prevent 
any explicit mention of these factors which Maria might then 
question, or seek alternative help. 
Vicki 
Vicki ' s  physician, despite expressed hesitancy, the 
usual referral practices, a suggestion to remove a bodily 
mole first, insufficient time to complete the job and a lack 
of "desirable " tools, follows her request and removes her 
facial mole. There are a variety of contextual factors 
which make this action more reasonable. The hesitancy and 
the practice of referral are similar in that they are 
concretely expressed in the interaction and always occur 
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accompanied by reassurance of the resident ' s  ability to 
perform. Whereas routine practices which form part of 
Sheila ' s  treatment were unexpressed and yet influential, 
they are expres sed and non-directive in Vicki's .  
Interactionally, both of. these patter n s  may be 
manifestations  of  communication patterns  which 
sociolinguistic studies have noted in medical interview s 
,·· 
(Shuy, 1983 ; Fisher and Gr oce, f orthcoming ;  Fisher, 1983 ) . 
But such interview s are str uctu red in a manner which serves 
particular functions (Fisher, 1979, 1983 ; Fisher and Todd, 
1983, 1986 ) . Caref ul examinatiqn of  the organization of  the 
setting and the pr ofes sion, as well as the history of its 
development, reveals some of  the social factor s  which help 
to direct the str ucturing of  the interaction and the 
f unction which this str ucturing serves . 
The fir st expres sion of  hesitancy and refer ral 
practice is intertwined with reassurance of  the resident ' s  
ability �o  per fo rm :  
D • • • • Well, the pr oblem is that, ah, on ah, 
young attractive females I don't usually take 
them off  the face . But I can do it and 
pr obably every thing will go well, but those 
are best done by either a dermatologist or  a 
plastic surgeon . But I ' ll be glad to do it . 
We can do one in another location and see how 
it goes, and if you feel comfortable with it 
and I feel comf ortable with it we ' ll do the 
one oi your  forehead . 
Note the patte�n  of  "No, ye�, no, yes, maybe . " Vicki has 
not inter r upted this piece of  disco u r se .  It is as if the 
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resi dent is str uggl ing w ith his lack of  conf idence and 
desi re to remove the mole f or Vick i. Then he str uggles with 
the practice of refer ral and h is desi re to do the surgery. 
Final ly, he comes up with a compr omise. The reasons for  
refer ral and the resident's hesitancy is techn i cal 
exper tise ; but, at no point does th is enter expl ic itly into 
the discussi on. As noted by Waitzk in  (1 983 : 138-1 5 9, th is 
avoidance of  pr oviding technical information aff i rms medical 
author ity and contr ol  of  technical abi l ity. Th is prevents 
the patient f r om actively participating in  the del i beration 
over who is in  fact best or  adequately prepared to do the 
procedure, increasing the asymmetry of the interaction and 
asserting medical author ity, wh i ch is based on what has been . 
cal led medical i deology (Waitzk in, 1 983, 1 57-15 9 ) .  As 
Freidson (1 9 7 0 b )  has noted, the organ izati on of  the practice 
of  medicine has a considerable ef fect on patient care . In 
h is case, the pr ofession ' s  concen with issues of how to 
divide pr ofessional care, thus income and exper ience, 
affects the physician's del iberations on Vicki's appr opr iate 
treatment . 
In the second piece of  the interview, the resident 
raises the question o f  refer ral and expresses h is hesitancy, 
sti l l  intertw ined w ith assurance of  h is abi l ity to perform ,  
a pattern  of  "Maybe, no, maybe, yes" is man ifested : 
D. Okay. Uh, i f  it's all  r ight w ith you I want to 
have one of  our  old  doctors come l ook  at th is mole 
on your f orehead and get h is opinion on it. I 
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was telling him about it, you know, describing it 
and, uh, you know, as I was saying family 
practioners normally don' t take moles off faces, 
faces j ust because of, uh, mal, you know they have 
to go up on your malpractice insurance and things 
like that, that we normally handle by people who do 
it all the time, however, I have removed them off 
peoples' faces without any problems before. I t' s  
just that we are being conservative and protecting 
ourselves when we do so. But I wouldn't hesitate 
at all to take that one off. 
The physician is a third year resident who is not required 
to consult with staff unless he feels he needs to do so. So 
his talking to the staff physician is a further expression 
of his anxiety. I t  sounds as if he needs approval to do the 
surgery, but then he qualifies that it is not for Vicki' s 
sake that he is hesitant, but for his own, since the primary 
concern discussed is malpractice insurance premiums. Of 
course the reason that malpractice might be increased is due 
to increased risk of successful suits. Minor facial 
surgery, such as mole removal, is actually covered by the 
unit' s malpractice insurance . I t  is, of course, possible 
that the resident was not aware of the coverage . But the 
discussion of this practical concern of the physician' s 
masks the technical point that he may not be well qualified . 
to perform the surgery. 
Historically, there . has been a struggle between 
family practioners and surgeons over who is qualified to 
perform surgical procedures. As early as the turn of the 
century, there was an obvious need to consider how the 
medical profe�sion ought to regulate specialization of 
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medical practice, with a significant concern being the 
future of general practice _ (Stevens, 1971 : 78-97) . The 
early 1900's saw an increase in the number pf general 
practitioner referrals to surgeons  (Stevens, 1971 : 82 ) . In 
191 2, Franklin Martin began campaigning f or the f ounding o f  
an American College of  Surgeons whose primary purposes 
included the standardization of surgical procedures and a 
medical degree supplement to qualify a phy sician to do 
surgery. Despite the then influential American Medical 
Association ' s  (AMA ' s )  current .policy against distinguish ing 
mark s for specialists, they were silent when the American 
College of  Surgeons  was formed in 1913 (Stevens, 1971 : 87-
89) . As specialization developed, the general practiti oner 
was seen aa one who had stopped short of  specialization ; as 
less  educated than the specialist . Phy sicians were fir st to 
be generalists, and then specialists. Practicing general 
practitioners simply had not specialized. In 1940, the 
general practitioners were notable in their unique postion 
of not having any certifying machinery or even a section 
within the AMA. By 1 9 4 7, they had and active section within 
the AMA and had begun working towar d a mechanism f or formal 
specialization through board examinations (Steven s, 197 1 : 
297-305 ) .  The rise of  the role of  the hospital in medical 
practice raised f urther problems f or the general 
practitioner which were partially alleviated in 1947 by the 
establishment of  general practice residencies (Stevens, 
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197 1: 305-310) . In 1959 a f inal report of a w idely 
representative committee to st udy general practice 
preparat ion did  not include surgery, a point which rai sed 
considerable discussion ( Stevens, 197 1: 31 1) . Follow ing 
th i s  report, twenty graduate training programs were set up, 
but because they included some surgi cal training, they were 
called general pract ice instead of family prac tice (Stevens, 
197 1: 31 2) . In 1965, the Amer ican Academy of General 
Pract ice dec ided to promote the motion of a certify ing board 
examinat ion for family medi cine, wh ich was approved in 1969 
(Stevens, 1971: 313) . Stevens points out that the th irty 
year s struggle to gain spec ialty recognit ion and statu s, 
based on �ducat iona1 · equality, was a hard won battle perhaps 
result ing in family pract ioner s who were overeducated for 
their responsibilities ; 
But such a comment ignores the compelling pressures 
of profess ionalizat ion, toward h igher educat ional 
standards and peer recognit ion .  ( Stevens, 197 1: 
314) • 
The relevance of  th i s  h i stor i cal development to 
Vicki ' s  case i s  that her consulting the family pract it ioner 
for facial surgery i s  a borderl ine i s s ue for profess ional 
boundar ies . Family pract i t ioners as profess ional group have 
fought hard to maintain the - right to perform some types of 
surgery . They have also struggled har d  to w in the 
reputat ion of  educat ional and technical equals of 
specialists  in other areas . It i s  reasonable to assume that 
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some of these values and their strategic value have been 
passed onto Vicki's physician . Furthermore, the residents 
are evaluated on their performance in their residencies, and 
attention is paid to the variety and type of  procedures in 
which they show proficiency and gain experience . All of 
these professional concerns are served by the choice to 
proceed with the removal of  Vicki ' s  facial mole . It is 
unlikely that the resident would proceed if he was convinced 
that he could not perform the procedure, but in the face of  
hesitancy and a borderline case which might normally be 
referred, it is understandable that he would choose to 
operate, to w ork through noon, to use tools which he 
considers less than d�sirable , and to come in on his day off  
to  check on  Vicki . The context of  the delivery of  health 
care within which Vicki receives her care is a complex one 
which provides some reason to think that there are conflicts 
with simply serving her interest . 
There may be another factor which makes more 
reasonable the resident's decision to do the surgery . After 
his first expression of  hesitancy, the patient expresses 
her comfort with his perf orming the surgery : · 
P .  I would not be afraid t o  have you d o  it all . 
First of  all I can't af f ord anybody else . 
D .  Okay . 
P .  But it's like (unintelligible )  I would not be 
ashamed to have a scar . 
D .  Okay . Well it shoul dn's leav� a scar • • • •  
Perhaps all that the resident heard was that Vic ki 
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was not afraid to have him do the faciai surgery. I t  is 
al so po ssible .that ne accepted her financial reason. But 
since tne financial reason is responsible for directing 
VicKi to  the unit for the mole removal, it is inf luent �al in 
snaping the treatment she receives regardles s o f  whetner or 
not the resident was inf luenced by it. This is another 
manifestation of  what was earlier dis cus sed as a two-clas s 
system of  health care which yields  lower quality nealth care 
for tne poorer members o f  tne society ( c f. ,  page 21 2 ) . As 
hospital s . developed. and medical care increasingly depended 
on nospital s, poorer communities attracted fewer physicians 
and investment in hospital s due to  the inabiltiy to  
generate funds • . In  1946, tne Hill-Burton program attempted 
to redistribute the construction of hospitai s and to  bririg 
tne number of  available hospital beds in l ower-income 
neighbornoods up to  that of  middle-class neighborhoods  
( Starr, 1982: 347-35 1 ) .  Though tne program seems to  have 
been responsible for this redistribution, it failed t o  
attract doctors to  low-income states , o r  to  lower-income 
regions within  states ( Clarke, 1980 : 532-5 5 0 ; Rushing, 197 5 : 
2 0 0-203 ) . I t  nas become a common feature o f  hospital care 
in low-income and public nospital s that much of  the care , 
especial ly that o f  c linics such as this family practice 
unit , is preferred by physicians-in-training. The two-c las s 
system o f  health care is thus reinf orced by an 
organizational tendency to use tho se wno cannot af ford 
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private care as a means of  educating the physicians. 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1 9 70 :  2 2, 23, a�d Chapter One ) 
have argued that the poor have . been our society's research 
and educational material since the profession began 
apprenticing, internships and research. Vicki's explanation 
that she cannot af ford to go to a specialist, or perhaps 
even to a private family practitioner ' s  of fice, fits into 
this pattern. Her presence in the unit f or a facial mole 
removal is a direct result of her financial status, whether 
or not the resident takes it as sufficient reason to operate 
on her rather than refer her, which, as he describes, is the 
usual practice. 
Another interesting feature o f  the interaction is 
the number of  times that Vicki asserts that she is not 
concerned about facial appearance or scarring. As quoted 
above, she initially expresses it as part of the reason that 
she is not concerned to have the family physician do the 
removal. Later she laughs when the staff physician explains 
that the scar should match a line on her forehead. When he 
expressed hesitancy to  do the surgery, she again asserts 
that she does not care about her facial appearance : 
SD. We ' re reluctant to  cut on women ' s  faces. 
P. Well  I ' m  not very_ vain on my face. 
SD. Wel l, we are (laughs) . 
When the resident explains that the incision may be longer 
than Vicki might expect, Vicki again af firms that she is no 
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concerned about her face and that she had planned to take 
out the stitches herself: 
D. And don't be grossed out by the fact that the 
incision is a little longer than you might have 
expected, but I opened it a bit like that so that 
it would · be, leave less · of a scar. 
P. I won't be. 
D. You ' re not too particular are you? 
P. No I ' m  not. I was planning on taking the stitches 
out myself. Ill 
D. II Well, on this one I ' d  like to 
see it, on the others I might go along with the 
idea, okay ? 
P. Uh huh. 
D. This one is on your face. I can ' t have that, 
you know. Turn around • •  
I t  seems a little odd that if Vicki is so 
unconcerned about her facial appearance and cannot afford a 
dermatologist to have it removed that she is concerned to 
have it removed at all. Once this feature is noted, what 
becomes striking is the lack of reason for the removal, 
unless  it is for cosmetic reasons, which seems belied by 
Vicki ' s claims that she is not concerned with her facial 
appearance. If she is acting out of fear of malignancy or 
other medically relevant detail, she never mentions it and 
the resident never · asks for her reasons. Rather, both the 
staff physician and the resident reinforce that Vicki ought 
to be concerned with her facial appearance more than she 
appears to be � Yet if they think that her lack of concern 
is strange, especially in light of the fact that she is 
willing to undergo facial surgery to remove the mole, they 
never raise the issue. 
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As Waitzkin ( 1983: 151-163) has pointed out in 
analyzing doctor-patient interviews, the technical 
orientat ion of the procedure is what gives the physicians 
the "right " to discuss Vicki ' s  facial appearance, and their 
response to her desire to have her mole removed is not to 
explore whether there is some fear or social situation to 
which this is a response, but ·rather to use their technical 
ability and medical . ideology to direct attention to the 
medical response and away from the inconsistent attitudes of 
their patient. They are able to make this response, which 
Vicki has solicited by coming to the unit for mole removals, 
due to their culutral authority and the widespread 
acceptance of medical ideology. Thus both Vicki' s presence 
in the unit for facial mole removals and their acting in 
support of her request, rather than referring or raising the 
issue of why she wants this medicalized cosmetic surgery, 
are manifestations of the control that the profession has 
over non-medical aspects of patients '  lives. Rather than 
suggest that Vicki resist the · notion that her mole is 
dangerous or unbecoming and therefore worthy of the risk, 
discomfort, inconvenienc�e and expense of removal, the 
physicians act in a manner that reflects their attitude that 
the technical-medical response is appropriate. This of 
course also feeds into the notion that a woman in our 
society is required to be attractive. 
One further aspect of the interaction seems a 
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little odd. When the resident admits to Vicki that he did 
not have the proper tools, or at least the one� he thought 
would be best, she is not at all express�ve of 
disappointment or fear which might be appropriate. Combined 
with his earlier hesitancy to remove the mole at all and the 
expressed intent to do a bodily one first to make sure they 
are both comfortable with his proficiency, this seems to be 
a strange lack of response. Perhaps this is so because it 
is too late now. On the other hand it may be that Vicki is 
operating on the assumption that the physician is the 
technical expert, and as her physician, has no reason to 
have operated on her if he thought there was any unnecessary 
risk or pain involved. The same cultural authority and 
medical ideology which helped to direct Vicki to the unit 
for the facial mole removal and gave authority to 
expressions of ability in the face of hesitancy and common 
practice may have justified even this expression of 
increased risk. 
Though Vicki has requested the removal that she 
receives, it is not clear why . she wants her mole removed. 
Nor do the physicians pursue this issue. There are good 
reasons why the physicians might want to have the 
opportunity to do the surgery. Though they indirectly refer 
to reasons why they perhaps should not do the removal, their 
willingness to do so prevails and carries the decison, 
without any overt expression of their reasons for doing so. 
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Vicki has come for the removal because she does not believe 
that she can afford a higher level specialist while it is 
possible that a specialist in the immediate community could 
have cost the same or less. But there is neither incentive 
nor encouragement for patients to verify such information. 
She has come for reasons that are either not expressed (fear 
of malignancy, cosmetic concern } ,  contradictory to her 
expressed attitude about her face (unconcern } ,  or erroneous 
(cost } .  The removal is done without any explanation as to 
why her case is different from usual practice. 
In all three interactions there are elements of the 
interview which on close examination are puzzling. 
Consideration of the social context within which the 
patients and physicians live and th emore speicalized 
setting of the delivery of healthe care results in a more 
reasonable explanation of these otherwise puzzling 
interactional elements. The descriptions of the historical 
and social patterns of medical practice have been observed 
by others and are not explanations unique to the particular 
analyses. What emerges from this analysis is support for 
the claim that there is a basic asymmetry in the doctor­
patient relationship which both supports and reflects the 
social norms of the society and sub-culture within which 
health care is delivered. As Waitzkin has commented: 
medicine ultimately is inseparable from the wider 
society. Problems in medical care derive from and 
reinforce social contradictions. Distorted 
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commun ication in medical encounters both ref lects 
and supp·orts the institutional context in  wh ich 
doctors and patients participate . The study of  
ideologic reproducti on and social control in . 
med icine must l ink concrete medical  encounters w ith 
th is wider context. (Waitz k in, 1983 : 1 4 4 ) 
Fisher, among others, has argued that th is "top­
down" approach must be accompan ied by a "bottom-up" whalysis 
which l inks the analysis of medi cal ianteractions w ith the ·,·· 
wider social context (Fisher, 1979, 19 8 3, 198 6 ; Fisher and 
Todd, 1983 ; Habermas, 197 0 ; Knorr-Centina and Cicourel, 
1981 ) . Theoretical accounts such as Habermas ' are 
notoriously weak in their lack of presentati on of  concrete 
instances of the phenomena c la imed to be so influential 
(Watiz k in, 1983 : 1 4 1 ) .  Such accounts gain plausibil ity as 
the asymmetry is placed in  its h istori cal and larger social 
context .  Behav ior wh ich i s  d i f f icult t o  understand w ithin  a 
trusting therapeutic relationsh ip becomes comprehensible i f  
we recogn i ze the complex social context o f  such 
relationsh ips . The failure of  institutions and social 
arrangements to provide as they were expected or designed to 
must be examined with in the social cl imate and pol itical 
l imitations wh ich constrain the f orm and content of the 
relationsh ips formed therein  (Wa itz k in and Stoekle, 197 6 ; 
Stevens, 197 1 ; Starr, 1982 ; Waitz k in, 1983 ; Navarro, 1973 ; 
F isher, 1979, 1983, 198 6 ; F isher and Todd, 1983 ; Waitz k in 
and Waterman, 1 974 ) . 
The need for such accounts is well documented and th is 
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type of social analysis has much to recommend it. My thesis 
is that such a social analysis is a profitable addition to 
deliberation over ethical issues in medicine. The next 
chapter is an application of the previous social analysis to 
the ethical issue of informed consent as well established 
doctrine in support of patient autonomy. The line of 
argumentation, as established in Chapter I, is that · informed 
consent, as protection of patient autonomy, must consider 
the asymmetry of the doctor-patient relationship. As we 
have seen, this leads us far beyond the usual boundaries of 
discussions of informed consent. 
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Chapter V 
Normative Analysis 
I have argued that in the interviews with Sheila, 
Maria and Vicki there has been a lack of information shared 
with the patients, that they have not been involved in the 
deliberations over the treatment decisions and that the 
context of the delivery of their health care is responsive 
to social factors which conflict with their interests. I do 
not think that any of these claims are obvious on a 
superficial examination of the interactions but are only 
arguable upon close scrutiny of both the interactions and 
the social context of the delivery of health care. No 
explicit normative claims have been made in Chapter IV. The 
task of this final chapter is to consider the social 
analysis and apply the normative considerations which are 
based on the analysis of the doctrine of informed consent 
(cf. , Chapter I, pages 48-73). This discussion will lead to 
considerations of the necessity of a social component for 
all applied ethical analyses. 
Three Goals of the Doctrine of Informed Consent 
As was concluded in Chapter I, a helpful technique 
for applying a socially-sensitive normative critique is to 
specify the social picture which is desired in fulfillment 
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of the ethical concerns. I have specified three such 
practical social goals (agreement with physician, shared 
responsibility, reduction of asymmetry) . The interactions 
which have been subjected to a social analysis may be 
readily compared to these normative models in an effort to 
analyze their normative adequacy . The comparisons, in turn, 
show both 1) the empirical fact that these interactions fail 
to fulfill the ethical requirements and, 2) the normative 
inadequacy of the first two models . 
The most conservative of these goals for ethically 
valid consent is assuring that the patient understand s the 
physician's reasons for the treatment chosen, and agrees to 
the treatment on that basis. 1 This is the most conservative 
goal because it preserves the medical paternalism 
1 
It may be that the legal doctrine of informed 
consent is even more conservative, requiring only disclosure 
of risks . This may be due to the influence of litigation on 
legal doctrines, since such suits typicaly involve injury 
which the patient may have been able to avoid if he or she 
had been warned of the risk (U . S. President's Comis sion 
Report, 1982: 23-26) .  As the President's Commis sion Report 
(1982: 16 ) queries "To what degree does this legal 
requirement of informed consent advance the ability of 
patients to maintain control of and be responsible for 
decisions regarding their lives and their health?" I assume 
that simple disclosure of ris k s  of the prescribed treatment 
is so obviously insufficient that the ethical discussion may 
reasonably commence with a standard which provides reasons 
for, as well as risks of, the prescribed treatment . (The 
President's Commis sion Report recognized this as well ; cf . ,  
U. S .  President's Commission Report, 1982: 29-31). 
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of the trad itional physician-patient relationship. The only 
d ifference between th is model and the authoritarian 
prescribing of treatment by the phys ician is that pat ients 
are to be told the reasons which presumably may have the 
prudential effect of increasing the chance of accurate 
compliance. If we assume the consent is optional, this goal 
may also be giving the pat'ient a choice between being 
treated or not being treated. This model is not concerned 
with presenting to patients a cho ice between alternative 
treatments, since it i s  not required that pat ients be told 
these. This model may be ethically sufficient in a consent 
to research with no therapeutic effects, s ince the cho ice 
for non-therapeutic research is whether or not to undergo 
the procedure and refusal has no therapeutic implications. 
Perhaps the history of this model is tied to responses to 
research-related abuses revealed in the Nuremburg trials 
(U.S. Defense Department, 1 9 4 8 , 1 9 7 4 ) . Therapeutical ly, this 
model can be interpreted as an effort to serve patients' 
� interests, since the medical experts are undoubted ly 
better prepared than the average patient to deliberate 
between treatments. This model of informed consent has the 
advantage over the simple consent-to-treatment in that 
patients may not be treated simply as a means to their own 
health, as those in the Kantian trad ition are likely to 
emphasize. It may also represent an attempt to balance 
promoting pat ients' welfare (beneficence) whi le preserv ing 
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their autonomy. A final ethical justification for this 
model might be a utilitarian argument that this form of 
informed consent is likely to maximize good consequences in 
that patients are likely to accept what is probably the best 
treatment, while preserving a degree of control over their 
treatment and establishing a less authoritarian 
physician-patient relationship. I t  might be more practical 
in its implicit recogn ition that physicians are better 
acquainted with medical knowledge than are patients. 
Before critiquing this model and discussing the 
others, note that even this minimal model of informed 
consent is not met in any of the cases discussed. According 
to this model, the physicians must share the reasons for 
their treatment. In both Sheila ' s  and Maria ' s  cases there 
are few, if any, reasons given for the treatments. In  
Vicki ' s  case, it  seems that the reasons for the physician 
treatment may have been identical with Vicki ' s  for coming to 
the unit. She came because she could not afford a higher 
level specialist and did not mind risking facial scarring. 
When the physicians expressed their hesitancy, she responded 
with these reasons, and they seemed to accept them. 
However, on closer scrutiny, it is not interactionally 
obvious why the physician proceeded, despite expressions of 
concern over malpractice and the intent to do a less 
conspicuous mole first, as well as problems of time and 
equipment. 
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It is also clear that the three patients either 
did not receive the best medical treatment option, or that 
the best treatment was not medically obvious. Sheila 
commenced treatment with a wide-range antibiotic prior to 
the screen being read. Starting the treatment after 
verifying the infection (or omitting the screen if treatment 
is initiated) is arguably a better option and a narrow range 
antibiotic would then be possible, since sensitivity could 
be checked. Maria was simply not treated for her medical 
problem. Any of the alternative treatment options would 
have been better. She was given reasons for non-treatment, 
but since she neither knew her options nor understood the 
reasons, this information did not help. Vicki was treated 
as requested, but not in the most medical risk-minimizing 
manner. 
Since there are different modes of treatment, 
different prescribing practices and practical and financial 
consequences of these, simply informing patient of the 
reasons for the chosen treatment fails to guarantee the 
"best treatment". If physicians are taken to be the 
authorities of what treatment is the best for a certain 
ailment in the case of each particular patient, then the 
"best" must be interpreted as "best medical" interest. As 
has been argued, it does not appear that the physicians, 
unencumbered by even the minimal requirement of informing 
their patients, chose the "best medical treatment for this 
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patient". Neither does it seem likely that the medical 
judgment will be greatly improved upon by patient 
involvement. Good, experienced physicians probably are the 
most likely sources of good medical judgment, though there 
may be some limited exceptions (e. g. , midwives, herbalists, 
chiropractors, nutritionists, physical therapists, health 
psychologists). 
Rather than simply trying to maximize the medical 
quality of care, the second goal or model of informed 
consent focuses on increasing patient control. Since some 
medical judgments are controversial, carrying different 
medical consequences (e. g. , side effects of drugs, impact on 
society, etc. ) as well as practical and financial 
consequences, patients who will bear these consequences 
ought to be involved in the deliberations over which option 
to choose. As discussed in the U. S. President's Commission 
Report (1982: 85-89) medical diagnosis and treatment is 
fraught with uncertainty in terms of incompleteness of 
medical knowledge, its application to particular cases, 
practitioners' personal knowledge limits and practitioners' , 
lack of familiarity with the very broad range of patients' 
life circumstances. Placing a heavier emphasis on autonomy, 
recognizing the controversy and uncertainty in medical 
treatment and the effect of medical definitions of illness 
and treatments on non-medical components of patients' lives, 
the second goal for informed consent emphasizes that 
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patients ought to choose from a knowledge of the 
alternatives and their consequences (cf., Burgess, 1 985). 
This is in fact the type of informed consent insisted upon 
by consumer- or patient-rights oriented groups (e . g., 
women's health groups who emphasize the choice of birth 
control rather than agreement to a physician ' s  
recommendation). 
That this goal is unfulfilled in the interactions 
is obv ious. But there is evidence in the interactions that 
the goal of promoting patient control would not be fulfilled 
by further disclosure. First, there is the widely 
recognized problem of patient comprehension of disclosed 
information (see discussion in Chapter I). This is 
demonstrated in the cases. Sheila did not ask why she 
should start a drug which she might need to discontinue in a 
few days. Maria probably did not understand why the 
physician considered her pain medication to be 
contraindicated . Vicki apparently failed to understand the 
physicians' hesitancy and their concern about malpractice . 
Second, it is not unreasonable to suggest that, even if they 
were informed regarding the alternatives and effects of 
their treatments, Sheila and Vicki, and perhaps Maria, would 
choose the options favored by their physicians. They are 
consulting these physicians by choice and thus have some 
degree of trust in the physicians' medical j udgments . 
Third, the patients are also consulting the physicians 
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because they believe themselves to be in need of medical 
care. The practical and financial differences for the 
patients are reasonably small, so the deciding factor may 
well be medical efficacy. Any expression of preference on 
the part of the physicians in such a context of ambiguity is 
at least possibly, if not likely, to be grasped as a medical 
reason to prefer that option. Finally, for such minor 
treatments, with these sorts of differences in effects of 
treatment, it is likely that most patients will generally be 
hesitant to request lengthy clarification. 
If the second goal of informed consent does not 
frequently res�lt in a practical difference, it may be a 
wasted effort. Perhaps only patients who are assertive 
enough to request the more detailed disclosure ought to be 
given it. For those who will predictably choose as the 
physician would suggest, perhaps the action is not 
unjustifiably paternalistic (cf. , Ackerman, 1982). If 
physicians are willing to take the responsibility for such 
decisions, and patients are willing to accept this 
arrangement, this could be construed as an implied 
"contract" whereby the patient consents to any treatment the 
physician believes is appropriate (cf. _, Veatch, 1972: 7; 
U. S. President' s Commission Report, 1982: 50-51). Such an 
arrangement would allow for the expedient delivery of 
medical care in such routine and minor cases as the three 
here considered. Certainly in these cases the physicians 
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intended only to dispense good medical care and the patients 
received medical care. 
It is not the purpose of this analysis to claim 
that the patients should have received different medical 
treatments. Nor are the consequences of the treatments 
enough to merit much ethical concern. Whether the reason 
patients agreed to treatment was based on trust of their 
physician and knowledge of the reasons for the recommended 
treatment (the first. social-normative goal), or knowledge of 
the alternatives and their consequences (the second 
social-normative goal) is not the crucial normative 
feature. Rather, the important feature is that perhaps 
surprisingly, even informed patients are likely . to accept 
uncritically physici ans' medical recommendations as 
authoritative and as completely constituted by medical 
considerations. In as much as this is an accurate depiction 
of physician-patient encounters, the basis of information 
which the patients possess is practically and ethically 
irrelevant. This is because the goal of informed consent, 
whether it is personal evaluation of physician's reasons for 
treatment or to promote patient choice is, generally 
speaking, undercut by patients' continued trust and respect 
of physicians. This dependence on physicians as authorities 
about what is in patients' interests is ill-founded because, 
as the social analysis of the three interactions 
demonstrated, the trusted medical practices are shaped by 
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social factors which may conflict with patients' interests, 
resulting in treatments which are probably no� even the best 
medical treatmen t, let alone most serving of patients' 
general interest s. Thus there is little reason, in defense 
of patient choice, to prefer full disclosure over simple 
disclosure of reasons for treatment or, for that matter, 
non-disclosure. 
There is, however, good reason to prefer full 
disclosure over partial or none, though it is not because it 
is likely to immediately increase patients' autonomy or 
control over their health. Rather, the third 
social-normative goal proposes that full disclosure of 
treatment options and consequences is important as part of 
an overall project to reduce the asymmetry of control in 
physician-patient encounters and to establish a more equal 
distribution of the responsibility for health. As the 
social analysis has shown, the professional practices of 
physicians are developed in a manner that is responsive to, 
and consequently supports, social factors which conflict 
with patients' medical or non-medical interests. What is 
learned are methods, "how to " diagnose and treat, or to seek 
medical care as an appropriate response to certain 
problems. The context of both the learning and the practice 
affects what methods are learned and used. The practices 
are not ethically problematic because of their intended 
purpose (i. e. , medical treatment). Nor is the issue that 
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medical practices uniquely reflect and reinforce social 
factors which do not explicitly enter into the encounters. 
The ethical objection is that due to medical authority, 
patients accept and participate in such practices and 
reinforce social factors both of which they might reasonably 
find objectionable. 
More specifically, the three women patients do not 
simply accept uncritically personal inconvenience, expense 
and the risks implied by the treatments. They also accept 
treatments which promote the pharmaceutical industry's 
manipulation of medical treatment (Sheila, Maria), the 
overuse of wide-range antibiotics (Sheila), the protection 
of fetal over maternal health (Maria), the use of 
financially disadvantaged patients for educational purposes 
(Vicki), the definition of illness in terms of 
work-performance (Maria), the control of access to 
specialists by medical professionals, and personal or 
professional values (Maria and Vicki). The last three of 
these factors in turn contribute to a double-standard in 
health care. This un intentional and uncritical 
participation in these social values is ethically 
problematic for two reasons. First, it is not explicitly 
consented to chosen. Patients accept medical care. They 
rarely consider the sorts of social practices and patterns 
they support by doing so. Physicians also are usually 
unwitting supporters of this social order. That they 
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benefit considerably by doing so does not establish moral 
blame . But their ability to more directly influence the 
practices which support these social values and effects does 
imply a degree of responsibility to work for change, once 
they are aware of the problem. 
Secondly, the formation of medical practice in 
response to these social factors constitutes a conflict of 
interest with that of patients . This conflict of interest 
is one to which patients have not consented, since they ar� 
unaware of it. The reason patients accept practices so 
influenced is that they have come to trust the authority of 
the medical profession. Members of the medical profession, 
of course, believe that they deserve this trust, though they 
do occasionally recognize that some of their professional 
interest and social connections conflict with that of 
patients or society (e.g., opposition to socialized health 
care, policy proposals regarding malpractice suits, 
increases in charges). But medical treatments are typically 
recommended by physicians because they believe them to be 
required, and accepted by patients because they trust 
physicians' judgments. The influence of the non-medical 
social factors on these practices is neither intended nor 
consented to . As such, these factors are not likely to 
become a part of the medical interaction even in the form of 
a disclosure in an informed consent procedure. 
It would be ludicrous to claim that prior to 
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medical treatment every patient must be given a 
Wittgensteinian analysis of the practices they are likely to 
participate in and then to ask if they still consent to the 
treatment. Not only would such an explanation be quite 
meaningless, it does not increase the patients' (or 
practitioners') alternatives within the interaction. There 
typically does not exist an interactional course of action 
�he physician or patient can engage in to avoid the 
influence and reinforcement of most of these social 
factors. Furthermore, they might not want a different 
treatment, and/or they may even support some of the social 
factors (e. g. , the influence of profit through 
pharmaceutical companies' efforts, justified on an 
"invisible hand" theory of economics). Informed consent is 
helpful in promoting personal responsibility, self-control 
of one's health and autonomy only when there are options. 
The most serious ethical problem is the unwitting, and 
"unconsented-to" participation in social forms which may be 
objectionable and/or conflict with patients' needs or 
interests. This problem exists due to the organization of 
medical practice within the structural constraints of 
society, and participation in ·it is accepted by patients 
(and propogated by physicians) due to the asymmetrical 
relations between physicians and patients, as well as 
between public and professional groups. This asymmetry, as 
has been discussed, is one of posses sion, by the 
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professional, of knowledge, access to diagnostic and 
treatment facilities or substances and the subsequent 
control of definition of illness, conditions of medical 
practice and even the structure of physician-patient 
encounter. 
Organizational/Structural Normative Analysis 
It might, of course, be objected that this 
analysis is drawing some very broad conclus ions based on 
three isolated cases. It is certainly accurate to claim 
that the analysis is most obviously applicable to the three 
cases, and perhaps to the typical practices of the three 
residents at that point in their careers � or perhaps to the 
particular unit during the few months the interactions were 
record ed. But there are good reasons to extend the 
analysis. 
First of all, the interactions are selected as 
parad igm cases of varying consequences. There are examples 
of this sort of paternalism in most, if not al l, of the 
interactions in the study from which these examples were 
taken (cf., Fisher, 1983, 1986; Fisher and Groce, 
forthcoming) . These cases are not unique, they are 
exemplary. But their relevance does not stop at being 
depictions of patterns expressed in the recorded interviews, 
nor only of the clinic at that time. 
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The interactional patterns are similar to those 
found in other analyses of medical interviews (Fisher, 1 979, 
1983, 1986: Fisher and Groce, forthcoming: Todd, 1983: 
Robillard, White and Maretzki, 1983: Frankel, 1983: Paget, 
1983: Waitzkin, 1983) as well as of other institutionally 
situated, non-medical, communicational events (Mehan, 1979: . 
Mehan, Fisher, �aroules, in press: cf. , Fisher and Todd, 
1986). The intelligibility and explanatory power of the 
presupposition-ascriptions which form the basis of the 
analysis depends in part on readers' �amiliarity with the 
practice of "making sense" of utterances and with the 
practices described. So the ·familiarity of the analysis of 
the social organization of medical practice throughout at 
least North American society lends credence to �ts accuracy 
as an account of routine medical p ractice in general. 
Finally, in as much as the analysis is "grounded" (cf. , 
"grounded theory, " Glaser and Strauss, 1 96 7 )  in other social 
analyses of medical (Freidson, 1970a, 1970b, 1973: Mechanic, 
1974: Parsons, 1951: Navarro, 1973: Conrad and Kern, 1978: 
Wait zk in, 1 9 83: Waitzk in and Waterman, 1 9 7 4 : Ehrenreich and 
Ehrenreich, 1 970: Ehrenreich and English, 1 ,1 s), 
institutional (Mehan, 1 979: Labov, 1972), and societal 
(Habermas, 1970: Parsons, 1 9 51: Marx, 1 964) accounts and 
theories, further credence is lent the analysis. 
Of course there are variations in organization of 
medical practice which may alter how or to what degree 
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specific social factors influence medical practices. For 
example, it is unlikely that reimbursement by an insurance 
company that is higher for one procedure than for another 
equally effective one would influence a salaried physician 
(cf. , Freidson's discussion of fee-for-service and 
group-practice settings, 1970a: 91-100). Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO' s) are responses to the rising cost of 
health-care for consumers and employers. A standard fee is 
paid in exchange for whatever medical attention an enrollee 
might require. Rather than any professional or group 
profiting from a more expensive procedure or group of tests, 
the HMO's profits are diminished by such practices. 
Although this is not always a social arrangement which 
serves patients' interests (cf. , Waitzkin and Waterman, 
1974: 92), it does affect the social analysis, requiring 
context-specific accounts of communication events and 
practices. Even patient assertiveness is an 
interaction-specific factor which qualifies the specific 
manifestations of particular practices (such as 
psychosomatic labelling of women' s complaints, cf. , 
Bernstein and Kane, 198 1 ;  cf. , Verbrugge and Steiner, 1981). 
The ethical claim is that the concern with the 
doctrine of informed consent as a means to promote and 
protect patient autonomy or participation and shared 
responsibility for health leads to a critique of routine 
medical practice. The pattern of routine medical practice 
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that is of concern is the complacency of physicians and 
patients in allowing social factors which conflict with 
patient interests to shape medical treatment, without 
patients' (or physicians' ) knowledge due to the asymmetry in 
physician-patient relations and communication. The 
ethically germane social factors in this pattern are: 
1. lack of informed consent to treatment, analyzed 
as due to--
2. the asymmetry of the physician-patient 
relationship, in which physicians may prescribe without 
patients' objecting or knowing that the medical practices 
are shaped by--
3. social factors which conflict with patients' 
medical need or practical and financial preferences. 
An ethical "program"  to respond to these issues 
must do much more than promote a standard of disclosure and 
patients' rights to choose their own treatment. The goal is 
to develop a context of health-care delivery in which 
professionals and patients come to a mutually acceptable 
treatment decision based on an understanding of medical, 
practical and financial alternatives and consequences. But 
such a goai is impeded by the organization of the 
physician-patient relationship as asymmetrical and the 
influence and reinforcement of ir relevant or 
patient-interest-conflicting social factors. The asymmetry 
must be balanced and the influence of those social factors, 
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or at least those which conflict with patient interests, 
must be eliminated or controlled. 
Just as the social analysis showed that the 
influence of the organizational or structural social factors 
on medical practice is manifested in concrete interaction, 
any effective response to those factors will need to address 
both levels. The influence of certain factors on medical 
settings may be dealt with in part by policy responses, and 
in part by interactional innovation. Consider the influence 
of pharmaceutical companies on physicians' prescribing 
practices, specifically through stocking clinics with 
samples. I argued in Chapter IV that Maria's non-treatment 
may have been influenced in this manner. The physician 
arrived with a drug sample which was contraindicated for 
pregnant or nursing mothers and, because Maria was pregnant, 
he did not dispense the drug, recommending over-the-counter 
medicine instead. A policy response could take a variety of 
forms. One form would be to forbid pharmaceutical companies 
from dispensing free samples. This would also decrease the 
cost of marketing such drugs. Another policy response would 
be to require that the physician prescribe before checking 
the availability of a sample, so that the decision would not 
be influenced by availability or supply by the 
pharmaceutical company. Either of these policies would 
probably have resulted in Maria receiving a prescription for 
a non-contraindicated drug, which she would need to fill at 
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her expense. The policies prevent the physician's possible 
concern over Maria's financial status, combined with sample 
availability, influencing his prescribing practice as it 
seems to have done in Maria's case. 
There are clearly controversial aspects of either 
policy response. While they are discussed, and other policy 
responses are considered, there are interactional responses 
which might equalize this social factor for Maria. If the 
physician were more expressive of his reasons for not 
prescribing the drug sample (protection of fetus) as well as 
his concern for Maria's expenses, and Maria were more 
assertive in negotiating her pain relief, a different 
outcome is predictable. One possiblity is the treatment of 
Maria's pain by prescribing a pain-relief medication which 
is not threatening to fetal health, avoiding the violation 
of the physician's conscience. Another would be that Maria 
insist on seeing a colleague of the phys ician who is not 
concerned with protecting the fetus but has a moral attitude 
more like Maria's. This physician could then dispense the 
sample medication. This latter response may also have the 
benefit of Maria's receiving the abortion information she 
requested. In this manner, as an interactional practice, 
informed consent has a role to play within the larger 
program. 
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The "New" Doctrine and Practice of Informed Consent 
The part that informed consent can play in a 
program to reduce the asymmetry of the physician-patient 
encounter (and its profession-public counter-part in the 
area of policy matters) and to promote shared 
profession-pati ent responsibility for health care (and 
health-related social issues), is two-fold. First, the 
practice of informed consent is to encourage those patients 
and/or physicians who already desire this "balancing" and to 
enable them to fulfill such goals as much as is now possible 
within the current social context of medical care. Second, 
the practice of informed consent may bring to patients' and 
physicians' attention the reasons for treating " routinely, " 
opening these to examination and thereby increasing both 
- professionals' and clients' discomfort with medical 
paternalism. 
It is important to realize that fulfi llment of the 
first task may undercut the goal expressed in the second. 
If all and only those patients who desired a detailed 
disclosure, and negotiation of their treatment with their 
physician received such care, there might be a considerable 
drop in the general sense and expression of frustration over 
such issues. Those who are not troubled by medical 
paternalism could go on allowing medical professionals to 
make decisions in their behalf. "Advocates, " "ethicists, " 
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and others who are working for a change in the practice of 
paternalism in medicine might then find that their audience 
is less receptive because they are more comfortable. If the 
only ethical concern were unconsented-to cases of medical 
paternalism, this might also fully respond to the ethical 
issue. 
As the preceding four chapters have endeavoured to 
establish, allowing (competent, mature, etc. ; autonomous) 
patients as much control over their medical care as they 
wish is not the only ethical concern. Patients who do not 
desire such autonomy are responding to, and reinforcing, 
medical paternalism and authority, both of which are 
generally overextended in unjustified ways. Th�se patients 
who do desire such control have their ethical claims 
strengthened and extended by the social analysis which 
identifies specifically that over which they have not 
previously had such control and why. That the asymmetry in 
knowledge, control of diagnostic and treatment modes and 
interactional ability to initiate and control topics is the 
method whereby undisclosed, and frequently unconsented to, 
treatment has been prescribed and accepted shows the need to 
share information in order to alter this lack of patient 
participation and contol. But it also shows that 
information alone is not enough. Interactional asymmetry 
can insert itself into the very process of informed consent 
which may then function as persuasion (Robillard, White, and 
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Maret zki, 1983). The organi zat ion and sett ing of the medical 
interview serve to reinforce this asymmetry, as do societal 
att itudes about illness, treatment and work (see Chapter 
IV ) . None of these are consented to by pat ients, nor can 
they be construct ively responded to by the doctrine of 
informed consent, as i t  is generally understood. 
Medical professional control of treatment and 
diagnost ic opt ions is not only interact ionally expressed 
through non-disclosure, but i t  is also more effect ively 
controlled through professional dominance and cultural 
authori ty (Freidson, 1970a, 1970b; Mechanic, 1974; Conrad 
and Kern, 1981; Wai t zkin, 1983; Wai t zkin and Stoekle , 1976; 
Wait zkin and Waterman, 1974; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 
1970; Ehrenreich and English, 1978; Starr, 1982; Stevens, 
1971; Navarro, 1976; Fisher, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986 ) I t  is 
far beyond any reasonable expectat ion of informed consent 
that individual pat ients will be capable of challenging this 
control, much less the social factors which affect the 
format ion of treatment pract ices and are in conflict with 
the interests of pat ients. Nevertheless, awareness of such 
format ive factors gives further ethical grounds to quest ion 
the reason for specific medical treatment recommendat ions 
and to insist on act ive part icipat i9n in their choice and 
construct ion. 
Not only do such considerat ions strengthen ·claims 
to informed consent in the sense described above, but they 
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extend the ethical claim beyond that of a right to informed 
consent. What is mandated by this analysis is patient and 
public participation in the (re-)organization of medical 
interviews and practice. Non-medical factors which affect 
patients' medical options, participation in medical 
decisions and eventually the non-medical aspects of their 
lives ought to be scrutinized by "patients " in the form of 
public or political criticism of the organization and 
institutional goals of medicine. Of course, such ·directive 
action by professional and non-professional groups also 
implies shared ethical responsibility for the consequences 
of the choices . 
The second purpose of informed consent (cf., page 
69) is to increase patients' and the "public's " 
understanding of the ambiguities of medical practices, as 
well as the influence of non-medical social factors on 
treatment decisions and general medical practice. Such an 
increased awareness will result in an increase in the 
discomfort with medical paternalism and with the asymmetry 
of both medical interviews and professional-public 
discussions of health-care or medical-institution related 
issues. This di�comfort may also increase among medical 
practitioners, so that they will seek more and 
better-informed patient input in medical interviews and 
public input into broader issues. Of course, such threats 
to professional autonomy (the freedom of the profession to 
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define both the context and conditions of its practice) have 
historically been heavily resisted (Freidson, 1970a, 1970b, 
Starr, 1982; Stevens, 1971). This resistance has no effect 
on the normative force of the current argument that patients 
ought to be more aware of these conflicts of interest and 
share in policy, institutional and treatment decisions. The 
profession' s past political resistance may forecast that 
some of these issues will become political-economic 
battles. Since these discussions will make normative and 
empirical claims regarding professional and patient rights 
and obligations, they too are extensions of the present 
discussion of normative goals and social critique. 
More specifically, the normative concerns 
supporting the doctrine and practice of informed consent 
also support other recommendations for social change in the 
organization of medical practice. Among these social 
concerns are the dernedicalization of social problems, the 
reduction of profit-motivated influences, the reduction of 
professional control over medical treatment, a more 
"rational " division o f  labor and an increase in public 
participation in the structuring of the "conditions " of 
medical practice (including considerations of allocation of 
research and development funds, development of health-care 
delivery systems, access to technology, geographical 
distribution of medical professionals, etc. ) Each of these 
have been discussed at length in medical sociological and 
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political literature, but the normative basis for their 
necessity is rarely discussed. 
The U. S. President's Commission report (1982) 
recognizes that the normative concern for joint 
decision-making in medical treatment leads to considerations 
of legal, educational and economic dimensions of health 
care. The Commission suggests that hospitals, professional 
schools, courts and legislatures must reflect this concern 
for ethically valid consent (U. S. President's Commission 
Report, 1982: 1-5, 102-111, Part 3). Correctly perceiving 
that the education and socialization of health care 
professionals, legal standards and method of payment 
influences physician-patient encounters, the Commission's 
suggestions are primarily organizational. While the 
concentration on the context of medical care is a 
considerable improvement, there may be other organizational 
factors, as well as structural, which reinforce the 
Commission's targeted-for-change organizational factors and 
their effects on medical encounters. 
The social analysis in Chapter IV established that 
structural factors influence the organization and practice 
of medicine, and makes patients' compliance more 
intelligible to the analyst. There are many medical 
sociologists and social critics who focus on structural 
criticism and change. I will now examine some of their 
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claims, illustrating their relevance to the ethical concerns 
underlying my normative social goal of informed consent. 
Demedicalization is a term used by several social 
theorists in calling for dif ferent sorts of change . Ivan 
Illich (1975: 37) criticizes the medical care industry as 
therapeutically ineffective as well as stimulating the 
overuse of  the medical system resulting in patients who 
search out a technological response to their social 
problems . As he is so well known for doing, Illich argues 
for personal and public scrutiny, legal licensing of  
professionals as a means of assuring adequate health care 
(Illich, 1975: 121) . Health, for Illich, is a thing for 
which each individual has personal responsibility (cf . ,  
Illich, 1975: 167-169) . 
Vincente Navarro argues that Illich is wrong, that 
it is not industr ialization which is responsible for 
manipulating people's in6reasing consumption of  medical 
care . Rather, the "capitalist mode of production and 
consumption" stimulates "commodity fetishism" which is a 
necessary condition of the capitalist production system 
(Navarro, 1976: 112) . Navarro summarizes that "addiction and 
dependency on consumption, " or medicalization in the 
health-industry sector is the result of  the capitalist 
socio-economic system which: 
requires for its survival (a) the creation of  
wants, however artifical or absurd they may be,. 
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(b) the existence of a passive and "massified" 
population of consumers, and (c) the replication 
of consumer ideology whereby the consumer is 
judged not by what he � (his work) but by what 
he has (his consumption). Within that system, the 
citizen, the consumer, is made to believe that his 
fulfillment depends in large degree on his 
consumption, be it of drugs, pills, prescriptions, 
cosmetics and whatever else may be required for 
his fitness, well being, and pursuit of 
happiness. (Navarro, 1976: 113). 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich note how medical 
practice has shifted from professionals practicing medicine 
to medical institutions educating, "researching", profiting 
and providing medical services. They argue that the 
increased dependence on technology of post-war medical 
practice resulted in greater dependence on hospital 
facilities, increasing physicians ' dependency on hospitals 
for expensive technology and support personnel and 
increas ing the need for third-party financial support of 
medical care and equipment. Most of the public funding 
plans (e.g., Blue Cross, commercial health insurance, 
Medicare, the federal Hill-Burton program) financed 
hospitals exclusively, or in addition to physicians 
{ Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1970: 29-39 ; cf., Stevens, 1971: 
274-275, 509-5 13 ; Starr, 1982: 347-351, 374-378) . This 
independence and institutionalization of the health care 
system has resulted in concerns other than health care (i.e . ,  
technology, training, and profit) shaping medical practice . 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, stating the thesis of their book, 
claim that "the American health system is not in business 
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for people's heaith" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1970 ; vi). 
If their analysis is at all accurate, much medical care is 
influenced or directed by these concerns which conflict with 
patients' medical needs. As Illich and Navarro have also 
claimed, "medicalizing" need, or defining certain health or 
social problems as in need of medical care or technology, 
results in inappropriate responses to patients' needs from 
which institutions and sometimes medical professionals 
benefit in terms of payment, public demand for funding, and 
increased role in directing public and private policy. 
Howard Waitzkin (1983) is also critical of the 
medicalization of social problems and the influence of 
non-health concerns of a capitalist economic arrangement. 
He suggests that the rapidly growing concern with the 
financial burden of health care can be adequately analyzed 
only when "the connections between the health sector and the 
struc ture of the capitalist system " are recognized 
{Waitzkin, 1983: 89). The power of technological medicine, 
combined with the pseudo-objectivity of medical science, 
inspire hope among professionals, politicians and the public 
for a value-free, effective and individualized response . 
Responding to such issues as sexual dysfunction, family 
discord, depression in the work place, adjustment problems 
relative to stages of life {i . e . ,  child-rearing, 
adolescence, aging, etc.), educational problems, and the 
like, medicalization removes the desire or need for 
250 
individuals and groups to take responsibility for social 
change {Waitzkin, 1983: 41). 
All of these authors agree that current Western 
medical practice fails to meet certain medical needs 
{especially Illich and Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich), mitigates 
personal responsibility for health {especially Illich and 
Waitzkin), and prevents recognition and organization to 
confront social issues {especially Navarro, Ehrenreich and 
Ehrenreich, Waitzkin). They also agree that the mechanism 
through which these social facts are accomplished, and 
conceded, is through medicalization of people's problems and 
desires. Medicalization defines problems or desires as an 
event happening .t.,Q a person, to be treated by medical 
professionals and institutions in a manner as minimally 
disrupting of the social order as posible, usually through 
prescribing some technological treatment to which patients 
only have access through the medical profession. They 
further agree that this medicalization serves the interests 
of the larger social order, often not that of patients. 
Professionals, institutions, industry and corporations all 
gain profit from such a process. Medicalization of 
patients' problems and desires, as well as their creation by 
definition and marketing, occurs and is sustained because it 
serves these purposes, not because it serves patients well, 
or even in some cases, adequately. 
Note that the analyses are of the social context, 
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albeit a large and diverse one. The breadth of the context 
makes generalization or description more defeasible. But 
the argument that no one in the "system" acts with corporate 
profit or market control as an intention, if accurate, does 
not defeat the description. It is, as was discussed in 
Chapter II, a "scenic" description of the context within 
which practices are formed, institutionalized and 
sustained. The description is of methodological assumptions 
which shape the practices. Their description is akin to 
Coulter' s presupposition-ascription in that they make more 
intelligible the particular organization and practice of 
medical care. 
Though different in their specific 
recommendations, these authors are members of a group of 
sociologists and political theorists who agree that a 
complete analysis of problems in the delivery of health care 
must include an examination of the effects of structural 
level factors of cultural-economic-political arrangement s. 
Since these structural factors describe part of the context 
within which medical institutions and practices are formed, 
they may reasonably be expected to shape the medical 
institutions and practices. Having become practices in a 
social setting which emphasizes or limits concerns such as 
profit, responsible employee behavior, prestigious 
conditions of work, technological innovation, etc. , medical 
diagnosis and treatment reflect the influence of structural 
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factors and reinforce their assumption as acceptable 
normative principles. 
Medical practice is not unique in this, but 
neither is it exempt. Patients' acceptance and physicians' 
prescriptions of medical definitions and treatments are each 
based on the acceptance and legitimacy of medical 
authority. But this authority is not legitimately extended 
to cover non-medical aspects of patients' lives, nor to 
choosing to support social factors which are ir relevant to 
or conflict with patients' health. Informed consent , if it 
is a doctrine whose practice is to result in patients' 
effective responsibility for their whole lives, and shared 
responsiblity with medical professionals for health-issues, 
requires that we further analyze the definitions and control 
of these aspects of people's lives through medical 
practice. 
A carefully implemented practice of informed 
consent is not likely to result in more than a very limited 
extension of patients' actual exercise of autonomy. 
Recognizing that this is due to the social context of 
implementation leads to consideration of medical paternalism 
and cultural authority as expressed in interactional 
asymmetry. Examining the social and historical basis for 
these interactionally manifested factors brings into focus 
the fact that medical authority, practice and institutions 
are, to a great extent, constituted by social factors which 
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are either not germane to, or actual ly conflict with health 
care. Informing patients of this social analysis is both 
impractical and ethical ly irrelevant. Patients who were 
made aware of this analysis could not do much differently 
individual ly, in terms of their own treatment, than could 
those who are simply fully informed of the medical options 
and consequences. 
There is, however, much that can be done publicly 
outside of the medical interviews. For example, recognition 
that certain issues, such as stress and depression in the 
work place, are not individual-medical problems but social 
problems may encourage organizat ion of workers for social 
change rather than their division into private patients. 
Perhaps pressure from organized patient groups, or from 
malpractice suits, wil l  result in future Sheilas 
contemplating non�treatment, requesting a cheaper, generic 
drug, or negotiating access to an antibiotic to be taken 
only if the screen is positive and her symptoms worsen. 
Future Marias might have easier access to abortion 
information and pain medication, as well as be able to get 
paid time ofD of work so that her leg can heal less 
painfully. Perhaps Vicki, at a "better" time, might choose 
not to have her moles removed, or not have to be concerned 
with whether she can afford the least hazardous location and 
practitioner. At least her choice of specialist should not 
be made out of a sense of financial handicap. 
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Physicians also stand to benefit by such changes. 
Sheila's physician could share the responsibility of 
unnecessary treatment versus adequate care, rather than 
devising elaborate schemes to cover all the concerns. 
Maria's physician could simply consider Maria's leg pain, or 
could freely express his concern over fetal health, 
negotiating with Maria or referring her to a colleague. 
Perhaps he would never encounter her, if -the time off work 
was permitted without endorsement of Maria's need by a 
physician, and abortion information were more accessible. 
Vicki's physician could not be caught in the middle of 
concern over adequate patient care and the need for surgical 
experience, if he were more adequately prepared . or Vicki did 
not need to be concerned about money. 
The doctrine of informed consent is a practical 
attempt to extend patients' autonomy in medical encounters 
in a mannner that gives them control over the non-medical 
aspects of their lives and results in their sharing 
responsibility for medical issues with the medical 
professionals. But the asymmetry of medical interviews 
prevents the goal from being achieved, since it results in 
patients' and physicians' uncritical acceptance of routine 
medical treatment, and conceals the non-medical factors 
which exercise considerable influence on what practices 
become routine in medical settings, as well as in the home, 
work place, etc. The normative goals of informed consent, 
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requiring the expressions of autonomy mentioned above, 
cannot be fulfilled simply by instituting the practice. 
Explicit disclosure of the reasons for treatment decisions 
or diagnostic procedures increases the visibility of 
non-medical considerations, and raises the possiblity of 
questioning the more basic assumptions which reflect the 
presupposit ions of the practices ' formation and use. The 
more abstract social analysis of the organization of medical 
practice and its institutionalization within the structure 
of society are now more obviously relevant. Now it is more 
feasible for patients to recognize the concrete effects and 
manifestations of medicalization, pursuit of profit, 
technology, etc. Furthermore, though the analysts are not 
in agreement on appropriate political recommendations, the 
relevance of social organization and political-economic 
factors would more adequately be dealt with by an educated 
public. 
Implications of combined social/Normative Analysis 
Informed consent and medical paternalism are only 
two of the complex issues which arise in discussions of 
medical ethics. Other issues could also be treated in a 
similar fashion. The issues of abortion, genetic 
manipulation and reproductive technologies should be 
examined in the context of medicalization of sexuality and 
reproduction. Much of these technologies and treatments 
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reflect non-medical issues, the promotion of technology and 
profit, and the concealing of personal and social problems 
(cf. , Daly, 1978; Fisher, 1979; Gordon, 1974; Ehrenreich and 
English, 1978; Scully, 1980; Scully and Bart, 1973; Todd, 
1982). Issues in definitions of mental health and illness, 
involuntary commitment and modes of treatment quite 
obviously connect with social control (cf. , Chesler, 1972; 
Szasz, 196 1). The effect of financial status on place and 
mode of treatment or the emphasis on suicide prevention 
rather than examination of high risk groups' socially caused 
distress reflect individual istic-interventionistic 
approaches rather than entertaining the need for 
socio-economic change. Euthanasia, non-treatment, refusal 
of life-saving treatment, definitions of death, artificial 
organs, and organ transplants should be discussed in a 
context of the marketability, and thus profit-creation and 
medicalization, of death-avoidance. 
Of course, patients and practitioners must respond 
to these issues today, in the current context of medical 
care. Policy decisions, such as allocation of research and 
development funds, affect the options which will be 
available to future physicians and patients. The social 
analysis may, in the short term, suggest non-medical, or 
less technological medical responses to problems which 
patients bring to physicians. But the initiative to make 
personal changes in promotion of health, and to organize for 
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social change, might not be completely undermined by a 
medical-technological response if analysts, professionals 
and patients are more cognizant of the influence of the 
social context. 
Some of the most resourceful organizing and 
fund-raising groups today are those organized around the 
cause of disease research and t reatment. It is the 
rnedicalization of the social processes which results in 
these groups' being mouthpieces and fund-raisers for medical 
research and treatmen t. They are also suppor t  groups for 
victims of disease and their loved ones. Perhaps a more 
comprehensive social analysis could guide these groups into 
const ructive organization around social issues such as 
reducing costs of t reatment , channelling research money and 
alternative ways of accepting and accommodating handicap and 
death. 
I have argued that a social analysis increases the 
normative force of ethical claims and recommendations, 
broadens their scope and effectiveness , and unites as well 
as increases the effectiveness of case and policy 
approaches. Concrete exploration of how ethical problems 
ar ise in medical interactions leads to reflection on the 
legitimacy of the social processes which contribute to the 
constitution of the ethical problem. Recognizing the 
complexity of the social setting within which these 
processes are formed and practiced, it is reasonable to 
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consider what social factors have affected the formation of 
the social processes and practices. These social factors 
may, in turn, be subjected to normative analysis. There is, 
as has been shown, good reason to be suspicious of medical 
practice for reasons of efficacy as well as propagation of 
undesirable, unhealthy or unethical social effect s. 
Recommendations in medical ethics, or any other 
area of applied ethics, need to be integrated and 
graduated. Particular and immediate ethical problems, while 
clarified by the social analysis, may or may not greatly 
benefit in terms of increased options or normative clarity. 
In Maria's case it is evident that she had options of which 
she was not aware (insist on a prescription, ask for a 
referral) and which social analysis might raise. Vick i or 
her physician might have chosen an experienced dermatologist  
if either had known that it would not cost  more than the 
family practice resident, and if they had known of time and 
equipment factors. It is not obvious that Sheila or her 
physician would have been aided by the social analysis. 
Note, however, that a more complete disclosure of the 
options and reasons for choosing them would accomplish these 
immediate goals. 
Considering the medicalization of needs raises a 
different set of ethical recommendations, although not ones 
wh ich help these pat ients now. Recognizing that personal or 
social needs are often medicalized, we can see the need for 
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those in Maria's situation to receive paid sick leave which 
would reduce or avoid her need for medication . Vicki's 
cosmetic concerns may reasonably be responded to by her 
talking about it to someone in her life who is making her 
self-conscious. She may, of course, decide to have the 
moles removed anyway. This raises the perhaps ethical 
question of whether such a medical response to cosmetic 
dissatisfaction ought to be covered by a privately or 
publicly funded insurer. The ethical analysis of these 
issues leads to recommendations for change in minimum 
cond itions of employment and in appropriate responses, 
whether they are personally or publicly financed, to 
cosmetic desires . 
Sheila receives antibiotics for a sore throat, 
poss ibly due to strept infection. If this is so easily 
d iagnosed and routinely treated, why do Sheila and her 
physician need to engage in this interview? Control of 
diagnosis and access to treatment by the medical profession 
may be an inefficient arrangement. Such medical care can 
and has been delivered by nurse practitioners . Once in a 
medical interview with a physician, patients are most 
directly affected by the asymmetry and there is almost no 
limit to the time, information and tests which physicians 
may demand . A vis it to a "technician, " who has limited 
tasks of diagnosis and treatment may not only be more 
efficient in  terms of patients' and physicians' time, but it 
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avoids unnecessarily subjecting patients to the 
inconvenience and personal invasiveness that medical 
interviews may promote. Physicians, especially those in 
family practice, would benefit in conservation of time and 
effort for more complicated tasks. The recommendation at 
this level is for a rearrangement of the organization of 
primary care within the hierarchy of medical professionals. 
Some would object that patients need practitioners 
who will be concerned with their general health. For Vicki, 
this does not seem assured by her going to a physician. For 
Maria, this is quite obviously not achieved. Perhaps 
recommendations of a team approach would have been more 
helpful for Maria. A social or psychological professional 
might pursue the fact that Maria has a history of abortions 
which is not a healthy practice for her. But this 
medicalizes what is probably a social problem for Maria. The 
presence of a health-psychologist in the setting did not 
help Maria, since the physician also controls access to this 
resource. Two ethical recommendations arise from these 
social facts. One is the increased use of support 
professionals in the medical setting. However, since this 
does contribute to the medicalization of sexuality and 
reproduction (which is taken here, for the sake of argument, 
to be "unhealthy" and perhaps unethical) a second 
recommendation is the provision and promotion of non-medical 
sources of such information and service. 
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As the recommendations broaden in scope, two 
further social factors affect their effective 
implementation. First as the scope of social organization 
increases, the group (s) to which it must be addressed 
becomes broader and more diverse. With this increase in 
scope comes an increase in reasons for opposition. Some 
employers do not want to pay workers for sick-time, family 
physicians do not want to give up the routine treatment of 
simple maladies, the medical profession does not want to 
publish charges and information of experience, and patients 
tend to want to consult physicians for even their simple or 
questionably medical needs. This set of social 
circumstances provides opposition to the broader ethical 
recommendations. Social analysis of why this opposition 
exists leads to the influence of profit, prestige and 
professional autonomy on medical practice. This level of 
social analysis generates yet another set of ethical 
recommendations. 
The broader ethical recommendations are 
necessarily harder to implement and more likely to meet 
opposition. they are also more dependent on the accuracy of 
the social analysis. As discussed in Chapter I I, less 
context-specific descriptions are less dependable because 
they cannot account for context-specific elements. It is 
for this reason that such recommendations run the risk of 
being too general and ineffective, or wrong, and thus having 
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undesirable or even unethical effects on the interaction. 
This problem can be (fallibly) responded to by breadth of 
discussion of the analyses and by constant reference to the 
interactional level. Reductions in controversy over points 
of a social analysis through discussion with other analysts 
capitalizes on inter-subjectivity and breadth of 
experience. Medicalization of social and personal needs i s  
perceived as problematic by analysts who disagree on the 
social analysis of why it exists. Reflecting on 
interactional manifestations of medicalization gives further 
empirical support to this factor' s influence on medical 
practice and patients' attitudes. 
Ethical and social analysts must also guard 
against paternalism. Recommendations for re-organization of 
medical practice or of other institutions embody compromises 
of interests which cannot always be decided through ethical 
deliberation. Decisions of allocation of funds toward 
reproductive technologies have implications for the quality 
of life of individuals. The provision of more basic health 
needs (nutrition, shelter, etc. ) take ethical priority over 
such medicalized responses to infertility, due to their 
being basic to pursuit of any quality of life. But if such 
needs are adequately provided for, then decisions of what 
quality-of-life enhancing options to pursue, questions of 
equal access aside, are less ethical than a matter of 
personal or social preference. Compared to other items in a 
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national budget, these may collectively be of greater or 
lesser importance. Such decis ions on behalf of ind ividuals 
ought to be made by them in as democratic a manner as is 
possible . But this too implies a critique of the current 
irrational "system" of allocation of health resources and 
priorities (Waitzk in, 1983: Chapter Four; Ehrenreich and 
Ehrenreich, 1970: especially 19-20, 191-198) .  
A combined social-normative analys is clarifies the 
eth ical problems at var ious levels of complication of social 
organization, starting with the phys ician-patient 
interaction and conclud ing with criticism of pol itical and 
economic structures. The normative analys is of the more 
concrete eth ical problems actually gains force from the 
social analys is . Recognition of the concrete manifestations 
of eth ical problems based on broader social analyses 
increases the ir support as accurate normative and social 
analyses. An integrated social-normative analysis is 
necessary to ver ify accuracy and to construct effective 
recommendations. Failure to integrate interactional 
recommendations with the broader recommendations will result 
in only short-term change wh ich will accommodate rather than 
challenge the social production of the eth ical problems. 
Failure to integrate the broader recommendations will result 
in ineffective, undesirable or uneth ical effects on the 
interactions among people. 
The necessity of a social-normative analysis in 
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medical ethics has several implications for the role of the 
applied philosopher in medical ethics (hereafter referred to 
as "medical ethicist"). First, and most obvious, this type 
of analysis reaffirms the already widely acknowledged claim 
that medical ethics is an interdisciplinary effort. More 
specifically, health-care professionals, philosophers, 
sociologists, political theorists, economists, 
administrators, politicians and representatives of public 
opinion all have a contribution to make. Obviously, 
different levels of analysis and recommendations will 
require the relevant contribution from different people. 
But as a philosopher, the medical ethicist ought to be able 
to engage in such interdisciplinary endeavors, at least as a 
member of the community of applied philosophers who may draw 
on colleagues' expertise. 
The second implication is due to the need for 
medical ethicists, or at least some members of that academic 
community, to have access to medical professional-patient 
interaction. For reasons discussed in Chapter II, recording 
these interviews greatly enhances the analysis. Clearly, 
this requires some relation with a medical practitioner or 
institution. Within this setting, the ethicist will need to 
be concerned with the most concrete of recommendations and 
policy. Whenever the context of the delivery, or its 
practitioners, are criticized, it is important that the 
social production of the problem (how it came about or why 
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it arose) be emphasized so that whatever practitioners, 
patients or administrators are able to do to avoid the 
problem's recurrence is clear. Malicious actions ought not 
simply be condemned but features of the setting which 
permitted or encouraged the action should be critiqued. 
Third, recommendations for change in the 
organization of medicine require that the ethicist convince 
medical professionals, administrators, patients and others 
affected or in a position of power that there exists an 
ethical need . and of the social advantage of the change. 
Careful social analysis ought to aid this effort, though 
social change is often not responsive to careful analysis as 
much as to emotional appeal. Encouraging such practices as 
informed consent, however, may stimulate enough suspicion 
and frustration among health professionals and patients that 
these groups might be more interested in education and 
social change. Once again, a familiarity with, and 
illustration of, the analysis through medical interviews is 
a better and more convincing analytic basis. Case studies, 
policy discussions, issue-oriented seminars ought to provide 
both immediate responses to the ethical issues, while 
emphasizing that the response is limited in effectiveness 
and ought not be treated as a final answer or panacea (cf., 
Burgess, 1985 ; Burgess and Wylie, 1985). 
Fourth, in recognition of the homogeneity of the 
medical professions, the class structure of society and 
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their own academic membership, medical ethicists ought to 
call for and facilitate the public's involvement in ethical 
and policy discussions and decisions. Emphasizing the 
ethical reasons for countering medical paternalism with 
patient/public participation and shared responsibility, 
ethicists should provide meditil professionals and 
institutions with the social analysis which shows their 
prudential advqntage in this approach over full 
responsibility ; litigation, legislation, and complete 
control (cf., · starr, 1982 ; Waitzkin, 1983). 
Fifth, wh��e social or political action 
(organizing, campaigning, lobbying, etc.) is required, 
those medical ethicists who are involved with medical 
institutions ought to call medical professionals to fulfill 
their social-ethical obligations in promoting public 
health. In recommending or directing such action, medical 
ethicists ought to create a social description of the 
desired changes in both the social organization and of the 
medical interview. If the connections between the 
recommended social change and the ethically mandated change 
in the medical encounter cannot be explained in detail, the 
analysis is weak, and the recommendations not well 
supported . 
Sixth, a single medical ethicist clearly cannot 
fulfill all of the above duties with equal facility. 
Rather, cooperation with academic, professional, political 
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and public  communit ies is required. It is the analys is as 
an integrated soc ial-normat ive assessment of what soc ial 
changes are required , and its interd isc iplinary essence, 
which the med ical ethics community can most adequately 
fulfill. It is at such an end that this d issertation is 
aimed. 
F inally , as . philosophers , med ical ethic ists ought 
to engage their philosophical colleagues in critic iz ing and 
improving on the ethi cal and epistemological foundations of 
this endeavor. Further d iscuss ion into the analys is of 
human action along the lines suggested by Jeff Coulter 
(1979) and outl ined in Chapter II  may a id efforts in applied 
eth ics and , combined with soc ial analysis , may complicate 
and challenge not ions in trad itional ethics and 
meta-ethics. The emphasis  on soc ial contexts as 
constrain ing but not determining people's behav ior raises 
the issue of freedom and moral responsibility. The 
applicat ion of the normative sub-d isc ipline of ethics in 
soc ial contexts suggests that there ought to be a 
theoretical br idge between ethical and soc ial-political 
philosophy. This theoretical development might assist the 
understanding of the normat ive connections here posited on 
the basis of a model soc ial analysis . 
In affirming these philosophical roots , it is also 
interesting to note how d ifferent areas of appl ication of 
ethics have resulted in d ifferent types of approaches. For 
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example, medical ethics is frequently treated as if quite 
different from business ethics, partly on the notion that 
medicine is a "profession " and that business is a pursuit of 
profit in exchange for goods or services. As this analysis 
has shown, this distinction does not run very deep. 
Philosophers in different areas of application should be 
cautious not to assume that the considerations in one area 
are inapplicable to another. This is quite obvious as the 
analysis broadens. 
Conclusion 
Assuming that one of the objectives of medical 
ethics is effective recommendations, I have argued that a 
social analysis is required to understand the occurrence of 
ethical problems. Arguing for the superiority of an 
ethnomethodological over a cognitive or intentional model of 
analysis, I have shown that the normative analysis and 
recommendations are best directed at elements of the social 
context over which actors have the most control. By 
extending the social analysis to better understand the 
social constitution of the ethically problematic actions I 
argued for further ethical recommendations and additional 
support for the normative analysis. But the social analysis 
also shows the limitations or inadequacies of the 
interactional-level recommendations. Consequently, it is 
2 6 9  
important that more normatively adequate goals be set as 
part of an overall program. Immediate-interactional 
recommendations must be carefully devised so as to 
stimulate, rather than conceal, the need for further change 
in the organization of the practice of medicine, as well as 
in the structural elements of society which promote 
unethical practices. 
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APPENDIX 
University of Tennessee 
consent to Act As Human subject 
Consent to Act As Human Subject 
Subject' s Name: ___________________ _ 
Date: ________________________ _ 
This study examines, for research and educational 
purposes, how doctors and patients communicate. 
I. I hereby authorize Sue Fisher and the assistant 
selected by her to gather information in the 
following ways: 
a) to audio-tape, video-tape and observe 
interactions between my physician and I ;  
b) to review my medical records; 
c) to conduct interviews with my attending 
physician. 
II. I hereby authorize Sue Fisher and the assistant 
selected by her to use these tapes and this 
information to teach residents about 
communicational skills. 
III. I understand that the information-gathering 
techniques described in Paragraphs I and II hold 
the potential to enhance doctors' and patients' 
abilities to communicate with each other. 
IV. I understand that my confidentiality will be 
protected by removing my name and all other 
personally identifying information from all 
teaching and reserching materials obtained by 
audio-taping, video-taping and observing the 
the interactions between my physician and I. 
v. I understand that Sue Fisher and the assistant 
selected by her will answer any inquiries I may 
have at any time concerning the information­
gathering techniques. 
VI. I understand that my participation in the study 
is voluntary and that I may terminate it at any 
time with no risk to my doctor/patient relationship 
or to the quality of care I am receiving. 
Subject' s Signature 
Witness _________________ _ 
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